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INTRODUCTION: ARE SOME MEMBER STATES MORE 
EQUAL THAN OTHERS? 
 
…Seven social sins: 
Politics without Principles, 
Wealth without work, 
Pleasure without conscience, 
Knowledge without character, 
Commerce without morality, 
Science without humanity and 
Worship without sacrifice 
 
Mahatma Ghandi (1925) 
 
oes a member state’s administrative capacity affect the amount of influence obtained at the 
European level? In the European policy-making process, member states (MS) have ample 
opportunities to voice their constituents’ concerns within the Council of Ministers. Ideally, we 
would expect MS influence to be a natural consequence from their activities within the Council. 
Recent studies that inquired into the different tactics and strategies employed by MS in the 
different Council meetings have uncovered substantial variation among the MS.  1  
This evidently raises questions about the causes of the uncovered variation between MS. What 
makes it that some MS dispose of the required expertise to engage in arguing? Why can some MS 
derive a position much faster? What determines their ability to engage in coalition-building? 
Research inquiring into these causes has only just begun to scrape the surface. Size – be it political 
or economic- is the most straightforward explanatory factor forwarded in the literature, but also 
characteristics of the administration are often suggested as potential explanations. The limited 
information on member states’ administrations does not need to surprise as detailed comparative 
research on the domestic coordination process of European policy is scarce. Ever since the edited 
volumes by Kassim, Peters, and Wright (2000) and Kassim et al. (2001) were published, few 
                                                     
1  Dür & Mateo (2010) for example studied the application of soft and hard bargaining strategies; Tallberg (2008) and 
Haverland & Liefferink (2012) point at expertise-based arguing, whereas other scholars, such as Naurin & Wallace (2008), 
emphasised the importance of coalition-building. Finally, Diana Panke (2011) constructed an additive indicator based on 
fifteen actions that have been associated with the attainment of influence in the Council. 
D 
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studies appeared that engaged in a systematic comparison of how MS derive and coordinate their 
position on European Union (EU) policy.2 Even fewer scholars combined a detailed analysis of 
the functioning of the domestic administration, with the activities and influence achieved in the 
Council and its preparatory working groups.  
In this dissertation, I therefore aim to address the following research question. Does a member 
state’s administrative capacity affect the amount of influence obtained at the European level? 
1. Endogenous information asymmetry and control 
To understand the relation between the member states as represented in the Council and the 
European Commission, the Principal-Agent (PA) model will be applied. This model studies the 
delegation of authority from a principal to an agent, whereby the latter acts on behalf of the 
former. To ensure the agent operates in the interest of the principal, control mechanisms are put 
in place. Such control is only partial, as the principal can only monitor the outcome and not the 
actions of the agent. Information asymmetry between agent and principal thus explains why the 
agent can deviate from the principal’s interests. The model is well-suited to enhance our 
understanding of the relation between the member states-as-principals and the Commission-as-
agent because it places the highly institutionalised decision-making process that characterises the 
EU at its heart. 
Existing applications of the PA-model in EU studies often focus on the Council as a collective 
principal. In so-doing, individual MS does not really matter unless they are able to shape the 
Council’s actions. However, to address the research question outlined above, it is important that 
the model enables differentiation among the MS. The critical challenge lies in contesting the 
nature of Council-Commission interaction: can the MS individually exert control over the 
Commission, or can they only act under collective agreement? Once the toolbox of multiple 
(rather than collective) principal(s) can be unlocked, we can address the research question 
formulated above by integrating insights from negotiation theory and public administration into 
the PA framework.  
The main argument, thus, goes as follows: in a context of multiple (competing) principals, each 
MS signals their preferences to the agent. Such signals can range from indicating a red line during 
                                                     
2 While several authors have focused on a comparison between two or three countries (see e.g. Schout and Jordan 2008), 
almost none did so for all EU member states. One exception, is the work by Gärtner, Hörner, and Obholzer (2011) who 
expanded the analysis of Kassim (2003) to include the newer member states. 
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a meeting to organizing a personal meeting with the responsible Commission official. The 
frequency or intensity that member states provide such signals is a recurrent subject of inquiry in 
negotiation theory. By applying a signalling approach, we can easily integrate the insights from 
negotiation theory in the PA-model and redefine the notion of control in a setting of multiple, 
competing principals. 
A second problem when conceptualizing the Council as a collective principal relates to the 
limited variation across the MS in terms of information asymmetry. The inability to attend the 
external negotiations applies to all MS equally. By introducing a novel distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous information asymmetry to the PA-model, it becomes possible to 
differentiate among the principals. Endogenous information asymmetry refers to the information 
a MS could have obtained regarding the agent’s actions, but failed to acquire due to factors 
related to its own administrative functioning. This can occur, for example, if a MS is absent in one 
of the many meetings in the Council preparatory bodies or if national administration fails to 
construct an internal position to be defended. In short, the argument is presented that limited 
administrative capacity gives rise to endogenous information asymmetry which affects a 
principal’s propensity to exert control. Applied to the European Union, I argue that member 
states vary in their ability to oversee the Commission’s actions and accurately derive the nation’s 
interest in a particular debate. Hence the central thesis of this dissertation is the following: 
“In a context of multiple principals, endogenous information asymmetry explains 
whether a principal has limited or extensive control over the agent.” 
2. Research Design 
To test this hypothesis, I will focus on the EU’s external trade negotiations. There is a theoretical 
as well as an empirical justification of this policy domain. Theoretically, the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) is an exclusive competency of the European Union. National trade 
administrations do not make trade policy themselves, but are solely maintained to participate in 
the European Policy-making process. This exclusive focus facilitates the execution of the 
envisioned research. Indeed, any administrative capacity uncovered will be exclusively for the 
purpose of influencing EU decisions rather than determining national policies. In cases of shared 
competencies, one would ideally separate the capacity used to monitor and derive a position on 
European policy issues and the capacity used for national policy-making. Moreover, the case of 
external trade negotiations is also particularly interesting from a theoretical perspective as it 
contains a second delegation, i.e. that of negotiating authority to the Commission. By 
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consequence, the Commission-as-agent disposes of an additional information advantage that 
makes a differentiation among the MS monitoring capabilities more appropriate. 
But there is also an empirical reason to focus on external trade negotiations. Concerns have been 
expressed whether the MS still dispose of the required administrative capacity to promote their 
interests in trade policy discussions. Matthew Baldwin, in his function of director Market Access 
in the Commission’s Directorate General Trade, formulated the issue as follows:  “Just at the time 
when the issues are becoming more, not less, complex and political, it is vital that member states maintain 
their capacity to promote their interests (and arbitrate effectively between different national interests where 
necessary), question the Commission, and defend the line against third-country ‘incursion’.” The trade 
agenda has increasingly focused on regulatory issues that often include behind the border 
measures such as investment, product standards or social policies (Young and Peterson 2006). 
This ‘deepening’ of the trade agenda has two ramifications for the member states’ administration. 
First of all, it requires more specific expertise. Assessing the impact of a technical barrier to trade 
for domestic producers is far more opaque than a simple tariff rate. Similarly, the benefits that 
accrue from the recognition of a geographical indication (e.g. Parma ham, Champagne or Danish 
Blue cheese) are difficult to compare with the additional market access obtained from the 
liberalisation of trade in transportation services. At the same time, there has been a drastic 
increase in the number of (bilateral) trade negotiations simultaneously taking place, further 
augmenting the workload for national and supranational trade administrations.3 
Despite the increasing demand for administrative capacity, the question can be raised whether 
the supply has followed: a concern also acknowledged by Matthew Baldwin: “[The] potentially 
greatest problem [in EU Trade Policy], but one which is perhaps only now coming to the fore, concerns the 
weakening of member state capacities in trade policy. At a time when most national (as well as European) 
budgets are being held back or reduced, it is perhaps understandable that member states may decide to 
reallocate resources away from trade policy, given that it is the Commission which has the responsibility to 
negotiate on their behalf.” (Baldwin 2006, 930).  Moreover, administrative reforms in the nineties 
that fostered decentralization and agencification, have made horizontal coordination an even 
more daunting challenge (Verhoest et al. 2007).  
                                                     
3 The strain the enlarged trade agenda causes; was also acknowledged in DG Trade’s year report of 2006: ‘Trade policy is 
“getting bigger” in several different ways. […] As a result the DG Trade is negotiating with many more third countries, and it needs 
to make greater efforts of communication, have more extensive consultation with Member States and civil society. It is also working 
increasingly on policy areas that go beyond traditional Trade activities and engage in more in-depth analysis. Given that the DG is 
responsible for a key and exclusive competence of the Community, its relatively low level of staffing (1,7 % of the total Commission 
workforce) means that the DG operates with severe strain on resources.’ (Commission  2006a:18) 
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Having a clear a priori thesis, I seek a confirmatory research design. On the basis of the existing 
literature, we can expect to uncover more variation across MS than within a single MS over time. 
Hence, a cross-sectional comparison will be preferred over a longitudinal design. In terms of 
data-gathering, I will apply a sequential mixed methods research design in order to reap the 
benefits from qualitative and quantitative analytical techniques (Bergman 2011). To test the main 
hypothesis, I will make use of two surveys. The first survey is distributed among national 
representatives in the various preparatory bodies of the Council and seeks to measure MS’ 
propensity to signal their preferences to the Commission. The second survey targets trade 
officials in the member states and aims to obtain a clear picture of administrative capacity. 
Nevertheless, the limited knowledge on the decision-making process in the Member States 
warrants exploratory qualitative research to construct a sensible survey instrument. Similarly, 
with the aim of identifying the most relevant policy arenas and most prevalent ways of signalling 
the Commission, a qualitative inquiry into how the MS actually interact with the Commission 
was deemed appropriate.  
After the analysis of the survey-data, follow-up interviews help understand deviations from the 
expected results and trigger the formulation of new alternative hypothesis for further research. 
3. Overview 
The starting point of this inquiry is an analysis of the existing literature on the subject. 
Throughout Chapter 1, it will become apparent that no single approach can fully provide a 
compelling answer to my research question. Insights from the often-applied Principal-Agent 
model need to be complemented with lessons drawn from Comparative Public Administration 
and Negotiation Theory. In doing so, the chapter elaborates the potential contribution of my 
research to the wider literature. 
In order to reap the synergies between the three literatures, a rigorous framework is required. The 
key to this framework lies in the conceptualization of the Council as a multiplicity of principals 
rather than a collective principal. Assuming each MS can quasi-independently exert control over 
the Commission enables the integration of Negotiation theory.4 Simultaneously a distinction 
between endogenous and exogenous information asymmetry permits a smooth application of the 
                                                     
4 More specifically, the argument is presented that the Council is a hybrid principal due to qualified majority voting. In 
case simple majority applies, it would have been a collective principal (that is a majority needs to be found to reject the 
agreement) whereas consensus-voting would result in the conceptualization of the Council as a multiplicity of principals 
(each MS can veto the agreement and can thus control the Commission).  
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comparative insights derived from the public administration literature. This argument will be 
provided in Chapter 2. 
Building upon this framework, Chapter 3 will provide the broader research design, which lays 
down the foundation for the empirical work. It distinguishes the main dependent variable 
(control) and the main independent variable (administrative capacity), provides a broad 
conceptualisation of both variables and elaborates the relation between both. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion on the empirical strategy applied to test the main hypothesis. 
Figure 1: Schematic Representation of the Dissertation 
 
The empirical section of the dissertation consists of five chapters. The first two empirical chapters 
seek to foster a greater understanding of the dependent variable. Chapter 4 raises the question as 
to how the MS can actually exert control over the Commission. Due to concerns over the accuracy 
of older administrative accounts, an update was warranted. How are the MS represented within 
the Council? Where and how often do they meet? Who represents the MS and what happens if 
there is disagreement among the MS? Addressing these questions provides crucial information 
for the development of the survey and the identification of potential respondents.  
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Chapter 5 builds further on these insights. The chapter identifies various instruments of control 
and classifies them into collective and bilateral signals. In addition to type of signals sent, the 
survey also looks into the stage of the negotiation process at which MS signal. Three propositions 
are formulated with respect to the type and stage at which signals are sent. Following a 
discussion of the data-gathering process, descriptive statistics are provided along with a test of 
the formulated propositions. 
The following two chapters mirror this approach and apply it to the independent variable. 
Chapter 6 explores the policy-making process in three MS. In contrast to the conceptualization of 
control, existing comparative scholarship on administrative capacity is still limited. As a 
consequence, qualitative pilot studies were required to obtain a better insight in the domestic 
policy-making processes. Using a most-different case-design, variation is uncovered along three 
dimensions: i.e. degree of (de-) centralization, the interaction between public and private actors, 
and the coordination procedures to reconcile (divergent) opinions. 
Building upon these insights, Chapter 7 develops a survey using the notion of a policy network. 
Following a discussion of the data-gathering process, descriptive statistics are provided, mapping 
various types of administrations and describing particular patterns interesting for further inquiry. 
Chapter 8 can be considered the capstone chapter of this dissertation. It seeks to provide an 
answer to the research question formulated above, i.e.  ‘Does endogenous information asymmetry 
explain variations in the amount of control exerted by the principals?’ Following a brief 
reconstruction of the main arguments, the chapter brings together the dependent and 
independent variables defined, measured, and discussed in the four previous chapters. The data-
analysis combines quantitative multivariate regression analysis with graphical (added-variable) 
scatter plots.  
A Conclusion will expand on the ramifications of the findings. It seeks to reflect on the internal 
and external validity of the research findings and explores additional paths for further research. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
MEMBER STATES IN EU TRADE POLICY 
 
hat is the relation between member states’ administrative capacity and the influence 
obtained at the European level? To address this question, a first source of inspiration is 
the existing scholarship. The most obvious starting point is the specialised literature on the EU’s 
external trade policy. Political research on this subject is still relatively young. Up until the 
nineties, research was largely confined to legal studies and a handful of political analyses (Dür 
2006; Poletti and De Bièvre 2014). Now, a broader literature has developed, which applies a 
multitude of theoretical lenses, developing its own research traditions and contributing to 
broader policy fields such as International Political Economy, Comparative Politics, and 
European Integration. Applying the Principal-Agent (PA) model, a flourishing tradition emerged 
studying how the institutional setting enables or constrains the MS’ application of control over 
the Commission during international trade negotiations (da Conceição-Heldt 2011b, 2013; Dür 
and Elsig 2011; Kerremans 2006). These developments notwithstanding certain voids still persist. 
More specifically, existing approaches to study the interaction between the MS as represented in 
the Council and the Commission have focused only on the highly politicised issues thereby 
neglecting the bureaucratic nature of the trade policy process. In addition, rarely have studies 
explicitly focused on the divergent abilities of individual member states to weigh on trade policy 
outcomes. 
To cover these lacunae, insights from other research traditions are required. As far as the 
domestic decision-making process is concerned, inspiration can be drawn from (comparative) 
public administration research. In addition to the study of various modes of decision-making, or 
the critical conditions for successful policy reforms, recent applications increasingly focused on 
the MS of the EU. Comparative studies on the member states inquire, amongst others, into 
mechanisms of national coordination (Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000; Kassim et al. 2001), 
domestic administrative reform as a consequence of EU membership (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; 
Knill 2001) and the ability of a MS to implement European legislation (Börzel et al. 2010). 
Unfortunately, rare are the cases where more than three MS are studied for nomothetic rather 
than idiographic purposes. By consequence, the insights from this literature still fall somewhat 
W 
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short in explaining divergent behaviour of MS in the Council. To address these caveats, it is 
useful to draw insights from a third research tradition: negotiation theory. 
In a negotiation, we can study who gets what by giving what in return (Hampson and Zartman 
2012). Applied to the context of the MS as represented in the Council, we have seen a proliferation 
of studies inquiring into the strategies MS apply (Dür and Mateo 2010a; Naurin 2009; Panke 
2010b) and their resulting pay-off (Arregui and Thomson 2009). Less common are cases where 
characteristics of the national administration have been linked to the capabilities of MS to 
participate and be successful in Council negotiations. Moreover, one can question the extent to 
which the insights as obtained from cases of (regulatory) policy-making can be transposed to the 
case of external, Commission-led negotiations. 
Only when combined can these three approaches – PA, comparative public administration and 
negotiation theory – provide a compelling answer to the research question formulated at the 
onset of this chapter. The strengths and weaknesses of each tradition will be elaborated in a 
separate section below. In the conclusions, I will elaborate the strategy applied to reap the aspired 
synergies. 
1.1 The IPE of EU trade policy: rational-choice institutionalist perspective 
Common topics in  research on the EU’s external trade policy are debates about the nature of the 
EU as an external actor (Damro 2012; Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006; Orbie 2011; Zimmermann 
2007); its policies (Sbragia, 2010; Young & Peterson, 2006); and the drivers behind those policies. 
Within the latter tradition, a distinction is often made between interests, institutions and ideas 
(Elsig 2002). Whereas studies on the involvement of interest groups in the EU’s trade policy have 
flourished (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Dür 2007b; Eckhardt 2013) ideational approaches have only 
recently caught on (Elsig and Dupont 2012; Siles-Brügge 2011). The institutions have attracted 
most scholarly attention and provide a good starting point in our search for answers to the 
research question of this dissertation. 
The Principal-Agent model features prominently when studying the relation between member 
states and the European Commission. We can distinguish between two applications of the model. 
A first tradition focuses on the distribution of competences between member states and the Union 
as it evolves over the consecutive treaty reforms (Nicolaïdis and Meunier 2002; Niemann 2011, 
2012). Research along these lines notes that the increasing scope of delegation to the European 
Union coincides with the strengthening of MS control (De Bièvre and Dür 2005). However, 
applications of the PA-model are not limited to the tug-of-war during the Intergovernmental 
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Conferences; other scholars focus their attention on the interaction between MS and Commission 
in a stable institutional context and inquire into when member states’ activate the available 
control mechanisms and under which conditions the Commission can act autonomously from the 
member states (da Conceição-Heldt 2010, 2011b; Kerremans 2004, 2011b; Meunier and Nicolaidis 
2006). Research in this tradition focuses more on the application of control in particular policy 
decisions and aligns best with the aspirations of this dissertation 
The Principal-Agent model (see Chapter 2) has taught us to think in terms of factors that foster 
Commission autonomy and those that improve member state control. It is this literature that I 
will discuss more extensively in the first subsection. In the second sub-section, I will point to two 
remaining tensions that I consider particularly relevant for the study of the member states within 
the EU’s external trade policy. 
1.1.1. From Member State Control to Commission Autonomy  
When studying MS involvement in the EU’s external trade negotiations, it becomes clear that the 
MS –through the Council- are involved at each stage of the negotiation process: from the 
determination of the mandate, through the various negotiation rounds up until the eventual 
ratification of the negotiated outcome. Weary of accusations regarding the democratic deficit and 
bound by the strict voting rules within the Council, the European Commission has plenty 
incentives to report fully and truthfully to the member states. The close monitoring of the MS in 
Council working parties, gave rise to the comparison of the Council as twenty-eight mother-in-
laws overlooking the Commission as it tries to negotiate (Delreux and Kerremans 2010, 361).   
Cornelia Woll quoted a diplomat saying: “the Commission negotiates more with the member 
states than with the rest of the world” (Woll 2004: 227). These reasons led scholars to argue that in 
the area of trade policy, control by the member states over the Commission is relatively tight 
especially in comparison to other policy domains like competition policy (Damro, 2007). Prime 
examples of such control can be found in the lead-up to the launch of the Doha Development 
Agenda (Kerremans 2004), the closing of the Uruguay round (Meunier 2005) or the inclusion of a 
(weakened) social clause (Adriaensen & González-Garibay, 2013; Young, 2007).  
Notwithstanding the importance of the MS’ formal instruments of control, the Commission has 
an additional incentive to comply with the MS’ demands, and that is the shadow of the future. 
The decision to grant autonomy or exert control is an iterative, on-going game (Kerremans 2004). 
If the Commission oversteps its mandate or deviates from MS interests, the member states are less 
likely to provide the agent much discretion in future negotiations. In the years following the 
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conclusion of the Uruguay round, France’s Blair House blues limited the propensity of the 
Council to delegate negotiating authority to the Commission (Meunier 2000, 122–125).5 Likewise, 
the failure of the WTO-ministerial in Cancun can be partly explained by the Commission’s desire 
to obtain a future mandate from the Council (Kerremans 2004).  
In reaction to and building upon the hypothesis of MS control over the Commission, a series of 
studies emerged that emphasised the conditional and imperfect nature of such control. The most 
recurrent arguments invoked by these scholars are the existence and consequences of information 
asymmetry, agenda-setting power, the shaping of the MS’ policy preferences and the 
effectiveness of control instruments. 
Information asymmetry 
Drawing upon the Principal-Agent model, it is suggested that the Commission obtains additional 
leverage over the member states due its greater access to information. In bilateral trade 
negotiations, member states cannot attend the negotiations. As a result member states are largely 
dependent on the Commission for information. MS are largely left in the dark with regards to the 
concessions to be obtained from the negotiating partner(s). But the asymmetry of information also 
entails the vigour by which the Commission defends a member state’s interest in the negotiations. 
Within the WTO the EU member states are also individual members and therefore can attend the 
negotiations as well. Still, even in these situations, the Commission is often at an informational 
advantage when meetings take place among WTO-members in smaller venues. Certain rooms 
cannot accommodate all of the member states, in which case the Commission represents the EU 
(da Conceição-Heldt 2010). Having the most accurate information regarding the offers made, the 
room for manoeuvre and potential package deals to be struck improves the relative autonomy of 
the Commission vis-à-vis the member states. Even if it is in the interest of the Commission to 
inform the member states, it is clear that the Commission can decide what information it discloses 
to the member states.  
Agenda-setting power 
A second mechanism through which the Commission can increase its autonomy vis-à-vis the MS, 
is its agenda-setting power. It acts as a first-mover in the legislative process and can therefore 
propose its preferred policy option among a range of feasible alternatives (Delreux and 
                                                     
5 This agreement, concluded by the end of the Uruguay Round between the US and the EU, liberalised agricultural trade. 
According to France this was not in line with the mandate granted to the Commission. 
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Kerremans 2010). But agenda-setting power also implies that the Commission can set the pace of 
the game and strategically make use of windows of opportunity to table proposals when MS’ 
opposition is weakest (Johnson 1998, 59). Moreover, the ability to construct package deals has 
made it so that the Commission can negotiate agreements that are in line with its own preferences 
as long as MS benefits still outweigh the costs. While a MS might be inclined to cast its veto on an 
individual issue, it is the linking of various issues into a package that diminishes MS opposition 
(Dür 2007a).  You do not throw away the baby with the bath water. 
Shaping Member States’ preferences 
The Commission has the ability to press forward its own agenda through the strategic use of focal 
points (Elsig 2002, 2007). Framing the KOREU FTA within a context of transatlantic competition 
for market access (export discrimination) reduced MS objections to the conclusion of a deep and 
comprehensive trade agreement (Elsig and Dupont 2012). One of the reasons why such a focal 
point can affect the collective of Member States, is related to the socialization processes that take 
place among trade officials within the TPC (Murphy 2000; Niemann 2006). As the group of 
representatives meets frequently, it is only natural that there is scope for groupthink. In such a 
setting, a compelling focal point can easily take root. The Commission’s initiatives are not limited 
to the Member States, though. Cornelia Woll emphasised that the Commission can also influence 
the involvement of business interests thereby garnering public support for (or against) particular 
policy proposals (Woll 2009). Such cues also reach the member states and can contribute to the 
broader assessment of the desirability of the overall proposal. 
The need for broad mandates and the likelihood of the nuclear option 
The Council needs to adopt a mandate before the Commission can negotiate. While this can 
strengthen control over the agent, the effectiveness of the mandate as an instrument of control has 
regularly been questioned. To allow sufficient room of manoeuvre during the negotiations, it is 
desirable that the negotiator disposes of a vague, discretion-based mandate (Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis 2005). Unlike a rule-based mandate that contains specific provisions on how the 
Commission should act, a discretion-based mandate leaves room for the Commission to negotiate 
as it sees fit (Hawkins et al. 2006, 27). For the Doha Round, heterogeneous interests within the 
Member states limited the extent to which MS could constrain the Commission’s action through 
the mandate (da Conceição-Heldt 2011b). 
The potency of the ratification process as a mechanism of control is also disputed. The political 
cost of rejecting an agreement enters into the cost-benefit analysis of the member states (Delreux 
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and Kerremans, 2010). Member states are reluctant to be held responsible for the rejection of a 
carefully struck balance at the international level. Following the intense consultation between the 
Commission and the member states throughout the negotiations, member states experience a 
form of co-ownership over the agreement, further weakening the effective use of sanctioning (M. 
Baldwin 2006; Murphy 2000). By consequence, effective rejections are exceedingly rare.  
This overview highlights that there are valid reasons to argue for and against strong MS control 
over the Commission. The question about whose interest ultimately prevails and under which 
conditions is still left open for discussion.6 In summary, the existing political studies on EU Trade 
policy have mainly assessed how the institutional context in which decisions are made can affect 
the relative power of Commission and Council. To address the central research question, there 
are still several caveats that need to be overcome. This dissertation hopes to contribute to the 
existing scholarship by filling in these gaps. 
1.1.2 Identifying the scope for progress 
The first caveat observed pertains to the role attributed to the member states. When Member State 
preferences are an explicit part of the analysis, they are often used to illustrate a broader 
argument on Council-Commission interaction. Rarely are such preferences studied in their own 
right. By consequence, in most of the above cited studies, MS preferences are considered 
exogenous to the analysis. A second gap in the literature pertains to the explicit focus on 
politicised issues, thereby neglecting the –often- bureaucratic nature of the EU’s decision-making 
process. 
Opening up the twenty-eight black boxes 
The elaborate research conducted on the origins of Commission preferences stands in stark 
contrast to the existing knowledge on the determination of a Member State’s position on trade 
issues. At present, we dispose of elaborate (discourse) analyses of the Commission’s ideological 
preferences (Abdelal and Meunier 2010; Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012), have expanded our 
knowledge on the various interest groups attempting to influence the Commission (De Bièvre 
and Eckhardt 2011; Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Dür 2007b; Eckhardt 2013), and have intricate views 
on how the Council of Ministers influences the Commission’s behaviour (see supra). However, 
when it comes to the member states, we can only make educated guesses at how they derive their 
                                                     
6 Empirical work often faces the challenge of coping with observational equivalence (Damro 2007). When interpreting a 
lack of involvement from the member states, does this reflect Commission autonomy? Or is it that the Commission has 
anticipated potential critiques and adjusted its proposals accordingly and hence there is perfect control? 
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position and thus are left in the dark when exploring the traits of the domestic administration that 
foster control over the Commission. To address the formulated research question, a better 
understanding of national administrations is crucial.  
This is not to say that member states are absent in the existing literature. However, in the event 
that individual member states feature in applied empirical research, its interests are considered 
exogenous. Member States frequently feature to make a more generic argument regarding the 
relations between Council and Commission. For example, disagreement among Member States 
enables statements on preference heterogeneity (da Conceição-Heldt 2011b). A case whereby a 
MS was effective in forcing the Commission to adjust its behaviour implies Council control (e.g. 
Kerremans, 2004). The key argument is that Member States are rarely taken as the main focus of 
inquiry. Evidently, there are a number of exceptions. To my knowledge, three studies have taken 
the effort to study decision-making on trade policy in national trade administrations (da 
Conceição-Heldt 2011a; Hayes 1993; Jordana and Ramio 2003). 7 Unfortunately, only one of theses 
focused on the EU member states. John Philip Hayes conducted a comparative study of three EU 
Member States (Great Britain, France and Germany) in 1993. The findings –while interesting - 
date from a period when the WTO was not in existence, bilateral trade agreements a rarity, the 
EU consisted of only half its current membership and the regulatory turn in trade policy still had 
to take place.8 These studies nonetheless reveal plenty variation across various trade policy 
making systems. In their mapping of twelve Latin-American trade administrations, Jordana and 
Ramío structured the uncovered variation along five dimensions. In addition to the responsible 
line ministries, administrations also differ with respect to their institutional fragmentation, degree 
of formalisation of coordination, the network of private players and the formalisation of their 
participation in the policy network (Jordana and Ramio 2003). Without discarding the possibility 
of equi-finality, it would be surprising if such differences would not amount to varying outcomes. 
This suggests that there is ample scope for useful inquiry. 
Bureaucratic or Political 
In the event that member states are being studied, there is a strong tendency to focus on 
politicised issues and more particularly on the most vocal proponents within such conflicts. Maria 
Garcia noted the changing institutional setting within Spain as a critical factor to explain the 
                                                     
7 Other studies have also studied the MS’ parliamentary debates, but here, the focus was not on a systematic assessment of 
variation among MS decision-making processes, but rather the positions formulated (Kerremans 2011b). 
8 More recently, a study by Falke focused on a single Member State’s administration i.e. Germany (Falke 2005).  
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conclusion of the EU-Chile FTA. The prospect of negotiation success outweighed the potential 
damages to the large Spanish fisheries industry for the Aznar government (Garcia 2011). 
Similarly, the actions undertaken by France in response to the prospect of agricultural 
liberalization as documented in relation to the Blair House Accord (Meunier 2000) or in 
anticipation of the Cancun Ministerial (Kerremans 2004) reflect instances of high political salience.  
Here, a tension emerges between the predominant bureaucratic nature of the trade policy-making 
process and the academic literature with its (almost exclusive) focus on highly politicised issues ( 
Woolcock, 2012). This implies first and foremost that we only have knowledge on those MS that 
became vocal in the process, but not on the position and behaviour of other MS.9 It also implies 
that we only have information on cases where MS activity led to conflict either between Council 
and Commission or within the Council. This neglects the population of cases where the 
Commission embraced input from the MS, as well as cases where such divergent opinions were 
resolved in an early stage and have not been documented by specialised media.  
If we construct our theories about member states’ role and influence in the EU’s external trade 
policy on the basis of a limited number of ‘deviant cases’, chances are real that the constructed 
theories contain biases. A political scientist naturally focuses on those issues and topics that are 
subject for public debate. It is easier to study member state behaviour if we know ex ante that 
there has been a discussion between Commission and Council. Analysing such behaviour on a 
range of issues where debate might have been resolved at an early stage or where (specialised) 
media remained silent is more risky, but at the same time can paint a different, more realistic 
picture. For these reasons, it is also important to gain an insight into the interaction between MS 
and Commission across a wide range of trade topics some of which might be politicised. A few 
exceptions exist, however. Margareta Frenhoff Larsén studied both the EU-South-Africa FTA as 
well as the negotiations on the EPAs (Elgström and Frennhoff Larsén 2010; Frennhoff Larsén 
2007).  
In this dissertation, I do not claim to fully address these ails. My focus will not be on particular 
policy cases, but rather the general interaction between the different Member States and the 
Commission. I intend to shed light on the processes that unfold within the MS and assess how 
this affects their level of activity at the European level. This, I believe, can provide a first step in 
addressing the lacuna identified here.  
                                                     
9 It is important to recognise that variation among MS has been documented to a certain extent by the reporters of Agence 
Europe and used in analyses of the EU’s external trade policy. (see e.g. da Conceição-Heldt, 2011b). 
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1.2 National administration in EU policies: a Comparative Public administration 
perspective 
To address the problem of limited information on MS capacities, Comparative Public 
Administration (CPA) presents a fruitful alternative to look for potential answers. This subfield of 
Public Administration is relatively young and has gained most traction by the turn of the 
millennium(Pollitt 2011). While not always classified as such, an increasing number of scholars 
have engaged in CPA research with regards to the European Union. The information gathered 
and insights derived therefrom are particularly vital to unpack the Council and study the role of 
the member states in the EU’s trade policy. Similar to the previous section, I will first summarise 
the main findings of this literature before identifying the remaining challenges we face when 
explaining varying MS influence.  
1.2.1 From describing the process to questioning its consequences 
At the most basic level, scholars sought to map the diversity in administrative models to 
coordinate a national position. The most important work in this regard are two large edited 
volumes providing a detailed description of the national coordination procedures in the MS 
studied both from a European and a domestic perspective (Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000; 
Kassim et al. 2001). Eleven (and ten) MS were thus described and –to a limited extent- compared 
among each other. The gathered data subsequently led to a classification of MS along two 
dimensions: the degree of centralization and coordination ambition (Kassim 2003). The degree of 
centralization refers to the presence of specialised institutions within the centre of government 
responsible for coordination. Centralised systems are characterised by a desire to speak with a 
single voice. The other dimension, ‘coordination ambition’, points to the degree in which member 
states aspire to coordinate a position on every issue (comprehensive) or only on a limited number 
of such issues (selective). This classification has been expanded to encompass the enlarged Union 
(Gärtner, Hörner, and Obholzer 2011). A similar mapping exercise occurred for the development 
of oversight and coordinating bodies in the new MS (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007) 
A second application of CPA that is useful in addressing the formulated research question 
concerns the study of the effect of EU accession on national administrations. The process of 
Europeanization focuses on the various ways in which the MS adapt to the multi-level policy-
making system (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). The (diminishing) diversity among MS is thus taken 
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as a dependent variable while the pressures associated with EU-membership are used to explain 
these changes (Knill 2001).10 The expectation that national administrations adjust to the European 
context, is built upon the premise that such reforms are made with the purpose of streamlining 
either the downloading of European legislation or the uploading of domestic preferences to the 
European level (Börzel 2002). Of the two relations most researchers have studied the former 
(Börzel, Hofmann, and Panke 2012; Börzel et al. 2010; Falkner, Hartlapp, and Leiber 2004; Falkner 
and Treib 2008; König and Luetgert 2009). Thus it was found that the speed at which European 
directives are transposed into domestic law or MS lack of compliance has been attributed to the 
policy fit between EU and national policies and the related lack of political willingness (Börzel 
2002; Giuliani 2003; Knill and Lenschow 2001). Administrative procedures play a crucial role here 
as well (Falkner, Hartlapp, and Leiber 2004; König and Luetgert 2009). Finally, it is interesting to 
note that the concept of administrative capacity is also invoked with respect to the capacity of 
candidate MS to incorporate the acquis communautaire in domestic legislation (Dimitrova 2002; 
Nunberg 2000) 
The booming literature on MS downloading capacity is strongly contrasted with the limited 
studies on policy uploading. This is somewhat surprising as the ability to shape European policy 
according to domestic preferences is at least as important as the implementation of legislation. 
This problem was also recognised by Beyers & Trondal (2004, p. 920) as they advance a bottom-
up interpretation of Europeanization. Unfortunately, their analysis regarding supranational and 
intergovernmental role conceptions of national representatives was only based on two cases 
(Sweden and Belgium). This severely limits the generalizability of their findings. While their 
venture was laudable, few scholars have taken up their call to study the ability of MS to upload 
domestic preferences to the European level. One notable exception being Diana Panke, who 
linked traits of the domestic coordination process to the timing and quality of instructions 
submitted to permanent representations (Panke 2010a).11  
The complementarities with the PA-approaches outlined above are clear. CPA studies have 
granted us a much greater insight into the ways in which national administrations are organised 
                                                     
10 The extent to which these processes are truly ‘caused’ by EU-membership can be questioned on the basis of the cases 
studied. The exclusive focus on European member states inhibits a thorough comparative design. Moreover, the limited 
amount of MS also limits generalizability (Haverland 2006) 
11 Studying the REACH, Haverland and Liefferink also studied the capabilities of the Dutch administration as an 
important factor to influence the negotiations (Haverland and Liefferink 2012). However, this research did not apply a 
comparative perspective. 
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and how they have adapted to policy-making in a multilevel setting. Moreover, the empirical 
focus of Comparative Public Administration is not restricted to the most politicised issues, quite 
the opposite. There are, nonetheless, two limitations that constrain the ability of CPA to provide 
compelling answers to the formulated research question. 
1.2.2 Limitations of Comparative Public Administration 
The first limitation pertains to the study of the effects of variation in public administrations. 
Existing research is often focused on a limited number of member states and has refrained from 
engaging in theory-building and hypothesis generation. This applies particularly to the study on 
the relation between different administrative structures and the (in-) ability to shape policies at 
the European level. A second caveat concerns to the question of temporal and topical 
transferability of data. To which extent can we build upon data gathered in a (distant) past or on 
data referring to a different policy domain?  
Explaining policy influence 
While there are many studies comparing and mapping the domestic coordination processes in the 
Member States, few have sought to assess the consequences of such variation. Or as Goetz stated: 
“in the study of the executive, it is generally held that 'institutions matter', but how they matter for 
executive performance has scarcely been tested” (Goetz 2000, 221). The identified problem is not 
strictly related to the subject of uploading preferences but is more endemic to the broader study 
of Comparative Public Administration. The tension between nomothetic and idiographic 
approaches to the comparative study of public administrations is a long recognised ail that is 
particularly challenging for the posited research question (Pollitt 2010). Whereas the drive to 
obtain generalizable findings is high and has been increasing in salience in recent times due to the 
pursuit of ‘good governance’ practices (Pollitt 2011, 123), the supply of the aspired insights have 
not always followed.  
In my reading of the literature, two explanations for the hesitance to engage in nomothetic 
research are offered. First of all, there is the limited number of cases used in comparative studies. 
Almost 76% of CPA articles published between 2000 & 2009 used a sample with four or fewer 
cases (Fitzpatrick et al. 2011). In comparative research on the EU member states, two or three 
administrations is the norm (see e.g. Beyers & Trondal, 2004; Knill, 2001; Schout & Jordan, 2005, 
2008) and four or more is the exception. The limited number of cases incorporated in existing 
studies also hinders the formulation of generalizable hypotheses. The second reason for the 
scarcity in nomothetic research is related to the importance of contextual factors in explaining 
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performance of various administrations. The one-size fits all approaches to public management 
have repeatedly been shown to be quite problematic. In his research, Matt Andrews has shown 
that governments conforming to the ‘one-best-way models’ are not likely to exhibit better public 
financial management practices (M. Andrews 2010). Contextual factors play a crucial role in 
understanding why certain reforms work in one setting but fail in another (Pollitt 2013). A feature 
also recognised by heterodox development economists (Rodrik 2010). 
The focus on a larger sample of member states will definitely be helpful to contribute to the 
growing CPA literature. Caution is required, though when elaborating hypotheses relating 
particular traits of MS administrations and their ability to control the Commission during external 
trade negotiations. 
How far do generalizations travel? 
A second limitation of existing scholarship is the extent to which we can generalise from the 
obtained findings. Ever since the edited volumes by Kassim, Peters, and Wright (2000) and 
Kassim et al. (2001) came out, few studies appeared that engaged in a systematic comparison of 
how MS derive and coordinate their position on EU policy.12 The question can be raised whether 
these observations remain valid across time. Almost 15 years have passed since the original data 
has been gathered. It is hard to believe that throughout this period MS have not reformed their 
administration despite the pressures for Europeanization. If we attach any credence to the 
Europeanization literature, we would expect the newer MS’ administrations to be particularly 
susceptive to change. Moreover, as becomes apparent in chapter 6 and 7, changes in a 
government’s structure can greatly affect a horizontal policy domain such as trade. 
Secondly, most detailed case-studies took place with respect to a particular policy domain. Hence, 
we have learned more about domestic coordination processes in EU MS with regards to 
environmental policy (Knill and Lenschow 1998; Schout and Jordan 2005), health policy (Greer 
and Martin de Almagro 2012) or chemicals regulation (Haverland and Liefferink 2012). Whether 
such observations transfer well to the domain of the EU’s external trade policy, can be called into 
question. Research with regards to Europeanization as well as the transposition of EU legislation 
has shown considerable variation across policy domains within the MS (Haverland, Steunenberg, 
and Van Waarden 2011). Explanations for MS’ success at downloading or uploading have centred 
                                                     
12 While several authors have focused on comparison between two or three countries (see e.g. Schout and Jordan 2008), 
almost none did so for all EU member states.  
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on the (mis-)fit of EU policies with domestic legislation (Falkner, Hartlapp, and Leiber 2004). 
Seeing that trade is an exclusive competency of the EU, alternative explanations are called for. 
Furthermore, the specific institutional context of international negotiations also deviates from the 
ordinary legislative procedures studied in most of the cases mentioned above. 
In conclusion, the potential contribution of this dissertation to the existing CPA literature is 
modest but not negligible. The study of national trade administrations provides a novel addition 
to the growing body of literature dealing with national coordination of EU policies as it focuses 
explicitly on an exclusive competency of the EU i.e. the Common Commercial Policy. The 
envisioned research also seeks to contribute to the broader literature by formulating concrete 
hypotheses linking administrative capacity to a MS’ control over the Commission.  
1.3 Influence and control: negotiation theory 
Both the Principal-Agent model as well as the Comparative Public Administration literature 
provides limited insights into member states’ varying levels of control over the Commission. To 
address the formulated research question, it is therefore appropriate to borrow from a third 
research domain i.e. negotiation theory. 
1.3.1 From the nature of interaction to individual MS punching weight  
Research on (International) Negotiations focuses on the question of who gets what and through 
which means and why. Applied to the context of the European Union, three topics have attracted 
scholarly attention. 
A first subject studied, is the nature of interaction between the MS. It has raised questions 
regarding the characterisation of Council discussions as a setting for problem-solving or 
distributive bargaining (Naurin, 2009). Research has discovered variation across the different 
Council meetings along the dimension of technical complexity (Lewis 2010). Thus it is argued that 
technical discussions exhibit more problem-solving behaviour. But variation across stages of the 
negotiation have also been hypothesised (Elgström and Jönsson 2000) and confirmed (McKibben 
2013; Niemann 2004). Moving from the overall negotiating dynamic to specific strategies, scholars 
have also sought to differentiate between the actions of individual MS.  
A second line of research, inquires into the particular strategies applied by a MS and the factors 
that condition such application. This enables the identification of different strategies and tactics 
member states can undertake in the COREPER and council working groups to influence policy-
outcomes. Dür & Mateo (2010) for example studied the application of soft and hard bargaining 
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strategies, Tallberg (2008) and Haverland & Liefferink (2012) point at expertise-based arguing, 
whereas other scholars, such as Naurin & Wallace (2008), emphasised the importance of coalition-
building.  Finally, Diana Panke combined all the identified tactics into a comprehensive indicator 
of ‘negotiating activities’ (Panke 2010). 
A third tradition in negotiation theory is to study the outcome of negotiations. Which member 
states have been able to exert influence and how can such influence be observed? The most 
prominent example of such assessments is the DEU (The European Union Decides) database 
developed by Robert Thomson and his colleagues (Thomson 2011; Thomson et al. 2006). In their 
database, for more than 330 controversial EU decisions, member states’ policy preferences and the 
salience attached to that position were coded. Linking these positions to particular policy 
outcomes enables a wide range of applications (see e.g. Arregui and Thomson 2009; Cross 2013). 
The findings in all these studies, suggest that there is substantial variation across the member 
states. There are some member states that are particularly active, while others rarely raise an issue 
during Council meetings. This evidently raises questions about the causes of the uncovered 
variation between member states. What makes it that some delegations dispose of the required 
expertise to engage in arguing? Why can some member states derive a position much faster? 
What determines their ability to engage in coalition-building? Careful steps are taken in 
negotiation studies to address some of these questions. The relation between a MS’ network 
capital - a measure of the number and intensity of the ties a MS has with other countries (Naurin 
2007)- and negotiation success has been tested and confirmed in multiple analyses (Arregui and 
Thomson 2009; Golub 2012). In a similar fashion, the relation between countries’ bargaining skills, 
power and information has been a factor to explain MS influence (Bailer 2004). 
The advantage of Negotiation theory in addressing my research question lies in the detailed 
assessment of negotiation strategies and negotiation success of the different MS. Unlike the 
previous approaches, due attention has been given to the performance of all MS. To address my 
research question, input is nevertheless required from the Principal-Agent model and 
comparative public administration as the next section shows. 
1.3.2 The questions unanswered 
Again the limitations are twofold: on the one hand, the administrative capabilities that enable a 
MS to (successfully) wield particular strategies have only received scant attention while on the 
other hand most applications on MS negotiations in the Council have focused on policies subject 
to the OLP, not on external negotiations led by the European Commission. 
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Capabilities and negotiating power: Why can some MS punch above their weight?  
The focus on bargaining skills, network capital, or information already go a long way in relating 
national capabilities to negotiation activities and their outcomes. However, the causal proximity 
between these capabilities and the dependent variable, limits the insights and conclusions to be 
drawn for our research. Knowing that more bargaining skills or a stronger network with larger 
MS improves bargaining success re-asserts the question as to what traits lead to network capacity, 
improved bargaining skills or information. A detailed analysis linking the functioning of the 
domestic administration to the activities and influence achieved in the Council and its 
preparatory working groups remains a rarity.  
The potential synergies to be reaped by opening the toolbox of comparative public administration 
quickly become apparent. To explain MS’ negotiation activities, the staff of permanent 
representation, budget and staff of the line ministries were a first approximation of administrative 
capacity (Panke 2011). But more refined approaches are also called for. To understand the 
capacity of the Netherlands to punch above its weight in the negotiations on REACH (Regulation 
for the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemical Substances), 
Haverland & Liefferink (2012b) distinguish between three factors that enable MS influence i.e. 
scientific expertise, experiential knowledge and target group support. Finally, Diana Panke has 
linked the internal coordination processes to the speed by which a position is formulated (Panke 
2010a) 
While these recent developments are encouraging, further research is required to enable a more 
systematic assessment of the impact of administration capabilities and member states’ ability to 
exert control over the Commission.  
No applications to external (trade) negotiations 
A second weakness is that none of the recent data- intensive studies focused on external trade 
negotiations. Both the DEU dataset as well as the data collected by Panke focused on internal EU 
legislative processes. Differences with external trade negotiations are threefold: first of all, the 
existence of a second level of delegation affects the relation between Commission and Member 
States (Delreux and Kerremans 2010; Meunier 2000). As the Commission negotiates on behalf of 
the Member States, the latter have only incomplete information regarding the feasible policy 
options. In other words, MS need to act in a setting of uncertainty. A second observation that 
constrains the generalizability of existing studies to the setting of external trade negotiations 
pertains to the negotiating dynamics in the Council. Unlike legislation subject to the Ordinary 
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Legislative Procedure, there are no formal opportunities to amend drafts of the agreement for 
external trade negotiations. Member States rarely get to view the entire agreement until the very 
late stages of negotiations when room of manoeuvre is extremely limited. By consequence, the 
member states need to influence decision-making during international negotiations in the absence 
of a completed proposal. And finally the institutional context also differs with regards to the 
involvement of European Parliament (see Chapter 4). 
The bottom line is that we can raise the question as to whether existing findings can easily be 
generalised to a context wherein the Commission has been granted a negotiating mandate. Here, 
insights from the principal-agent model are particularly welcomed. The institutional setting in 
which negotiations take place lies at the heart of the many PA –studies outlined in the first section 
of this chapter.  
1.4 Filling the voids, reaping synergies 
Having introduced the relevant literatures and their weaknesses in terms of addressing the 
formulated research question, one can more easily recapitulate the main synergies between each 
of the summarised sub-disciplines. Whereas the existing political research on the EU’s trade 
policy has emphasised the institutional context that constrains or enables control over the 
Commission, it overlooked the actions of individual MS as well as the drivers of such action. 
Comparative public administration by contrast was able to address the question of variation in 
MS administration, but refrained from linking it to MS behaviour within the Council. MS 
behaviour in turn was the central focus of Negotiation theory, but here only limited attention was 
given to the institutional context of external (Commission-led) negotiations as well as the factors 
that explain MS capabilities. In providing an answer to the central question of this dissertation, I 
hope to provide a contribution to each of the respective literatures.  
To exploit the hypothesised synergies, a consciously elaborated framework is required. Indeed, 
how can we bring these insights together in an elegant and coherent structure? The key to this 
puzzle lies in our interpretation of the relation between MS and Commission as studied in the 
PA-model. Recall that existing studies of EU trade policy have studied the interaction between 
MS and Commission largely from the perspective of a collective principal. The MS could only 
exert control through the collective and hence studying individual MS rarely made sense. The 
critical challenge lies in contesting the nature of Council-Commission interaction: can the MS 
individually exert control over the Commission or can they only act under collective agreement? 
Once the toolbox of multiple –rather than collective- principal(s) can be unlocked, insights from 
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negotiation theory and public administration can easily be integrated within the PA framework. 
By developing this argument, the next chapter acts as a vital bridge between the three theories.  
 
Figure 2: Exploiting synergies across theories 
 
As a short preview, negotiation theory can easily be linked to the signalling approach developed 
for a context of multiple (competing) principals. Moreover, by introducing a novel distinction 
between endogenous and exogenous information asymmetry to the PA-model, the role and 
influence of the domestic administration becomes apparent. Chapter 2 will therefore provide the 
theoretical framework that allows the integration of the three literatures in a meaningful research 
design. The third chapter will then work towards an empirical research design elaborating a 
crude conceptualization of the key variables and undergirds the main relation between 
dependent and independent variable. Regarding the dependent variable (control), we will see the 
resurfacing of the literature on negotiations. Likewise, the conceptualization of the independent 
variable -administrative capacity- will draw extensively on insights derived from (comparative) 
public administration. 
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CHAPTER 2: CAUGHT IN A COLLECTIVE? THE 
DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF EU MEMBER STATES WITHIN 
THE COUNCIL 
 
o which extent can the member states influence the European Commission during 
international trade negotiations? To address this question, the literature overview made 
clear that insights from various research traditions need to be combined. Central to achieve this 
integration is the principal-agent model. This model studies the decision of a principal (the 
Council) to delegate authority to an agent (the Commission) whereby the latter acts on behalf of 
the former.  
In studying the interaction between member states and Commission, most scholars have focused 
exclusively on the MS as part of a collective principal i.e. the Council. Seeing that it is the Council 
that delegates negotiating authority through the adoption of a single mandate, such an 
assumption can be easily maintained on institutional grounds. In this chapter, I argue that there 
are, nonetheless, good reasons to deviate from this tradition and treat the various member states 
as a multiplicity of principals whereby each MS varies in its propensity to monitor, sanction and 
thus control the Commission. Central to this claim are the strict voting rules required for ratifying 
an agreement. Deviating from the assumption of a collective principal has two important 
ramifications. First and foremost, it becomes sensible to study and compare individual member 
states’ interaction with the Commission. A second consequence is that, in a context of multiple 
competing principals, we can hypothesise that the principals confronted with capacity constraints 
run the risk of facing sub-par policy outcomes.  
To present the argument, I will proceed in three steps. In the first section, I will introduce the 
principal-agent model, its key concepts –delegation and control- and the underlying conditions 
that need to be fulfilled for the theory to provide explanatory leverage i.e. information asymmetry 
and goal conflict. Having laid down the foundations of the model, the second part introduces the 
issue of common agency and argues why –contrary to existing research- I consider it useful to 
study member states’ attempts of control in (relative) isolation from the collective Council. 
Several concepts commonly developed within the context of a collective principal need to be 
T 
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redefined or refined to capture any variation across MS. This will occur in the third section. A 
conclusion follows. 
2.1  Introducing the Principal-Agent model 
Principal-Agent (PA) models study the decision of a principal to delegate the performance of 
specific tasks to an agent and its ensuing attempts to ensure the agent performs the delegated 
tasks appropriately. In essence, every time a delegation occurs, it is possible to distinguish a 
principal and an agent.  
Originally developed within economics to study the relation between insurance companies and 
their clients (Spence and Zeckhauser 1971), the model clearly had greater use to a broader set of 
hierarchical relations (Moe 1984). The potential for application within political science was 
quickly acknowledged but took quite a while to catch on (Moe 1984). Despite Barry Mittnick’s 
pioneering work (Mitnick 1973, 1982), PA-approaches did not enter into the mainstream of 
political science until the advent of the ‘Congressional dominance school’. In reaction to earlier 
studies criticizing the limited influence of US Congress over its bureaucracy (see e.g. Niskanen 
1971), scholars reacted by pointing at the variety of ways in which Congress is able to exert 
control (Mccubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Weingast and 
Moran 1983). 
By the end of the nineties, the PA-model started making its way into studies of the European 
Union. The similarity between the EU’s institutional context and that of the US facilitated 
application of the PA-model (Pollack 2002). Over the last two decades, empirical application of 
PA to the study of European policy-making has drastically increased. Whereas a first generation 
largely dealt with questions of European integration (De Bièvre and Dür 2005; Marks, Hooghe, 
and Blank 1996; Moravcsik 1994; Pollack 1997) later studies increasingly applied the model to 
explain policy outcomes in the area of trade (De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011; da Conceição-Heldt 
2011b; Kerremans 2004), competition policy (Damro 2007), environmental policy (Delreux 2008, 
2009), sports governance (Geeraert 2013) and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security policy 
(Dijkstra 2010; Drieskens 2008a, 2008b). But applications of the PA-model are not constrained to 
the fields of economics and politics. It has become a staple approach in the study of International 
Relations (Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney 2009; Nielson and Tierney 2003), Public Administration 
(Lane 2005; Waterman and Meier 1998) and Sociology (Shapiro 2005). 
Each of these fields have developed continuously, quasi independently from another, each 
struggling with their own questions and challenges while occasionally re-joining to take stock 
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and draw inspiration from each other. In my treatment of the literature I start from the European 
tradition and will seek to enrich where appropriate from applications in other sub-fields of 
political science.  
2.1.1  About delegation and control 
Policy-making in a representative democracy consists of long chains of delegation. It is based on 
the idea that it is impossible for all citizens to organise themselves in an efficient way to develop 
policy. Voters select a parliament who should from then on represent their interests when 
approving legislation. By doing so, a voter relinquishes his direct involvement in the policy-
making process to a Member of Parliament. In turn, parliament delegates its authority to the 
government who is responsible for developing policy propositions.  
Figure 3: Chain of Delegation 
 
As a result we end up with an increasingly smaller –but manageable- administration responsible 
for the drafting of a country’s laws. While recent developments in the literature have started to 
emphasise the impact of such delegation chains (Dür and Elsig 2011; Kerremans 2011a), my focus 
will be restricted to the relation between MS and Commission. Within this relation, we can 
28 
 
distinguish between two delegations. First there is the delegation of trade authority from the 
member states the European Union. In a second stage, the Council –as a collection of member 
states- delegates to the Commission allowing the latter to negotiate trade agreements on behalf of 
the former (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999). 
The decision to delegate is often modelled as the consequence of a trade-off between the benefits 
to be accrued from having the Commission conduct negotiations instead of the 28 member states 
and the costs associated with the agent concluding a deal that deviates somewhat from the 
principal’s ideal policy outcome (agency losses) and the costs incurred to exert control over the 
agent (agency costs). The benefits from delegating trade authority are diverse. Reference is made 
to the ability to credibly represent (and commit) the member states (Kerremans 2004), the 
reduction of transaction costs (De Bièvre and Dür 2005), the additional bargaining power 
obtained from pooling resources (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006), insulation from domestic 
pressure groups (Meunier 2005; Woolcock 2005) and the ability to make use of the expertise and 
resources of an experienced agent (Billiet 2006).13  
The decision to delegate depends therefore also on the question of how much control needs to be 
applied to ensure the agent does not shirk. If the costs associated with controlling the agent are 
too high, delegation is undesirable. Delegation occurs for a wide range of tasks ranging from the 
provision of (public) services, the drafting of legislation to the negotiation of agreements. By 
consequence, the available control mechanisms tend to vary considerable across these cases. For 
executive agencies control often takes the form of budgetary adjustments, new legislation (Moe 
1987), the (re-)appointment of senior officials (Weingast and Moran 1983, 769) or the initiation of a 
public investigation.  
In case the delegation concerns negotiating authority, the selection of negotiators, provision of 
narrow mandates, and the rejection of a proposed agreement are often-cited control mechanisms 
(Delreux 2008). Two types of control are generally identified in the study of the EU’s external 
trade policy i.e. ex ante and ex post control. Ex ante control mechanisms take place before the 
delegation whereas ex post control occurs once authority has been delegated.14 In delegating 
                                                     
13 For a more extensive discussion on the diverse motivations behind delegation see Kassim and Menon (2003) 
14 Bart Kerremans distinguished a third control mechanism ie. ad locum control. In the event that Member states can 
effectively attend negotiations next to the Commission, it is possible to monitor the agent’s actions directly and signal 
potential problems ‘on the spot’(Kerremans 2006). This idea was applied fruitfully to external environmental negotiations 
(Delreux 2008, 2009). In the area of trade policy this has become quite rare as the chapters that fall under MS’ competency 
are negotiated separately from the trade component (see infra).  
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trade policy-making authority to the EU, member states have stipulated clearly where EU 
competences end and where MS retain authority. When delegating negotiating competency to the 
Commission, additional ex ante control can be exerted through the determination of the 
negotiating mandate that sets out the red lines the negotiator cannot cross. In case the aspired 
agreement involves mixed competencies, member states can also determine to whom negotiating 
authority is granted. This can involve the EU’s External Action Service, the Council presidency or 
a Member State with particular expertise (Delreux and Van den Brande 2013). Often a broad 
mandate is preferred to enable the Commission sufficient negotiating room to broker an 
ambitious and balanced trade deal. Such a discretion-based mandate implies a greater emphasis 
on ex post control.  
In the study of ex post control mechanisms, a distinction is made between monitoring or 
oversight on the one hand and sanctioning or rewarding on the other hand. Sanctioning largely 
occurs through the ratification process that follows the legislative process. For issues falling under 
the Common Commercial policy, the Ordinary Legislative Procedure applies. This implies that 
MS (along with EP) can sanction the agent by not approving the suggested legislation with a 
qualified majority. Oversight is guaranteed through the continuous interaction between MS and 
Commission in the Council working party system. While treaty provisions mention the 
establishment of a particular committee to which the Commission should report regularly during 
the negotiations; it is the set of procedures governing the Trade Policy Committee which makes it 
a potent instrument for monitoring and control. The practice to convene the Trade Policy 
Committee each week, the organization of informal technical meetings to disclose more technical 
information regarding the negotiations, as well as established practices to circulate draft texts of 
e.g. tariff schedules well in advance of the negotiation rounds strengthens the member states’ 
capacity to monitor and control the agent whenever appropriate. Procedural rules can be used to 
mitigate informational disadvantages as well as making the agent more responsive to the 
principals’ interests (Mccubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Sanctioning of the agent can occur 
during the ratification of the agreement. International trade agreements are ratified with a 
qualified majority in case the agreement does not touch upon MS competencies.  
Keep in mind though that the decision to delegate negotiating authority to the Commission takes 
place in a setting of repeated games enabling more cooperative behaviour (Bó 2005; Radner 1981). 
To ensure that the Member States will grant the Commission negotiating authority in the future, 
it has an additional incentive to act according to the principals’ preferences (Kerremans 2004). 
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Whereas control mechanisms can easily be identified, observation of its effects is less apparent. 
Active use of control instruments only tell half the tale as control can also be exercised latently. 
That is, the threat of sanctioning can be a sufficient deterrent to ensure compliance by the agent 
(Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989). This problem of observational equivalence, has been 
one of the key challenges in PA-analyses (Damro 2007; Weingast and Moran 1983).  
2.1.2  Goal conflict and the scope for shirking 
The mere act of delegation does not in and of itself make the relation between a principal and an 
agent suitable for a PA-analysis. Whereas the many conditions imposed on the canonical PA-
model have been relaxed in its application to political science (Miller 2005); there are two 
assumptions that are still worth stressing as important prerequisites for a useful application of 
PA-analysis. First of all, there needs to be a conflict of interests between the principal (who 
delegates authority) and the agent (who acts on behalf of his principal) and secondly the agent 
needs to be at an informational advantage (Dür and Elsig 2011; Waterman and Meier 1998). I will 
discuss each condition below. 
Goal conflict 
Within the literature, three sources of goal conflict are commonly invoked when pitting Council 
and Commission against each other. The most common of these pertains to the expected 
economic return of the resulting agreement. While the member states are solely focused on the 
maximization of their country’s benefits, the Commission-as-agent pursues a pan-European 
interest (Bouwen 2004). Following this line of argument, it is the Commission that aims to 
maximise the size of the pie, whereas each of the member states tries to get the bigger slice. The 
source of goal conflict according to this line of reasoning is of a distributional nature. 
A second source, concerns the distribution of power between the member states and the 
European Union. Member states wish to retain part of their autonomy, whereas the Commission 
seeks to enlarge his. Most applications of the PA-model relying on this conflict were applied to 
the subject of European integration (De Bièvre and Dür 2005; Kassim and Menon 2003; Marks, 
Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Pollack 2001). Applied to the issue of international trade it plays mostly 
when questions of mixed or exclusive competencies arise (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999). 
A third and final cleavage is ideological. The Commission -and in particular DG Trade- is 
considered more liberal, free trade oriented than the median member state. The allegation of a 
bias in the Commission’s ideology towards free trade is largely made on the basis of 
(interpretative) discourse and document analysis (Siles-Brügge 2011; De Ville and Orbie 2014). 
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Along similar lines, it is argued that the bureaucratic nature of the Commission grants them a 
longer time horizon than national politicians insulating them further from narrow interests (da 
Conceição-Heldt 2011b). 
This notwithstanding, it is important to highlight that there are also occasions in which the agent 
is indifferent and correspondingly has no inherent incentive to engage in shirking (Meier and 
O’Toole 2006; Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999). In the event that principal and agent have a 
common goal, the potency of PA-analysis is significantly reduced. In such a situation, principals 
and agent form –in the terminology of Waterman & Meier (1998)- a policy subsystem. Each 
member state contributes according to its own knowledge and expertise with the goal of devising 
an optimal outcome. Conceptualizing the principal and agent as forming a policy network can 
turn out to be more fruitful in those cases. For trade policy issues this largely occurs when 
fleshing out the technical details of a specific agreement or policy proposal. As negotiations 
progress specific sections of the agreement start to materialise. To ensure member state 
preferences are taken on board, the Commission requests input from the member states through 
e-mail correspondence or during the aforementioned ‘Informal Technical Meetings’ (see infra). 
But also in situations where political salience is low or cases where standard models or templates 
have been developed, goal conflict is less likely to occur.  
Information asymmetry 
The second assumption of the principal-agent model is that the agent has an informational 
advantage over its principal(s). It is this informational advantage that creates the potential for 
shirking behaviour or bureaucratic drift (Pollack 1997). Shirking occurs when the agent pursues 
policies that are not aligned with the preferences of his principals. Original applications of the 
Principal-Agent model used the difference in expertise as a main source of information 
asymmetry. To govern complex issues that require a specific type of knowledge, authority is often 
delegated to an expert agent (Egan 2002; Sharma 1997; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1993). It is this 
difference in expertise that led Max Weber to assert that “under normal conditions, the power 
position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always over-towering” (Weber 1960).  
The delegation from Member States to the Commission is of quite a different nature, though. 
Representatives attending Council meetings often have an equal formidable administration 
behind them, making epistemic sources of information asymmetry less probable, though not 
impossible. Differences in technical expertise are more likely to be relevant across the Member 
States than between Council and Commission. In the context of international trade negotiations, 
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there is an alternative source of information asymmetry that enables the agent to pursue its self-
interest and that is the privilege of the Commission to negotiate bilaterally without direct 
oversight of the member states. The lack of direct oversight results in the existence of private 
information on the efforts made and goals pursued by the agent. That is, the principal can only 
judge the outcome but not the actions of the agent. Has the Commission done everything it could 
to defend our national interests? Is the Commission reporting truthfully when it invokes the 
limited negotiating room to finalise a trade deal? There is ample reason to doubt the agent 
reporting openly as collusion between negotiators strengthens their position vis-à-vis their 
principals (Elsig and Dupont 2012).  
2.2  Twenty-eight principals or a single collective? 
In its simplest form, a PA-model only focuses on one principal who seeks to control a single 
agent. In the context of the EU, we are dealing with 28 member states as represented in the 
Council who have jointly delegated authority to the Commission.15 Common agency occurs quite 
frequently within political systems. In a country with a bicameral legislator, consent from both 
chambers is required before a decision can be adopted. Each chamber in its turn consists of a large 
number of elected representatives that need to decide –as a collective- whether to approve, 
amend, or reject proposed legislation.  
Two types of common agency are often distinguished within the literature i.e. a collective 
principal and multiple principals. In case of the latter we are dealing with a single agent having 
more than one contract with organizationally distinct principals, the former applies to a situation 
where the single agent is only bound by a single contract (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).  
2.2.1 The Council: a Collective principal? 
In studying the relations between member states and Commission during trade negotiations most 
scholars have focused largely if not exclusively on applying the notion of collective delegation 
(Pollack 2002, 213). It is after all the Council as an institution that provides a single mandate and it 
is also the Council that decides –as a collective- whether or not to ratify the agreement.  
The main distinction between a collective and multiple principals pertains to the ease by which 
control can be exerted. Within a collective principal, a majority needs to be construed to apply 
                                                     
15 Throughout this dissertation we will assume the Commission to be a singular agent to keep the analysis parsimonious. 
If the Commission negotiates, it is –however- not only DG Trade that represents the MS. The multiplicity of agents at 
times can affect the interaction between Council and Commission  (Elgström and Frennhoff Larsén 2010; Frennhoff Larsén 
2007). 
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control. This can occur through the adoption of council conclusions during the negotiations that 
further refine or adjust the mandate or through a rejection of the agreement (Delreux 2009, 197). 
In light of the formulated research question, this implies it would not make sense to study the 
dyadic relation between a single MS and the Commission thereby omitting the positions of the 
other principals involved. Along these lines it is argued that greater heterogeneity among the 
principals’ preferences obstructs the collective principal to activate its control mechanisms and 
therefore, the argument continues, we can expect preference heterogeneity to enhance 
Commission autonomy. In trade policy, such arguments have featured quite prominently (da 
Conceição-Heldt 2011b; Elgström and Frennhoff Larsén 2010; Elsig 2007).  
The hypothesis on preference heterogeneity and agent autonomy originates from cases of 
delegation between a legislator and its executive (agencies) or between a government and an 
international agency. The application of this logic to the EU’s bilateral trade negotiations, 
however, is not without problems. Executive delegation implies the agent can take actions which 
have concrete ramifications for their principals. Most control mechanisms identified in these cases 
(budget cuts, parliamentary investigation, appointment of senior officials) require a majority 
within the collective principal before they can be triggered (see e.g. Nielson & Tierney, 2003). This 
is not necessarily the case when we are dealing with the delegation of negotiating authority. For 
international trade negotiations the Commission cannot make any binding commitments on 
behalf of the MS unless the latter give their consent to implement such decision. In other words, 
no changes in the EU’s trade policy will occur lest the member states decide to ratify an 
agreement. The provision of a negotiating mandate does not imply a commitment in terms of 
result but rather a commitment in terms of effort.  
Unlike situations where principals need to agree among each other if they wish to exert control, 
we can assume in our case that control is exerted until MS give their consent. Control is the 
default position. Therefore, the voting rules at the end of the negotiation and not the existence of 
a single mandate determine the extent to which we can conceptualise the Council as a collective 
or a multiplicity of principal(s). In case decisions need to be taken by unanimity, each MS can 
independently decide to sanction the agent by rejecting the agreement. If normal majority applies, 
we can maintain the conceptualization of the council as a de facto collective principal. Indeed, if a 
majority is required to block the agreement, control can only be exerted through collective action 
in the Council. Qualified majority falls in between both extremes and results in a hybrid situation. 
On the one hand, a blocking minority needs to be constructed among Member States if they wish 
to control the Commission, while on the other hand it can be questioned whether the Commission 
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can ignore the signals sent by individual member states. Clearly, chances exist that the concerned 
member state might be able to forge a blocking minority.  
The notion of the Council being some type of ‘hybrid’ principal is not entirely new. Following the 
observation that many of the EU’s trade agreements includes clauses subject to MS competencies, 
the applicable procedures for such mixed trade agreements require a consensus among MS and 
thus the notion of multiple principals apply (Kerremans 2004, fn 9). The argument presented here, 
broadens and formalises this argument. Instead of a dichotomous treatment of the Council, I 
expect to observe both elements of collective and multiple principal-agent dynamics even in pure 
trade agreements due to qualified majority voting. Obviously, other factors will affect the balance 
between the two extremes. The presence of mixed competencies as suggested by Bart Kerremans 
or the existence of an informal norm of consensual decision-making (Kleine 2013; Meunier 2000, 
108) strengthen the conceptualisation of the Council as a multiplicity of principals. By contrast, 
arguments that weaken the credibility of a principal’s veto at the ratification stage suggest 
collective dynamics are still relevant. No member state wants to shoulder the entire responsibility 
for the failure of a carefully constructed trade deal at the international level (Delreux and 
Kerremans 2010). Even in the event that no consensus is aspired, the Council still operates 
through qualified majority, making insights from multiple principals particularly useful for the 
study of MS control. 
2.2.2 The Council as Multiple principals 
In a setting of multiple principals, each principal can independently decide to “reward, sanction 
or monitor the same agent” (Nielson and Tierney 2003). This implies that it becomes possible to 
study each MS’ attempts of control quasi-independent from the formal decisions of the collective 
principal. This also implies that each MS is responsible for the pay-off resulting from a common 
agreement. Within a collective principal, a sub-par agreement might have been the consequence 
of a MS’ marginal voting power or its inability to convince other MS within the collective.  
But there are additional insights to be obtained by focusing on the Council as a multitude of 
individual principals. The decision by one principal to exert control has ramifications for the 
other principals involved as well (Waterman and Meier 1998). A low level of control by a single 
member state does not necessarily result in the agent enjoying autonomy. Rather, it implies a 
relative increase of the remaining principals’ power. The main consequence, then, is policy 
outcomes that are skewed in favour of the other principals’ preferences. Within a framework of 
multiple principals, it also becomes possible to study competitive dynamics between (groups) of 
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member states. Such dynamics have been observed in US scholarship on Congressional and 
Presidential control over executive agencies. Competition between Congress and Presidency 
results in dynamic processes of move and counter-move where each of the principals tries to 
reign in their common agent (Whitford 2008). The mere uttering of a position by a member of one 
group can immediately be met with a reaction of the opposing group. Not because they have a 
different interest at stake, but due to the underlying assumption that one group’s gain, would 
imply the other’s loss. Applied to the Council, it would be interesting to study similar dynamics 
between the ‘like-minded’ and ‘open-minded’ group of MS which often collide on trade issues. 
Coming back to the original question whether preference heterogeneity results in greater agent-
autonomy, it is important to highlight that even in a context of multiple principals it is possible to 
hypothesise such relation. During the provision of the mandate, preference heterogeneity will 
affect Member States’ ability to provide a rule-based mandate. In the determination of the 
mandate the MS still need to act as a collective as they can only adopt amendments to the 
Commission’s proposal through qualified majority (Meunier 2000, 102). Preference heterogeneity 
will thus lead to a lowest common denominator approach. If all MS agree on the desirability of 
starting trade negotiations, they will provide a discretion-based mandate (da Conceição-Heldt 
2011b). However it will also increase their eagerness to exert control during the negotiations to 
ensure their interests are sufficiently defended. During the negotiations, I expect that 
heterogeneity has an opposite effect. Faced with multiple competing demands, the Commission, 
assisted by the Council presidency, needs to broker a compromise between the various interests 
of the Member States. Here, the agent can use its agenda-setting power to insert its own 
preferences in the proposed compromise (Coleman and Tangermann 1999). The scope for such 
autonomy is, nevertheless, limited to the set of compromises that are within each of the 
principals’ win-set. Meunier and Nicolaïdis linked this internal diversity and the unclear veto 
powers to an inflexible negotiating position which- in combination with the Schelling 
conjecture16- improves the EU’s external bargaining power. While the agent thus enjoys some 
autonomy in the construction of an internal compromise, in light of the external negotiations the 
overall autonomy is constrained. The overall effect of preference heterogeneity on agent 
autonomy is therefore unclear and ultimately depends on the importance attached to the mandate 
and the scope for imputing the agent’s preferences in the internal compromises. 
                                                     
16 The Schelling conjecture states that in international negotiations domestic constraints can increase a negotiators 
bargaining power as it hands are tight to a limited range of outcomes (Schelling 1960).  
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2.3 Focusing on individual principals 
If we wish to study or compare individual member states’ relation with the agent, we need to 
determine the scope for information asymmetry as well as the varying degree of control exerted. 
Unfortunately, with an –almost exclusive- focus on the Council-as-collective, existing 
conceptualizations are inadequate to capture variation across the principals. Two core concepts of 
the Principal-Agent model require a reinterpretation in light of the argument developed above. 
First of all, we need to adjust our notion of control. In a context of multiple principals, each 
principal can independently decide to sanction or reward the agent. Secondly, information 
asymmetry –the source of agency slack- should differ across the Member States if we want to 
understand varying pay-offs. 
2.3.1 From collective control to control as signalling 
How does control look like when focusing on a single member state? The distinction between ex 
ante, ex post or ad locum is not always that useful if we divert our focus from the collective to the 
individual principal. The legal provisions that regulate the relation between MS and Commission 
only refer to the MS as represented within the collective principal –the Council. The approval of a 
rule-based or discretion-based mandate generates equal leverage for the different MS to control 
the Commission. Likewise the sanction of ultimately rejecting a possible agreement applies 
equally to all the MS. The only indicator pointing at variation between the MS ability to control 
the Commission is the difference in voting rights.  
In a situation of multiple, competing principals the study of control benefits from focusing on the 
signals sent rather than the formal procedures in force (Wood and Waterman 1993; Worsham and 
Gatrell 2005). 17 At the basis of this signalling approach, lies the observation that communication is 
a crucial aspect of principal-agent interactions. Control can then be reinterpreted as the signalling 
of domestic preferences and their political salience. Signalling occurs in a variety of ways; it can 
range from the indication of a red line during a TPC meeting, arguing and bargaining with the 
commission to a national minister demanding a meeting with the Commissioner. Clearly, the 
aforementioned formal procedures still matter, but also in the discussions leading up to the 
provision of a mandate or during debates on the ratification of an agreement MS react through 
                                                     
17 In business applications of the PA-model, ‘signalling’ is an act performed by the agent to indicate the principals their 
capacities, thereby combatting problems of adverse selection. Here, the signalling occurs on behalf of the principals. I 
assume confusion to be limited as most EU applications of the PA-model are focused on moral hazard issues and are not 
using signalling as a concept.  
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the provision of signals. Such signalling can also serve an external purpose as it clarifies the 
negotiating partner the internal constraints the Commission is facing (da Conceição-Heldt 2013, 
26). In reaction to the MS’ actions, the EC can decide whether it will adjust its negotiating 
position. 18  
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that mentioning an issue is sufficient to influence the 
Commission’s behaviour. Being confronted by a plethora of demands, the Commission does not 
always know how ‘resolute’ the indicated red lines actually are. In a context of multiple 
principals, the agent is also at an informational disadvantage regarding the principal’s 
preferences. In every trade agreement, member states will win and lose at the same time. The key 
challenge is to assess whether a member state is willing to accept this compromise or block the 
entire agreement due to the crossing of one particular red line. This is not as daunting of a 
challenge as it may seem at first sight. Policy is set through a lengthy iterative process between 
MS and Commission; providing ample opportunity for the former to signal the salience of a 
particular issue and for the latter to grasp the severity of it. Member states can vary regarding the 
type of signals sent, the stage at which they are sent and the frequency by which they 
communicate their concerns. The stage at which a MS signals the Commission might affect the 
probability of success. Sensitivities can be brought up even before discussions on the mandate 
start and can be repeated up until the ratification process has been initiated. Early stage 
involvement has been related to negotiation success, as the room of manoeuvre is considerably 
larger at this stage. Besides the provision of signals to the Commission, the use of control can also 
involve coalition building with other member states. In the end, the collective dynamic still plays 
a role insofar the threat of rejecting the entire agreement lacks credibility. The larger the coalition 
sending out the same signal the less likely the Commission can ignore it.  
While size and power of the member state has been a staple in research on Council decision-
making, recent studies applying negotiation theory have shown that member states can 
occasionally punch above their weight by use of personal authority or technical expertise 
(Tallberg 2008). Such applications have also exposed significant variation in the activities 
undertaken by the MS to influence the Commission. In studying individual member states’ efforts 
                                                     
18 The representation of the policy process as one where the Commission proposes and member states voice concerns is a 
drastic simplification of their complex structure of interactions but is not so far-fetched. The Commission does possess 
substantial first mover advantages in international negotiations as it often suggests potential adjustments to be made to 
the mandate or suggests alternative scenarios (Delreux and Kerremans 2010). 
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at controlling the Commission, we can therefore build upon the insights obtained in negotiating 
theory.   
2.3.2 Endogenous Information asymmetry 
Parallel to the tendency to focus exclusively on collective mechanisms of oversight, information 
asymmetry has been derived exclusively in relation to the collective principal. Recall that the 
most pertinent source of such asymmetry is the Commission’s ability to take part in the 
negotiations unlike the member states. The resulting uncertainty regarding the Commission’s 
effort invested in the defence of the Member States’ preferences affects each principal equally. In 
these cases information asymmetry is derived from the (external) context within which the 
negotiations take place and can –to a large extent- be considered exogenous to the principal.  
If we wish to distinguish between the potential for agency slack across the multitude of 
principals, we need to focus on alternative sources of information asymmetry. Fortunately, there 
is ample literature to draw inspiration from. Above, the varying level of policy-specific expertise 
between an expert agent and dilettante principal was mentioned. As Member States are 
represented in the relevant council working parties by their domestic trade administrations, the 
scope for large differences in technical expertise is somewhat limited. An alternative source of 
information asymmetry originates from the functioning of the domestic administration. Inability 
to attend important briefings, lack of staff to monitor all on-going negotiations, or internal 
bureaucratic hurdles; each can limit a MS’ propensity to control. To differentiate such sources 
from the exogenous information asymmetry described above, I will use the term endogenous 
information asymmetry. It is endogenous due to principals’ control over the size of such 
asymmetry. I prefer to demarcate exogenous information asymmetry to encompass the gap in 
knowledge that cannot be overcome without breaking (inter)national norms and regulations.19 It 
is related to the institutional context in which negotiations take place and the constraints it 
implies for monitoring the agent. Endogenous information asymmetry by contrast arises due to a 
principal’s limitations.  
Seeing that monitoring -and in particular the “police patrol” variant- can be quite costly, it is not 
hard to understand why member states are affected differently by endogenous information 
                                                     
19 Clearly the dividing line between both is opaque and subject to interpretation. Following the discovery of widespread 
recording of private phone and computer data by the National Security Agency (NSA), much information prior thought to 
be strictly private (exogenous) can be obtained using costly (both economic and political) methods of information 
gathering. 
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asymmetry (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1987). Member states with well-organised, competent 
trade administration are better informed and hence less prone to ratifying sub-optimal trade 
deals. In a setting of multiple principals, administrative capacity affects the potential control of 
Member States over the Commission. Or as Terry Moe succinctly wrote: “How much influence will 
any given principal have over the agency? That depends to no small extent upon how its resources, 
information, and incentives stack up against those of the other principals competing with it for influence” 
(Moe 1987). 
Endogenous information asymmetry can be the result of a deliberate trade-off between the 
agency costs and the perceived benefits in which case there is no reason for concern. 
Nevertheless, there are always inefficiencies to be uncovered in the functioning of an 
administration. An administration can be understaffed, face challenges in internal coordination or 
is hindered by an abundance of administrative procedures. In these cases, there is room to 
improve the benefits to be derived from the delegation by reducing endogenous information 
asymmetry.  
Variation across the member states’ endogenous information asymmetry manifests itself both in 
the monitoring of the Commission during international negotiations as in the national 
coordination of EU policies. For the negotiation of mixed agreements, member states can directly 
monitor the Commission as they can attend negotiations. For the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, eleven negotiation rounds were held. Member States’ attendance ranged from 100% 
(France and Finland) to a complete absence (e.g. Denmark, Estonia, and Luxemburg).  20 But also 
for those trade agreements that fall completely under the Commission’s exclusive competency, 
variation exists regarding the amount of information member states have at their disposal. Not all 
member states attend all the preparatory meetings in the Council. Moreover, representatives to 
these meetings can vary from an intern to a technical expert flown over from the capital. 
Evidently, this affects the quantity and quality of information derived from such meetings. 
Additionally, more general characteristics of the administration can also affect member states’ 
ability to monitor and signal the Commission. In citing their double edited volume21, Hussein 
Kassim and Anand Menon noted: “Recent research on the national co-ordination of EU policy [..] 
reveals considerable differences in the ambitions and administrative resources of member states, as well as 
                                                     
20 Data coded from the Commission’s communication regarding the transparency of ACTA negotiations (Commission 
2012) 
21 See Kassim, Peters, and Wright (2000) &  Kassim et al. (2001) 
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evidence of ‘bureaucratic politics’ and problems in constructing coherent action”(Kassim and Menon 
2003). Endogenous information asymmetry does not only arise from MS’ inability to attend 
negotiation rounds or meetings in Brussels. Epistemic sources of information asymmetry clearly 
matter when regulatory issues such as Rules of Origin, IPR or technical barriers to trade are being 
discussed. Whereas few scholars have systematically mapped variation across the member states, 
available data already indicates the large potential to be untapped for further research. The 
insights derived from Comparative Public Administration scholarship as discussed in the 
previous chapter are particularly helpful to stimulate this effort. 
By now it has become clear that member states vary both in terms of their endogenous 
information asymmetry as well as their propensity to signal their preferences. As a result, it is 
possible to formulate my main thesis: 
In a context of multiple principals, endogenous information asymmetry is negatively related to 
principal’s control over the agent. 
In the next chapters, I will further elaborate the research framework and seek to derive a clear 
conceptualization of both dependent and independent variable. This will enable the formulation 
of more refined hypotheses. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Are the Member States caught in a collective? Using insights from principal-agent analysis this 
chapter has rejected this thesis. A case was made for the study of individual member states 
independent from the collective within which they operate. While recognizing that from a legal 
perspective the Council is a collective principal, I have suggested that applying insights from 
multiple principal models to the Council can lead to interesting new insights. The main 
mechanism to support this claim is the strict voting rules that apply in the EU’s policy-making 
process.  
In a context of multiple principals, it makes sense to study and compare individual member 
states’ actions to control the Commission and the effectiveness of such attempts. A second 
consequence is that externalities from one member state’s actions on the pay-off structure of other 
principals can trigger strategic behaviour. If the agent decides to protect a specific industry from 
import competition, this also has ramifications for those countries that are dependent on imports 
within that particular sector. Unfortunately, the framework and terminology used in existing 
applications of PA in the area of trade focuses extensively on the conceptualization of the Council 
41 
 
as a collective principal. Information asymmetry –the source of discretion- is invariable across MS 
as it is derived from the negotiating context of the agent. Similarly, notions of control largely 
focus on the rule-based mechanism that – apart from voting rights- are the same for each 
individual member state. Refinements are therefore appropriate.  
To this end, a distinction has been made between exogenous and endogenous information 
asymmetry whereby the latter focuses on the lack of oversight due to limitations within the 
principal’s administrative capabilities. Secondly, following other studies of multiple principals, a 
signalling approach towards the study of control is suggested, thereby highlighting the different 
actions a member state can take to signal their discontent. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
he previous chapter ended by formulating the hypothesis that endogenous information 
asymmetry explains variation among MS control. Endogenous information asymmetry is 
related to the functioning of the domestic administration. Weaker administrations face greater 
challenges in monitoring the Commission and, hence, are less able to exert control and influence 
over the Commission during international trade negotiations. The interpretation of the principal-
agent model as a case of multiple principals with a common agent was a vital step to enable a 
smooth integration of the comparative public administration literature on the independent 
variable’s side and the integration of negotiation theory on the dependent variable’s side.  
Despite the apparent clarity of both administrative capacity and the notion of control, conceptual 
challenges surface when trying to obtain unambiguous measures of both variables. If we assume 
that the main function of contemporary European trade administrations consists of overseeing 
and controlling the Commission during its negotiations, scope for conceptual overlap becomes 
apparent. This overlap largely arises through ambiguities concerning the independent variable. 
The first section, therefore, seeks to conceptualise administrative capacity and aims to elucidate 
the distinction between monitoring capacity and deriving capacity. The second section zooms in 
on the various measures of control that have been identified in the extant literature. Keeping the 
theoretical framework elaborated in the previous chapter in mind, I advocate the measurement of 
control as a process rather than as an outcome.  
The conceptualisation of the main dependent and independent variable is only one part of the 
broader research design. Understanding the causal drivers that link both concepts is another. The 
third section clarifies the relation between administrative capacity and control. More precisely, it 
explains why a MS’ deriving and monitoring capacity stimulates the emission of signals. In 
addition, the causal arrow does not necessarily point in one direction. We can expect that MS 
experiencing a higher need to control the Commission will adapt their administrations 
accordingly. Questions of endogeneity will also be addressed at the end of the third section. In 
the fourth and final section of this chapter, the mixed method research design used for the 
T 
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gathering and analysis of my data will be outlined. This will provide the bridge to the five 
ensuing empirical chapters. 
3.1 Administrative Capacity 
The information asymmetry between the member states and the Commission is not completely 
beyond the grasp of a member state. A MS can decide whether or not it will attend the numerous 
meetings organised in Brussels, consult actively with societal interests or ask experts in other 
ministries their opinion on a negotiation. The factors that determine this endogeneous 
information asymmetry can be largely divided in two groups. On the one hand there are the 
principal’s administrative capabilities, while on the other hand there is the (political) willingness 
to deploy such capacity in a specific negotiation. In this dissertation, I will focus largely on the 
relation between administrative capacity and control. An administration’s decision to invest 
(human) resources in a specific policy discussion is a question of political salience and 
prioritization and will be accounted for in the research design. 
A commonly used concept in Public Administration literature, the notion of ‘administrative 
capacity’ is still plagued by much vagueness nonetheless. The concept is broad and varies 
according to the many different sub-disciplines of the social sciences. The few comparative 
studies that operationalised administrative capacity often resorted to very distant proxies such as 
GDP per capita, aggregate indicators of administrative efficiency (Börzel et al. 2010), the number 
of staff in the permanent representation (Damonte and Giuliani 2012; Giuliani 2003; Kassim et al. 
2001), staff and budget of responsible line ministries (Panke 2011) or general government 
effectiveness indicators (Panke 2012). 22 In most of these studies, administrative capacity is used as 
a control to explain the (slow) implementation of EU legislation (see e.g. Borzel, Hofmann, Panke, 
& Sprungk, 2010). By contrast, I am mostly interested in the features that foster a member state to 
weigh on the formulation of the EU’s external trade policy. The relevant factors that determine a 
member state’s ability for downloading EU policy are not necessarily the same for uploading 
their preferences at the European level. Unfortunately, most work in this regard has been 
qualitative and focuses only on a limited number of cases (Beyers and Trondal 2004; Haverland 
and Liefferink 2012; Tallberg 2008). For these reasons, developing proper indicators of 
administrative capacity is paramount for a comparative study of national trade administrations.  
                                                     
22 The governance effectiveness indicators were developed as part of a broader World Bank project (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2009) 
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In the public administration literature, more attempts have been made to develop a formal 
definition of the concept. Authors like Jänicke (2001) describe administrative capacity as ‘the 
ability to perform functions, solve problems, set and achieve objectives’. Hildebrand and Grindle 
(1995) by contrast also focus on the sustainability and efficiency by which these tasks are 
performed. The United Nations Development Program combines both and defines administrative 
capacity “as the ability of individuals and organizations or organizational units to perform 
functions effectively, efficiently and sustainably” (UNDP 2006, 2). These definitions are rather 
broad and unwieldy for applied research. Therefore, Simona Milio suggests to incorporate both 
the specific functions an institute needs to perform and the goal one is trying to achieve in the 
definition of administrative capacity (Milio 2007). I am sympathetic to her reasoning, and will 
derive my own definition and measurement of administrative capacity accordingly. Trade policy 
is an exclusive competency of the European Union. The remaining functions of a national trade 
administration with respect to the EU’s international negotiations concern the monitoring of the 
Commission during these negotiations and the identification of domestic interests that might be 
at stake.23 For the purpose of this research, administrative capacity can thus be defined as: “the 
ability of a Member State to monitor the Commission and accurately derive its own preferences in 
policy discussions”.24 In the following two subsections, more attention is given to the 
conceptualization of a MS’ monitoring and deriving capacity. 
3.1.1 Monitoring the Commission 
Starting from a one-dimensional policy space (e.g. from trade protection to full liberalization) we 
can position the Commission and the Member States with respect to a specific policy issue as 
depicted in Figure 4. In such a simplified setting, monitoring would correspond to the 
observation of the Commission’s negotiating position whereas deriving concerns the 
identification of the domestic ideal outcome. Based on the observed gap between the desired 
outcome and what is being proposed by the Commission, MS signal their discontent or provide 
support to the Commission proposal.25 This summarises the main hypothesised relation in a 
                                                     
23 Member states still retain authority on trade promotion and as Chapter 4 will elaborate, there are still a few exceptions 
where authority remains with the MS also in external negotiations.  
24 Whereas others have distinguished up to nine sub-dimensions of administrative capacity (Farazmand 2009), I prefer a 
parsimonious approach relying on two components. 
25 I will make the assumption that once an administration is able to derive a position and monitor the Commission it is 
also able to put two and two together and make an adequate assessment of the gap between both positions. My definition 
of administrative capacity can easily be expanded to incorporate an administration’s ability to combine these two sets of 
information. 
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nutshell. Monitoring capacity in its simplest form involves observing the policy positions the 
Commission is taking in various discussions. Seeing that MS can observe the outcome but not the 
actions of the agent, monitoring also concerns estimating the amount of leeway the Commission 
has in negotiations and the (lack of) vigour by which the agent has effectively defended a 
particular position. Monitoring and reporting is a key aspect of the principal-agent model (Miller 
2005; Shapiro 2005). 
Figure 4: Monitoring and signalling the Commission 
 
Monitoring in the EU largely occurs through reporting requirements in the relevant Council 
working parties (Nicolaïdis, 1999; da Conceição-Heldt, 2010). The legal setting along with 
procedural rules, either formalised in the mandate or through common practice, creates –in 
essence- equal possibilities for all the MS to obtain such information. The remaining uncertainty 
regarding the Commission’s actions cannot be resolved through conventional measures and gives 
rise to exogenous information asymmetry. When comparing the interaction of principals and 
their agent in different institutional settings, it makes sense to draw on this conceptualization of 
information asymmetry (see e.g. da Conceição-Heldt, 2013). However, for the purpose of the 
envisioned research the notion of endogenous information asymmetry is of greater interest. That 
is: the information a MS could have obtained, but did not due to factors related to their own 
administrative functioning. I will discuss three potential sources of varying monitoring capacity 
and provide examples to illustrate my point. 
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The most important source of deficient monitoring capacity occurs through absenteeism in the 
oversight committees. Whereas MS and Commission have arranged a great number of reporting 
occasions at which information can be obtained on the on-going negotiations, MS can decide 
whether or not they will attend such meetings. Coming back to the example of the ACTA 
negotiations in the previous chapter, many MS did not take advantage of the opportunity to 
monitor the negotiations ad locum (Commission 2012). Until recently, not all MS even attended the 
relevant Council working parties where the Commission briefed the MS on trade negotiations, an 
observation that still applies for the increasingly popular Informal Technical Meetings (see 
Chapter 4).  
Secondly, variation can exist with regards to the representatives sent to such meetings. Some MS 
are represented by an experienced trade expert, others by a broadly trained diplomat while in 
some cases a newly hired trainee can be sent to take notes of the meeting. The amount of relevant 
information these different representatives can glean from such a briefing gives rise to variation 
in MS’ monitoring capacities.  
Finally, the observation that the Commission has frequent reporting obligations does not imply it 
will report ‘truthfully’ or rather completely. This problem has received far more attention in 
economic applications to the PA-model than in the political sciences (Laffont and Martimort 
2002). 26 The solution to this problem is often one of incentives i.e. the agent should share in the 
benefits to be derived from truthful reporting. Applied to the context of trade negotiations, the 
only incentive to be provided is the provision of discretion in future mandates. More interesting 
for the aspired research, is the ability for member states to consult a number of sources to 
complement and contrast the reports provided in the (in-) formal meetings. In addition to 
bilateral inquiries for more information, MS can exchange information amongst themselves; they 
can contact the external negotiating partner or consult the Council secretariat to paint a more 
complete picture of the negotiations. Frequently engaging in such activities will result in higher 
monitoring capacity. 
3.1.2 Deriving a position 
Next to monitoring, the trade administration also needs to derive a position. The capacity to 
derive a position accurately builds upon the assumption that there exists an objective exogenous 
optimal position for a country. For the sake of simplicity, this optimal position is considered to be 
                                                     
26 There have been a number of exceptions though (Brandt and Svendsen 2013; Lupia and McCubbins 1994) 
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defined with the purpose of delivering the greatest happiness to the greatest number. Clearly not 
all bureaucrats are ‘states-men’ adhering to the goal of maximizing aggregate welfare (Downs 
1967). All deviations, be it due to the presence of corruption, political patronage, lack of technical 
expertise or bureaucratic inefficiencies can result in a limitation of what will be termed ‘deriving 
capacity’. Clearly, affinities with policy capacity exist. Policy capacity is a loose concept. Its 
definition and key components vary widely (Baskoy, Evans, and Shields 2011; Fellegi 1996, 6; 
Painter and Pierre 2005, 5).One common element is that most definitions agree on the importance 
of knowledge and expertise and the use of such information in the policy process. Whereas 
discord pertains regarding the inclusion or exclusion of the implementation of policies as part of 
the definition, I will restrict my focus to the policy-making process. Seeing that little research has 
been conducted on ‘policy capacity’, I prefer to use the notion of ‘deriving capacity’ as it fits better 
with the developed –narrow- conceptualisation.   
If monitoring capacity serves to ensure all information regarding the negotiations reaches the 
concerned stakeholders, deriving capacity seeks to combine the input from these actors (public 
and private) into a (coherent) policy position. Two aspects are important in achieving this goal: 
the quantity and quality of the information provided by the various state and non-state actors on 
the one hand and the method through which such information is processed on the other hand.  
(1) Regarding the quality of information, a distinction can be made between state and societal 
actors. The horizontal nature of trade policy implies that many ministries are affected by its 
consequences. Whether central authority is located in the Ministries of Foreign affairs, the 
Ministry of Industry or Ministry of Economics will affect the sensitivities and available expertise 
(Allison and Halperin 1972; Jordana and Ramio 2003). Can alternative ministries provide input in 
an open coordination process or not? This will likely affect the accuracy by which a MS can 
determine its interests in an on-going negotiation.  
With respect to stakeholders in society, interest group approaches have repeatedly indicated that 
not all societal actors are equally able to overcome their collective action problems. The existence 
of concentrated and diffuse effects from trade policies were a first source to understand why 
certain groups in society were more able to mobilise than others (Olson 1971). The cleavages 
around which (protectionist) interests mobilise can be factorial (Dutt and Mitra 2006; Rogowski 
1987) , sectorial (Hiscox 2001; Ladewig 2006) or geographical (Busch and Reinhardt 2000, 2005). 
Stimulated by the rise of (preferential) reciprocal negotiations, another cleavage originated 
between societal actors that incurred costs or those that expected benefits (Chase 2003; Dür 2007b; 
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Tovar 2009). Currently, the lobbying landscape in the area of trade policy has become quite 
diverse including import-competing, import-dependent and export firms as well as NGO’s. This, 
however, does not imply all societal actors can equally weigh in the many trade negotiations that 
are currently taking place. Concerns have been expressed that smaller enterprises are largely 
absent from the policy process and that many firms do not rationally derive their interests in 
policy debates but often emulate the larger multinational firms in the sector (Woll 2008). 
Therefore, it is also important for trade officials to actively engage with societal actors. Not only 
to incorporate those interests often overlooked, but also to critically assess the true weight of an 
interest groups’ claim. Do they represent a broad interest or not? Are their fears warranted? 
Deriving a country or a sector’s interest, therefore, also requires expertise and analytical prowess 
on the side of the trade officials. Does an administration have sufficient in-house analytical 
expertise to critically assess input from interest groups (Howlett 2009; Tussie 2009)? Number of 
staff, availability of databases or on-the-job training are but a few factors that can help an 
administration to derive domestic interests more accurately. 
(2) With regards to coordination processes within MS’ public administration, Adriaan Schout has 
made a distinction in this regard between active and passive exchange of information (Schout 
1999). In the case of passive exchange of information, the line ministry does not actively inform 
other ministries leading the latter “to hunt around to find out – and influence – what the lead 
department is doing” (Schout and Jordan 2008). The method by which the coordination meetings 
deal with diverging opinions can be a second area of analysis. To reconcile the many dissenting 
voices, some form of voting rules are applied which constrain the scope for government action. If 
a lack of unanimity obstructs any position being taken, then an oversupply of information 
severely limits a MS’ capacity to exert control over the EC. 
3.1.3 Divergences with classical PA-approaches 
The above discussion in general and in particular the distinction between monitoring and 
deriving capacity has consequences for my interpretation of particular concepts common to the 
principal-agent lexicon. The first comment relates to the chosen conceptualization of 
administrative capacity. The decision to include monitoring as a component of administrative 
capacity has its ramifications for the dependent variable as well. Monitoring has consistently 
featured as a standard instrument of (ex post) control in most applications of the principal-agent 
model. For the goals set out in this research, it makes more sense to incorporate monitoring 
among the key activities of contemporary European trade administrations and to limit our 
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discussion on control as the activities undertaken by the MS to adjust the agent’s behaviour. 
Monitoring in itself does not lead to an adjustment of the Commission’s negotiating position. It 
merely acts as a precursor to the potential application of control (Krause 2003). While this 
requires adjustments to our reading of the principal-agent model, it is in no way contradicting 
prior applications of the model. It is a conceptual choice made in the context of this research 
design. 
A second remark pertains to the limitations of the distinction between fire-alarm and police-
patrol mechanisms of oversight in the application of PA analysis to the study MS monitoring in 
the EU’s external trade policy (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Police patrol is often marred for 
being too costly, leading scholars to emphasise the complementary role of societal actors as a fire-
alarm to support principals in monitoring the agent. It was originally developed in the 
Congressional dominance school to argue that a ‘seemingly dormant’ parliamentary system can 
still control an expert executive. Seeing that a Member of Parliament (MP) needs to monitor the 
executive on a wide range of topics, such fire alarms are useful in directing a MP’s attention. The 
application of the concept runs into problems if we seek to apply it to the relation between the MS 
and the Commission. In this case, we are studying a national executive that controls a 
supranational executive. What triggers a fire alarm to go off within society is the detection of fire. 
Yet, one of the main sources to provide such information to the concerned interest groups is the 
national trade administration. All information on the negotiations is centralised in these 
administrations. In the process of deriving a position most administrations will consult 
stakeholders in society. Hence, it is possible to hypothesise a reversed causality i.e. fire alarms do 
not go off to awaken a dormant principal, but rather fire alarms go off in response to a vigilant 
principal monitoring the Commission. Further research is required to elaborate the intricate 
relation between police patrol and fire-alarm mechanisms of oversight. Given the research goals 
of this dissertation, I have decided to focus only on the police patrol variant in the discussion of 
monitoring capacity.27 
  
                                                     
27 Societal actors, by contrast, will feature more prominently in relation to deriving capacity. The determination of a 
national position in light of a trade negotiation depends on input from concerned stakeholders in society. In other words, 
they can still fulfil a ‘fire-alarm function’ in terms of highlighting a discrepancy between what the Commission is 
proposing and what they believe the national interest to be. 
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3.2 Different concepts of control 
Applying a comparative design, a proper conceptualization and measurement of what is meant 
by ‘control’ is imperative. There are, unfortunately, few ready-made conceptualizations to build 
upon. Most applications of the Principal-Agent model did not need to bother with a clear choice 
of measurement as it was not concerned with comparative (either cross-sectional or longitudinal) 
research questions. That is, the large majority of empirical applications of the PA-model were 
mainly concerned with understanding the interaction between principal and agent in a particular 
policy discussion. The model is used then as a heuristic tool to elucidate the political process 
through an in-depth qualitative research design. In such a design, the choice of one particular 
operationalization of control over another is not a pressing issue as control can be observed in all 
its different conceptualizations simultaneously due to the intimacy of the researcher with the case 
under study. However, in order to make valid statements on member states’ ability to control, a 
larger population of cases is required to draw meaningful inference. Whereas different proxies 
have been developed in recent studies, it is not feasible to measure each of them for the twenty-
eight member states. Therefore, a choice needs to be made. This section seeks to achieve exactly 
that. First, I will distinguish between four categories of proxies commonly used in the literature. 
These categories are based on the manifestation of control (process or outcome) and the source of 
the gathered data (respondents or documents). In the second part, I discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different proxies and argue why a respondent-based measurement on 
instruments of control is preferred as the main dependent variable.  
3.2.1 Reviewing the literature, classifying different proxies  
According to the Oxford Dictionary, control is defined as “the power to influence or direct people’s 
behaviour or the course of events”. The clarity and obviousness of such a definition contradicts the 
complexity of translating it into a measurable –or even quantifiable- variable. How do we 
recognise control when we see it? How can we –scientifically- compare member states’ control 
over the Commission? In recent years, a plethora of studies have emerged that seek to address 
this question. We can classify these studies according to two dimensions resulting in four 
different approaches. A first dimension reflects the manifestation of control i.e. we can observe 
control as reflected through an outcome (often termed ‘influence’) or we can observe it as a 
process, the act of exerting control. The second dimension distinguishes between respondent- and 
document driven approaches. Each has their strengths and weaknesses as discussed in further 
detail below. 
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Control-as-outcome starts from the assumption that effective control should become apparent in 
policy outcomes. Put simply, if a MS obtains what it desired, it has been effective in exerting 
control. Sean Ehrlich, for example, interprets variations across the trade weighted means of the 
common external tariff as the outcome of individual member states’ actions (Ehrlich 2009). That 
is; a member state, able to obtain high tariff rates on products that are imported a lot, has been 
able to protect its import-competing industry and hence exhibits a high ability to control.  
Table 1: Measuring control: an overview 
 PROCESS OUTCOME 
 Strengths:  
o Intentionality 
o Accounts informal 
processes 
o No case-constraint 
Strengths:  
o Effectiveness of control 
o Reliability 
o No case-constraint 
RESPONDENT 
DRIVEN 
 
Weaknesses: 
o (Social desirability) 
o No effectiveness 
o Replicability 
Weaknesses: 
o ! Social desirability ! 
o Replicability 
o Internal validity (incidental 
success) 
 Examples: 
Using a survey for negotiating 
strategies (Dür and Mateo 2010a; 
Panke 2010b) 
Examples: 
The EU Decides Database (DEU) 
(Thomson 2011; Thomson et al. 2006) 
 Strengths:  
o Replicability 
o Intentionality 
Strengths:  
o Replicability  
o Effectiveness of control 
 
 
DOCUMENT 
DRIVEN 
Weaknesses: 
o (case constraint) 
o No account of informal 
processes 
o No effectiveness 
Weaknesses: 
o ! Case constraint ! 
o Reliability (coder and case) 
o Internal validity (incidental 
success) 
 Examples: 
Coding council meeting reports 
(Cross 2012) 
Examples: 
Interpreting outcomes according to an 
(implicit) social welfare function 
(Ehrlich 2009) 
 
The second perspective, by contrast, looks at control as a process and concentrates on the 
instruments applied by the member states in the act of controlling the Commission. It focuses 
more on activities undertaken by the member states to achieve control than on the consequences 
these entail in terms of shifts in policy outcomes. They can encompass anything from indicating 
red lines, threatening to veto the agreement to persuading the Commission through 
argumentation. Within principal-agent models, the focus on instruments has come quite natural. 
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From the decision to delegate over the determination of the mandate to the issue of monitoring 
and sanctioning; it is the ensuing struggle between delegating and controlling that lies at the 
heart of the PA-model. The distinction between process-and outcome based measures is reflected 
in the two columns of Table 1. 
A second classification can be made with regards to the sources of data used. On the one hand 
there are those researchers who focus on written documents or available (economic) data to 
assess member states’ control or influence, while on the other hand we can find those who rely on 
respondents’ recollection of events to measure the incidence or absence of control. Among the 
former, research focusing on control as a process has for example coded member states’ 
interventions in Council meeting reports (Cross 2012). The frequency that a member state is 
mentioned in such reports can be related to their degree of activity (or in our case control-as-
process). Unfortunately, TPC meeting reports make interventions of member states anonymous 
discrediting this approach as a viable option. Regarding outcome-based measures that rely on 
trade policy data, we can refer to the study by Ehrlich mentioned above. He used a trade-
weighted tariff rate which, combined with an (implicit) social welfare function, can measure the 
degree of control-as-outcome.  
Respondent driven research by contrast starts from the experience of involved experts as 
gathered through interviews or surveys. While many applications in the PA-literature were built 
around qualitative interviews, recent developments in negotiation theory have triggered an 
increase in the use of surveys. Most of these studies focus on the application of specific strategies 
or instruments of control. Instruments identified range from bargaining and arguing (Naurin 
2009) to the formation of coalitions within the Council (Elgström et al. 2001; Hosli 1999). One of 
the few studies that applied a comparative study on control as outcome through respondent-
based data-gathering is the DEU (The European Union Decides) database by Robert Thomson and 
his colleagues (Thomson 2011; Thomson et al. 2006). In their database, for more than 330 
controversial EU decisions, member states’ policy preferences and the salience attached to that 
position were coded. 
As with any classification, there are cases that do not fit exclusively within one of the four 
categories. The DEU database is an example thereof. In their coding exercise, document analysis 
was combined with qualitative interviews, resulting in a rich database. Diana Panke, in studying 
small states’ influence in EU decision-making focused on the use of 15 different negotiation 
activities (= process) which were then related to negotiation success (= outcome) (Panke 2011). The 
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advantage from combining different approaches lies in the ability to balance out the weaknesses 
of a singular approach. Unfortunately this comes at a cost in terms of time and resources needed 
to gather the necessary data.  
3.2.2 Comparing indicators and the need for triangulation 
Each proxy has its advantages and disadvantages. In evaluating the empirical qualities of the 
different measures, we focus on the internal validity and reliability of the indicators. Internal 
validity inquires whether the concept measures what we are really interested in. Reliability raises 
the question whether repeated measurements would yield the same result. To assess validity, a 
‘golden rule’ is often defined to identify whether a measure correctly categorises a particular case 
as a success or a failure. In other words, the ‘golden rule’ is used to assess an indicator’s ability to 
avoid type I errors (indicating control when no control was exerted) and type II errors (indicating 
the absence of control whereas control was exerted). Here, the golden rule is intentionality. 
Control is intentional or it is not. Using this rule, the argument can be made that process-based 
indicators perform better than outcome-based measures. To understand why, imagine a trade 
proposal of the Commission that lies close to a member state’s ideal outcome. In such a case no 
control is required nor exerted by the MS. However, based on the favourable outcome, we would 
be inclined to infer control. Similarly, cases can be identified where a MS has been able to thwart a 
worst-case scenario through the use of control but –based on the outcome- one might still deduce 
a lack of control. Evidently refinements can be devised to increase accuracy of outcome based 
measures, but this implies an increasingly complex research design. 28 Instruments, by contrast, 
are only invoked if there is a willingness to alter the agent’s behaviour. Unintentional use of 
instruments of control while possible is highly unlikely. A threat to veto the agreement is not 
voiced if one has no intention to alter the Commission’s position. It is important to note though 
that outcome indicators have the advantage of incorporating an element of effectiveness in their 
measurement. By counting the number of instruments applied, we still do not know anything 
about the effects obtained from the exerted control (effective influence). According to this 
standard, outcome-based measures perform better than instruments-of-control. 
Internal validity is also affected by on the data-source used. For respondent-driven research, the 
questions raised can evoke socially desirable answers resulting into invalid measures of control. 
                                                     
28 One refinement concerns the construction of a counterfactual outcome in the event no control was exerted. This implies 
knowledge of the preference of all other principals and the salience attached to it (see e.g. Thomson et al., 2006). 
Unfortunately, this also diminishes feasibility and reliability.  
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When questioning a MS’ ability to exert control, respondents can exhibit a tendency to overstate 
their performance seeing that they are requested to make a judgment regarding their own 
functioning. This problem is less pertinent for document-driven measures. Nevertheless, the 
latter indicators are prone to a different bias as their measurement is limited to the data that is 
(publically) available. We can only code or measure that which we can observe. Regarding the 
use of ‘control as process’ this obscures the many negotiating activities taking place outside the 
confines of a council working party meeting. Similarly, inferring control from the tariff rates on 
certain products might obscure the concessions obtained on non-tariff barriers.  
Reliability of the indicator reflects the odds by which repeated measurements would amount to 
the same outcome. A distinction is made here between case-reliability and coder-reliability. Case 
reliability focuses on the sensitivity of our inferences to the cases under investigation. If we were 
to focus on the association agreement between the EU and Algeria, salience differs widely for the 
Mediterranean and Northern member states. Domestic interests – and the propensity for control- 
are highly contingent on the cases studied. 29 Addressing this problem is harder for document-
based measures of control, as we need to ensure that as many cases as possible are included in the 
analysis to reduce biases. When focusing on respondents, this can be realised in a single 
measurement as one respondent can shed his/her light on the overall use of instruments over a 
wide range of cases. Of greater importance for the assessment of reliability is the degree to which 
the measurement is affected by the researchers’ personal judgments. Whereas the room for 
interpretation with respondents-based indicators is limited, this is not the case when resorting to 
document-based indicators. According to which rules do we judge the obtained outcome to be 
desirable for a concerned member state? Can we even make a generalising assumption regarding 
their ideal outcomes? If each MS has a distinct utility function, interpreting policy outcomes is 
difficult and rather subjective. The same applies when interpreting control as a process. Indeed, 
what might be termed a strong signal to one researcher may be a weak signal for another 
depending on negotiating culture or the manner in which the concern was voiced.  
It is clear that each proxy has its advantages and disadvantages. Ideally all different proxies are 
measured and triangulated, allowing a more accurate, balanced view of control. Unfortunately, as 
Voltaire indicated: le mieux est l’ennemie du bien; therefore a choice is needed to keep the analysis 
feasible. For my research purposes, I prefer to approximate control-as-a-process through 
                                                     
29  One way to overcome the limited reliability for outcome based measures is to incorporate a sufficient large amount of 
cases. Evidently this has ramifications for the feasibility of the research design. 
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respondent-based data. This choice is instigated by the challenges associated with the study of 
European trade policy decisions. Research has indicated that after the enlargement informal 
processes have become increasingly important (Elsig 2010). The ability to obtain an insight into 
activities that do not show up in official documents or go by unnoticed to other participants is an 
important advantage of respondent-based proxies such as a survey (Dür & Mateo, 2010: 689). A 
second motivation to focus on respondent-based data gathering is a matter of feasibility. Gaining 
access to the TPC meeting reports is no easy feature and it remains to be seen whether it mentions 
the intervening member states explicitly in sufficient cases. Based on the few reports I was able to 
access, serious doubts can be cast on these reports’ usefulness for the envisioned research goals. 
The same applies to the coding of negotiated outcomes. The importance of the trading partners 
tends to vary substantially across the member states and with it the need and willingness of a 
member state to control the Commission. In order to obtain a representative sample a wide range 
of issues in a wide range of negotiations should be coded to limit potential biases due to sample 
selection.  
An additional advantage of using respondents as a source of information is that both the use of 
instruments as well as the resulting outcome can be inquired in a single survey. Evidently, the 
problem of social desirability needs to be tackled. This issue is less problematic when information 
is requested on the use of a specific instrument, especially if the underlying research objectives 
are kept private. Self-reported survey-data obtained by Panke was found to be quite robust when 
cross-checked with responses from other member states’ and Commission (Panke, 2010). For 
these purposes, I decide to focus primarily on control as a process and this through a respondent-
driven approach. A secondary proxy will be the effectiveness of the control exerted i.e. the 
outcome.  
 
3.3 The relation between administrative capacity and control 
The conceptualization elaborated in the previous sections already shed some light on how 
administrative capacity and control as signalling are related to one another. The first sub- section 
seeks to explicate the hypothesised causal relation in greater detail. How do the various 
components of administrative capacity affect signalling? And would the finding of a correlation 
imply all Member States benefit from increasing their administrative capacity? Having clarified 
these questions, the second sub-section presents the research design through which the empirical 
analysis will take place. 
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3.3.1 Configuration of administrative capacity and the propensity to signal 
As discussed in the previous chapter, low monitoring capabilities result in higher information 
asymmetry between principal and agent. This information asymmetry strengthens the 
Commission as it provides various means to neutralise MS protest by appealing e.g. to the limited 
negotiating room, the extent of its efforts or the relative isolation of the MS within the Council. 
The reason it is able to do so credibly is the lack of information on the side of the MS. Such 
information is crucial to invalidate the Commission’s retorts. Even in the event that concrete 
concessions are being granted, low monitoring capacity result in a MS becoming easily 
complacent as the potential gain to be obtained from further protest is unbeknownst to the 
administration. By consequence, limited monitoring capacity does not necessarily affect the range 
of issues on which signalling takes place, but rather the frequency and severity by which a MS 
will keep signalling in response to the Commission’s actions. 
The consequence of low capacity in terms of deriving a position requires further explanation. 
Indeed, limited deriving capacity only makes a statement about the odds by which a MS can 
accurately derive the objective exogenous optimal position. Recall, that deriving capacity is 
related to the ability of an administration to approximate such an ideal outcome. Whether this 
leads to increased signalling is a separate question. The biases a limited capacity creates with 
respect to the estimation of the gap between a MS’ desired outcome and the Commission’s 
negotiating position, can be one of three types: (1) it can exaggerate the size of a gap between the 
Commission’s proposal and the domestic interests, (2) it can underestimate said gap or (3) it 
might result into lack of knowledge on the existence of a potential gap. In the latter two 
situations, it is clear that we will see fewer signals being sent (see Figure 4). In the first instance, a 
MS will seek to exert control even if it is not warranted. It results in a type I error, also termed a 
false positive. In the second and third case, we observe the opposite i.e. no control is signalled 
even though it might have been desirable. This is a type II error, or a false negative. The overall 
effect of deriving capacity on signalling is thus determined by the distribution of cases across 
these three types. If the false negatives are more likely than the false positives, limited deriving 
capacity results in less control overall. I expect this to be the case for the following reason: 
First of all, there are no a priori reasons to expect that the number of cases where limited deriving 
capacity results into an exaggeration of the gap (type 1) trumps the number of cases where said 
gap was underestimated (type 2). Following the assumption that each of these situations is 
equally likely, the third category –absence of knowledge about the existence of a potential gap- 
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determines the overall effect of deriving capacity on control. I believe this final category the most 
likely effect of limited deriving capacity. When the Commission gives the opportunity for MS to 
comment a policy proposal, it is up to the MS to identify the various issues at which the national 
position deviates from the proposal. Lack of technical expertise or limited input from societal 
groups is likely to limit the amount of issues that can be identified and thus the potential of 
signals to be emitted.  
Whereas our expectations regarding an administration that scores low (high) on both dimensions 
of administrative capacity is relatively straightforward, one could raise questions regarding the 
possibility of asymmetric capacity. What if a MS sees but does not know? Or what if it knows, but 
cannot see? My a priori expectations are that the two particular situations are less probable to be 
observed empirically. Both monitoring and deriving are functions that are intrinsically linked 
within the national administrative network. In some Member States both tasks are even 
performed by the same staff members. In the remaining cases, where functions are clearly 
separated, it requires large bureaucratic hurdles to enable a divergent deriving and monitoring 
capacity. In other words, the information flow must be significantly constrained between the 
responsible units. In addition, central authority to address such shortcoming should be lacking or 
incapable at interfering.  
In summary, I expect member states with higher administrative capacity (both monitoring and 
deriving) to signal the Commission more frequently, ceteris paribus. 
3.3.2 Endogeneity 
In studying the relation between administrative capacity and a member states’ ability to exert 
control, a second question to be addressed is the issue of endogeneity. The need to apply control 
is related to the specific interests a member state seeks to defend. Going back to Figure 4, it is 
clear that, if the Commission’s proposals are close to that of the member state, control is rarely 
required. Likewise, in the event that a member state expects other MS within the Council to 
defend a similar interest, they can free ride on other MS’ actions without having to negotiate with 
the Commission itself. Hence, MS differ among one another with regards to the demand for 
control they experience. 
Evidently, if such demand for control is relatively fixed and stable, it is not hard to imagine a 
Member State adjusting its administrative capacity correspondingly. Reversing the direction of 
causality, we might therefore argue that control determines administrative capacity. Formulated 
differently, the required administrative capacity is a function of the size of the MS economy and 
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the need for control. This problematizes the research design as any correlation uncovered 
between administrative capacity and the frequency of signalling can point in two opposing causal 
directions. In this case the problem of endogeneity arises due to an underlying latent factor 
driving both the dependent and the independent variable: the demand for control (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994, 189).  
Even if the relationship between administrative capacity and control is affirmed, this should not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that all principals should enhance their capacity. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the decision to delegate depends to a large extent on the balance between 
the aspired benefits on the one hand and the costs associated with monitoring the agent (agency 
costs) as well as the costs associated with the agent acting against the principal’s interests (agency 
slippage) on the other hand. Increasing administrative capacity increases agency costs while 
constraining the potential of agency slippage. An expansion or reform of the administration is 
only useful insofar as the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal costs of such a reform. I expect 
the relation to go predominantly in the hypothesised direction though. The (in-)effective 
functioning of a public administration is determined by a range of factors. These can range from 
historical dependencies (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005), institutional frictions (McGuire 2011) to 
issues such as leadership. Among all such explanations, a rational cost-benefit analysis is but one. 
Moreover - at the risk of being branded as a rational-choice institutionalist- I assume it to be more 
likely that ‘context determines conduct’ (Hay 2002, 53) than that structure has been adjusted to 
suit the experienced needs of the agents. Therefore, should a correlation be found, I consider it to 
be an affirmation of the hypothesised causal relation.30  Still, one has to be cautious when drawing 
lessons in case a firm relation were to be established between administrative capacity and control. 
3.4 Mixed method research design 
With the conceptual ambiguities surrounding the distinction between member states’ 
administrative capacity and their ability to exert control having been clarified; the remaining 
steps to be taken concern the collection of data and its ensuing analysis. The following five 
chapters serve such a purpose.  
Having a clear a priori hypothesis, I seek a confirmatory research design. With the purpose of 
testing this hypothesis a survey design will be used. However, the limited knowledge on the 
                                                     
30 Nonetheless, to address the issue of endogeneity, I will include a measurement of the ‘demand for control’ in the 
analyses in Chapter 8. 
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decision-making process in the Member States warrants preparatory exploratory research to 
construct a sensible survey instrument. Similarly, with the aim of identifying the relevant policy 
arenas and most prevalent ways of signalling the Commission, a qualitative inquiry into how the 
MS actually interact with the Commission is no excessive luxury. The relative strengths of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods force me towards a sequential mixed methods 
research design (Bergman 2011). In the terminology of Morse & Niehaus (2009) the core of the 
research is quantitative and deductive, but it benefits from supplementary qualitative research. 
Whereas a large portion of the literature on mixed method research designs have applied a 
typological account (see e.g. Creswell, 2006), others have advocated against it, indicating it can 
constrain the wealth of possible research designs (Bergman 2011; Maxwell and Loomis 2003). I 
follow the latter and distinguish between three stages in my analysis. 
Whereas the key concepts and their relation have been conceptualised in this chapter, obtaining 
good proxies to conduct the confirmatory analysis requires better knowledge on the subject. To 
this end, the empirical research starts with exploratory pilot studies to improve our 
understanding of both the context in which MS interact with the Commission as well as the 
manner in which national trade administrations formulate a position. The data thus obtained 
informs the development of a survey instrument that is both adequate and relevant given the 
context in which trade policy is being made. This approach will be applied both to the dependent 
and independent variable. 
To obtain a more detailed understanding of how the Member States usually interact with the 
Commission, interviews were conducted with six respondents hailing from the various European 
institutions. The qualitative data enables me to supplement the traditional legal perspective with 
an administrative perspective, identifying various ways in which the MS can signal the 
Commission. It also facilitates a greater understanding of the peculiarity of the EU’s external 
trade policy in comparison to the other components of the CCP. As such an ex-post legitimation of 
the choice to focus on external trade policy will be presented in Chapter 4. The qualitative 
insights together with insights from Negotiation theory as well as the ‘adapted PA-framework’ 
form the basis for the questionnaire that was distributed in a second stage. The respondents to 
this survey are the members of the different formations of the Trade Policy Committee (TPC). In 
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addition to elaborating the survey instrument, Chapter 5 will also formulate and test a number of 
propositions based on the collected data.31  
A similar approach is used to gather data on the independent variable. To obtain comparable 
measures of administrative capacity for the 28 Member States, I conducted 24 qualitative semi-
structured interviews with trade officials (TO) in three MS (Belgium, Estonia and Spain). The 
selection of the case-countries, the topic list used and the information obtained from the 
interviews are discussed in Chapter 6. On the basis of this information, and supplemented by the 
literature on Comparative Public Administration, the chapter concludes with the development of 
a second survey instrument. As with the measurement of MS signalling behaviour, various 
propositions will be derived and tested in Chapter 7.  
Once data on the dependent and independent variable has been collected, the testing of the main 
hypothesis can take place. This will be the focus of Chapter 8. Follow-up interviews have been 
used to help understand deviations from the expected results and derive alternative explanations 
or substantiate prior findings. These interviews have also been used to validate the quantitative 
data-set constructed on the basis of the survey-data.  
  
                                                     
31 To distinguish between the main hypothesis which pertains to the link between the dependent and independent 
variable and the hypotheses formulated with respect to either the dependent or the independent variable, I will use the 
notion of a proposition to signify the latter. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
MEMBER STATE REPRESENTATION IN THE EU’S TRADE 
POLICY 
 
efore constructing the survey to measure the dependent variable, it is appropriate to obtain 
an elaborate view on how the member states are involved in the policy making process. The 
starting point of this discussion is the legal framework that determines the setting within which 
such interaction takes place. The general decision-making process for external trade negotiations 
was already introduced briefly in the discussion of the PA-model. However, it is helpful to 
elaborate what the MS have actually delegated to the European Union; at which stages of the 
policy process they can influence the Commission and when or how European and national 
parliaments are involved. This will be the subject of the first section. 
How policy is determined de iure often differs from the de facto process. Older empirical work on 
the EU’s external trade policy has occasionally shed light on these differences (Johnson 1998; 
Murphy 2000; Niemann 2004). Unfortunately, much of this research was conducted at a time 
when the Lisbon Treaty was not yet into force32, or even before the Eastern enlargement took 
place.33 Moreover, as fieldwork is often tailored to address particular research questions the 
documented research is often suboptimal for the envisioned research goals. A qualitative inquiry 
was therefore considered both timely and appropriate. A second, more pragmatic, reason to 
conduct interviews is to obtain first-hand information rather than relying on my interpretation of 
other scholars’ research.  
As discussed in the first chapters, the member states exert control largely through their 
participation in the Council of Ministers. Seeing that much of the preparation take place in many 
of the Council working parties, interviews were used to inquire into the role and influence of 
these working parties. Who represents the MS in these meetings and how are the various working 
                                                     
32 Instead scholars have mainly documented the legal changes induced by the Lisbon treaty from which expectations were 
developed regarding its impact on political dynamics and their resulting outcome (Bungenberg 2010; Woolcock 2010). 
Empirical research –understandably- is still limited at this point. 
33 A notable exception is Manfred Elsig’s account of post-Lisbon interaction between member states and Commission 
(Elsig 2010). His findings suggest an increase of informal decision-making due to the enlarged Council. 
B 
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parties related to one another? During the interviews it also became apparent that MS have 
additional forums to influence the Commission in its external trade policy. While not aspiring to 
be exhaustive, I will expand on the Informal Technical Meetings organised by the European 
Commission and the rotating Council Presidency as supplementary channels of influence over 
the Commission. A third sub-section will be devoted to European Parliament. While the focus of 
this dissertation is solely on the Member States, omitting the European Parliament from this 
discussion would do injustice to their growing role in the EU’s CCP.  A conclusion sums up the 
main findings and draws lessons for the development of the ensuing survey. 
4.1 The legal framework 
The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is an exclusive competency of the European Union (Art. 
3(1e) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). This implies that only the Union 
may legislate and adopt legally binding acts (Art. 2 TFEU). Further specifications on the scope 
and arrangements for exercising this competency are laid out in Art.207 and Art. 218 of the TFEU. 
Since the Lisbon treaty, the scope of the exclusive competencies of the EU has expanded from 
trade in goods to encompass trade in services, investment and trade related intellectual property 
rights (Art. 207(1) TFEU). Member states still retain authority on services trade for three particular 
issues:  
1. “trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these agreements risk prejudicing the 
Union's cultural and linguistic diversity” (Art. 207(4a) TFEU), 
2. “trade in social, education and health services, where these agreements risk seriously 
disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of 
Member States to deliver them” (Art. 207(4)bTFEU) and 
3. “The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport” 
(Art. 207(5)TFEU) 
The existence of these exceptions grants scope for mixed competencies in the CCP. This has two 
consequences: firstly, regulations or negotiations that touch upon issues that fall under Member 
States’ authority are not approved by qualified majority but need to be taken by Common 
Accord. The latter is an enforced vote through unanimity. Secondly, it also implies that the 
Member States’ parliaments need to ratify the resulting legislation in addition to the Council and 
the EP. 
The provisions to exercise the Union’s competency vary according to the type of policy 
instrument. There are basically three different procedures through which the EU governs its 
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trade policy. In general, the CCP is subject to the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (Art. 207(2) 
TFEU). This procedure applies to topics generally classified as “autonomous trade policy” and 
will be discussed in the first subsection. However, much trade decisions originate through 
international negotiations either multilateral in the WTO, bilateral or pluri-lateral. In a 
negotiation a decision needs to be made regarding the institution or country negotiating on behalf 
of the Member States. The process of delegation and the ensuing negotiation is governed 
according to Art. 207 (3-5) and Art. 218 TFEU and will be explained in the second sub-section. 
Finally, for the execution of a number of trade policy decisions that do not require drastic changes 
to the existing legislation, competencies can be delegated to the Commission. The use of 
delegated and implementing acts (Art. 290 & 291 TFEU) in matters of trade pertains mostly to the 
use of trade defence instruments. While interesting in its own right, it lies outside the scope of 
this dissertation.34 
4.1.1 Autonomous Trade Policy  
One of the major innovations of the Lisbon treaty with respect to trade policy was the application 
of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) to the CCP. Legislation that needs to be approved 
according to the OLP is drafted by the Commission, after which European Parliament and 
Council engage in an iterative process of amending the proposal. The European Parliament is the 
first to propose amendments. Each party, in turn, can decide to accept the proposed amendments, 
suggest alternative ones or reject the proposal altogether. In case Council and Parliament do not 
reach agreement after two rounds (readings), a conciliation procedure is started to facilitate the 
conclusion of an agreement (Art. 294 TFEU).35 Before the TFEU was implemented, European 
Parliament was only ‘consulted’ on these issues. 
The OLP applies to all decisions the EU can take autonomously without another country’s 
approval. It concerns amongst others, the Union’s system of unilateral preferences towards the 
least developed countries. But also alterations to the internal decision-making framework for 
matters of the CCP are approved through the OLP. Examples thereof include the 
“modernisation” of trade defence instruments (anti-dumping and safeguard mechanisms) or the 
Omnibus regulations. To ensure that all secondary trade legislation is conform the new system of 
                                                     
34 For a good overview of the factors that shaped the transformation of the EU’s secondary legislation see Héritier, Moury, 
Bischof, & Bergström (2013) and (Brandsma and Blom-Hansen 2012). For more on the political economy of the EU’s 
attempt to reform anti-dumping policy between 2006 and 2008, see De Bièvre & Eckhardt (2011) 
35 In practice, the responsible working party and the parliamentary committee often convene in trilogue meetings to reach 
an early agreement (Farrell and Héritier 2004).  
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delegated and implementing acts, the Commission drafted the Omnibus I and Omnibus II 
legislative proposals. The former sought to bring all regulations that previously fell outside the 
comitology system within the new structure of delegating and implementing acts whereas the 
latter sought to realign existing legislation under comitology with the new system. As the EU can 
decide on these issues independently from other countries, the topics subject to the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure have been classified as “autonomous trade policy” (Woolcock 2012, 51). It 
is interesting to note that decisions on the bilateral safeguard clauses within international trade 
agreements are also decided according to the OLP.36  Because it concerns the internal processes 
determining the conditions by which such safeguards can be applied, it does not require 
international agreement and is, therefore, subject to the OLP.  
In light of the broader research goals it is important to highlight that, for legislation approved 
according to the OLP; it is near-impossible to fully assess MS’ influence without factoring in both 
the preferences of the European Commission ánd European Parliament. In such a situation, 
concessions to be obtained from the Commission are not only conditional on the position of the 
other member states in the Council, but also the majority of MEPs. This complicates the study of 
Member States’ activity and influence in the CCP and was one of the factors that led to my 
decisions to focus exclusively on external trade negotiations. 
4.1.2 International Negotiations 
Not all trade policy is determined at home. Changes to the EU’s CCP are often the result of 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In international negotiations the EU needs to speak with a 
single voice. By consequence a second delegation is required that allows the Commission to 
negotiate on behalf of the 28 member states as represented in the Council (Meunier 2003, 78). Art. 
218 TFEU elaborates the relation between Commission and MS in international negotiations. 
Approval to open negotiations occurs through the adoption of a negotiation mandate. The 
mandate stipulates the scope, ambitions and boundaries of the negotiations. This mandate is 
drafted by the Commission and tabled for discussion in the Council (Art. 207(3) & Art.218 (2) 
TFEU).  Once the Council adopts a mandate, the Commission can start the negotiations. The 
European Parliament plays no formal role in the decision on the mandate. Instead, it often adopts 
a resolution prior to the negotiations to indicate their preferences early onwards. This occurred in 
                                                     
36 A safeguard clause enables a partner to the trade agreement to temporarily halt the liberalization of specific products in 
case the imports have increased so drastically that it threatens the domestic industry’s survival.  
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advance of the EU negotiations with Japan (European Parliament, 2012) as well as the TTIP 
negotiations (European Parliament, 2013). The Commission negotiates while consulting a special 
committee appointed by the Council i.e. Trade Policy Committee (TPC). The Commission also 
reports regularly to the TPC and the European Parliament on the progress of negotiations (Art. 
207 (3)). This latter requirement is reinforced by Art. 218 (10) as it stipulates that the Parliament 
has to be: “fully and immediately informed during all stages of the negotiations”. Whereas the 
Commission consults the TPC, it merely informs the European Parliament, suggesting a different 
status of both legislative institutions (Woolcock 2010, 12). The importance of the TPC is also 
confirmed in the provisions of art. 207 (3) that stipulates that the TPC “assists the Commission in its 
task” (emphasis added) acknowledging the expertise embedded in member states’ trade 
administrations. 
Once the negotiations approach completion, the Commission forwards the agreement to the 
Council which can decide to conclude the agreement after the EP has given its consent (Art. 218 
(6) TFEU). Both the opening and conclusion of negotiations are normally decided by qualified 
majority insofar as the agreement falls under the Union’s exclusive competency (Art. 207(4) & 
Art. 218(8) TFEU). Whereas the Council can adopt negotiating directives and has ample 
opportunities to voice its concerns through continuous interaction with the TPC, the EP’s consent 
implies accepting or rejecting the complete agreement. This does not necessarily mean they have 
little influence. As mentioned above, the bilateral safeguard clauses incorporated in FTA’s are 
adopted according to the OLP. The EP made sure no consent would be given if its demands 
regarding the EU-Korea safeguard clause would not be accepted. That a number of amendments 
suggested by the EP affected the broader agreement, may add credence to the EP’s growing 
influence over the content of trade agreements (Richardson 2012, 18–20). 
As many of the new and comprehensive trade agreements encompass a wide array of topics, it 
can occur that certain provisions fall under member states’ authority. For such mixed agreements, 
a slight adaptation in the procedure is required (Art. 207 (5) & Art. 218 (8) TFEU). In such a case, 
the mandate can only be adopted by Common Accord. Common Accord is a reinforced 
unanimity rule stipulating that member states cannot abstain in a vote. The question whether the 
TTIP mandate impinged on member states’ competency and therefore be approved through 
Common Accord fuelled discussions leading up to the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) Trade of 14 
June, 2013 (Inside US Trade, 13 June, 2013). But also the eventual ratification of mixed agreements 
is more complex. As they cover both Union and national competency, they still require approval 
by the member states’ parliaments. Even if ratification is mostly just rubber-stamping, this 
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procedure can seriously delay the implementation of the trade agreement. For that reason, the 
Commission has developed a custom to simultaneously adopt provisional trade agreements 
which can be implemented directly. These provisional agreements are stripped down versions of 
the complete agreement to cover only those matters belonging to the union’s exclusive 
competencies. On a proposal of the Commission, the Council can decide to provisionally apply an 
agreement before its entry into force according to Art. 218(5) TFEU.  
4.2 Exploring MS interaction with the Commission 
What is established de iure is not always as representative of how European institutions interact 
among each other de facto. To supplement the legal framework, more practical insights are 
required. In total, eight in-depth interviews were conducted with trade officials in the Council 
secretariat, the Commission, the member states and the rotating Presidency with the ulterior 
motive of obtaining a better understanding of the interaction between MS and Commission. 
Knowing how the MS -as represented within the Council- interact with the Commission is of 
great importance when studying the Member States in European trade policy. But also outside 
the council (committee) structure there are other channels in the policy-making system through 
which a member state can defend their national interests. In the second sub-section, I will focus 
on two such venues i.e. the Informal Technical Meetings organised by the European Commission 
and the rotating Presidency of the Council. 
4.2.1 Participating in the Council 
By treaty, MS’ legal authority is intrinsically bound to that of the Council of Ministers. Before the 
Lisbon treaty, trade policy decisions were part of the broad agenda of the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council. Since the TFEU entered into force, the renamed Foreign Affairs 
Council (FAC) deals with all issues of the EU’s foreign affairs. It meets twice a year to focus solely 
on matters of trade.37 Prior to the implementation of the Lisbon treaty, it could occur that final 
decisions on matters of trade were taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister 
of a MS, despite such competency belonging to a different minister. This could occasionally create 
tensions between the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of economy in a number of 
                                                     
37 In April 2013, the Irish presidency also convened the first informal FAC Trade to meet with the ministers a first time in 
an informal setting. From the side of the presidency, the aim was to prepare and facilitate discussions on the ratification of 
a mandate for the Commission to negotiate a trade agreement with the United States. This ratification eventually took 
place a few months later in the formal FAC Trade (Interview, TO#22, #25, and #27).  In the past, the MS’ ministers of trade 
also convened informally in preparation of the GATT negotiation rounds (Johnson 1998, 18).  
67 
 
member states. In the current FAC Trade, the economic ministries are strongly represented. 
During the approval of the TTIP mandate, fourteen member states were represented by a 
representative from an economic ministry (industry or economy) whereas only seven hailed from 
other ministries (mostly Foreign Affairs) the remaining six MS were represented by their 
Permanent Representation (Council, 2013: pp 4-5).38 Notwithstanding the existence of a formal 
FAC Trade, it does occur regularly that trade decisions are approved in different council 
configurations. This is possible because all formations of the Council of Ministers are one and the 
same emanation of the legal entity that is the Council. Adoption of trade legislation by other 
formations than the FAC Trade generally occurs for those issues where agreement had already 
been reached in the Council working parties (see infra). 
Strictly speaking, all authority lies within the Council of Ministers. Most decisions are, 
nevertheless, prepared or even taken at a more bureaucratic level. Before tabling a proposal for 
legislation to the Council, it has been discussed and prepared by different Council Working 
Parties. Involvement in the working party stages is important especially for international 
negotiations. In these cases, the briefings provided by the Commission in the working parties are 
the main source of information for the Member States. There are two working parties that are 
important for trade policy issues. These are the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) as established in 
article 207 of the TFEU (see supra) and the Working Party on Trade Questions (WPTQ).  
Within the TPC, discussions take place on international trade negotiations. From the 
determination of the mandate, over the discussion of particular proposals to the eventual 
ratification of the agreement: all issues pertaining to trade negotiations are covered within the 
TPC. The Trade Policy Committee meets in Full Members (titulaire) each month in Brussels as 
well as with the start of a new presidency of the Council. In addition to the Full Members 
formation, the committee also convenes at the deputy-level on a weekly basis (suppléant). The 
difference between both formations is mostly one of authority. The TPC Full Members is attended 
by directors-general on the part of the Commission and senior officials of equivalent level from 
within the member states. This distinction also manifests itself with regards to the issues tabled 
for discussion in the different TPC formations. Topics addressed in Full Members tend to be 
politicised and selective whereas discussions in TPC Deputies are more in-depth and 
comprehensive. The exclusive focus of the Full Members on the political issues is reflected in the 
                                                     
38 In the coding, I classified ministers or state secretaries of trade policy according the ministry of which they are a part or 
on which they rely for the preparation of a policy position.  
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frequency and duration of the meetings. A deputy meeting lasts about a full day each week 
whereas a meeting of the Full members occurs only once a month, and lasts only half a day 
(Interview, TO#25).  
In a number of smaller member states, the Full Member is also in charge of representing the 
country in multiple other (high-level) working parties, making him/her less specialized in trade 
topics and highly dependent on input from the deputy (Interview, TO #28). This observation was 
also confirmed when distributing the developed survey (see Chapter 5). Upon replying to my 
invitation, multiple Full Members declined to participate and suggested I had better contacted the 
Deputy member as “he/she was more knowledgeable on the subject”. This, however, does not 
imply all issues are previously discussed in the TPC deputies. In some occasions it can occur that 
an initial discussion in deputies reveals that further discussions should exclusively take place at 
the level of full members. This was the case for the provision of a mandate to negotiate a free 
trade agreement with the United States. Similarly the mandate for the trade negotiations with 
Japan was only discussed briefly at the deputy-level but most decisions took place at TPC full 
members (Interview, TO#25). Internal coordination between the different TPC representatives is 
therefore quite important. 
The TPC also has three spin-off formations: TPC STIS (Steel, Textiles and other Industrial 
Supplies), TPC Mutual Recognition and TPC Services and Investment (S&I). TPC STIS originated 
through the merger of TPC Steel and TPC Textiles. As the name indicates, this meeting largely 
deals with trade in industrial goods and textiles. However, this particular expert meeting is 
fading out of existence. Meetings occur less and less frequently, and a number of MS have 
decided –as a matter of principle- not to attend these meetings any more. The TPC Mutual 
Recognition deals with technical product standards. This formation exists on paper only, does not 
convene and is part of the responsibility of DG Enterprise and Industry (Interview, TO#32; 
Commission 2004). The only remaining, important spin-off formation is the TPC S&I which is 
quite active and convenes every two weeks. Topics addressed during these meetings pertain to 
trade in services and foreign investment. The discussions often pertain to technical details and 
relatively new, complex matters that fall outside the scope of the TPC Deputies. Its agenda has 
increased drastically over the last years due to the widening and deepening of the trade agenda. 
To address these developments, meetings have recently been extended to last a full day. By 
organising a morning and afternoon session, MS with dual representatives (one for services and 
one for investment) can participate in the discussions of their respective field of expertise 
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(Interview, TO#29). The rising importance of TPC S&I to the detriment of TPC STIS reflects the 
broader economic trends within the Union.  
In addition to the TPC, there is another working party where trade issues are discussed in the 
Council. The Working Party on Trade Questions (WPTQ) is almost as old as the TPC, and deals 
with the general policy framework for the CCP. Its importance severely waned in the nineties 
(Johnson 1998, 19). Nevertheless, following the implementation of the TFEU, the WPTQ has 
regained its prominence as it became the central working party to discuss all issues falling under 
the OLP (Interview, TO#25; 26). By consequence interaction between MS and European 
Parliament is largely confined to this WP rather than the TPC.  
Figure 5: Institutions for EU decision-making on the CCP 
 
Besides the TPC and WPTQ, there are a whole range of Working Parties that only deal with very 
specific trade issues or only do so occasionally. The working party on the GSP is an example of 
the former and still convenes when GSP reform needs to be discussed. The various geographical 
working parties are an example of the latter. More specifically, a trade agreement with the US has 
an important foreign policy dimension. For that reason, the Working Party focusing on Trans-
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Atlantic relations (COTRA) is also briefed on developments regarding TTIP. Briefings to such 
geographical working parties do not dwell on particular details and are generally devoid of in-
depth discussions. From the side of the Commission, there is also an explicit preference to contain 
all discussions on trade within the TPC. In the event that a geographical working party places a 
trade topic on the agenda, DG trade will go to the meeting and explain their position (Interview, 
TO#25). A similar logic applies to the discussion of sectorial issues such as the liberalization of 
trade in agricultural produce. While the Special Committee on Agriculture can discuss such 
issues, it is in the TPC that MS needs to voice their concerns with regards to specific provisions in 
a piece of trade legislation. By consequence it is up to the Member States to coordinate internally 
with the agricultural ministries to ensure their interests can be defended in the TPC meetings. 
If no agreement can be reached in the working parties, the issue will be tabled for discussion at a 
senior political level. In first instance, this will be the Committee of Permanent Representations 
(COREPER), if no agreement can be reached at this level; the responsible Ministers try to solve the 
issue in the FAC Trade. Formally, the FAC’s approval is required for many issues but real 
discussions are a lot less frequent at the ministerial level. If agreement can be obtained within the 
council working parties it will be rubber-stamped in the FAC as a so-called ‘A-list item’. If debate 
is required in COREPER or the Council of Ministers, it is placed on the agenda as a ‘B-item’. 
Scholars’ estimation of the percentage of decisions taken by bureaucrats in the working parties 
(A-items) vary widely and range from 26 to 90% (Häge 2012; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, 
2006). The involvement of bureaucrats differs across policy domains. Unfortunately, no concrete 
data is available to map the extent that trade policy issues are decided at the Working Party level. 
Several respondents indicated, however, that the large majority of decisions are taken within the 
various formations of the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) and that it is rare for a trade issue to 
reach the agenda of the COREPER or the Foreign Affairs Council (Interview, TO#22/25/28).39 One 
recent exception was the launch of the TTIP negotiation, where even the French President got 
involved. This, however, is quite rare and again, reflects only one issue in a much broader 
discussion. 
  
                                                     
39 Nonetheless, one respondent indicated that this is starting to change somewhat due to the existence of a recurrent 
convening FAC Trade (Interview, TO#22). Knowing that every six months there will be a forum where your political 
seniors can take a decision; eases of the pressure to come to a consensus within the TPC. More research is required to 
assess whether this trend is really occurring and what the real underlying causes might be. 
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4.2.2 Alternative paths to influence 
Whereas the MS are formally represented within the Council, alternative forums are useful to 
advance ones interests. I will limit the discussion to two such forums i.e. the Council’s presidency 
and the Informal Technical Meetings (ITM) as organised by the European Commission. 
The Presidency 
The FAC Trade is the sole constellation of the Foreign Affairs Council that is presided by the 
rotating presidency and not by the European External Action Service.  By consequence, a MS can 
still take advantage of this opportunity to set the (long-term) agenda. In discussing the agenda-
setting power of the rotating presidency, it is useful to distinguish between the strategic and the 
operational agenda. Each presidency has the possibility to set a particular goal it wishes to 
accomplish during its term. DG Trade has a range of long term agenda items and discusses well 
in advance with the presidency which goals are attainable. The Irish presidency for example eyed 
the adoption of a mandate to open the TTIP negotiations, for the Lithuanian presidency it was the 
finalization of the eastern partnership agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
(Interview, TO#27).40 These priorities are often determined several years in advance. The 
Commission adjusts the pace of negotiations accordingly and seeks to ensure that – if all goes 
well- a result can be obtained by the final FAC trade. As the presidency, a MS can also set the 
agenda for the TPC meetings: this is the operational agenda-setting power. These agendas are 
generally drafted by the coordination unit in DG Trade after internal discussion. As it is the 
Commission that needs to brief the MS, it is logical in a sense that they indicate on which dossiers 
they can report new developments. The Presidency can then amend it (or ask for amendments) 
before circulating it to the other Member States. 
The existence of a separate formation of the FAC to deal exclusively with trade issues and it being 
chaired by the rotating presidency facilitates trade policy-making in a number of ways. First of 
all, it grants higher visibility to the domain of trade policy. The photo-opportunity for the 
presidency when launching or finalizing negotiations, rather than having a different minister (or 
the EU’s high representative) claim the credit provides additional stimulus to the decision-
making process. Moreover, each presidency is aware of the two occasions at which a trade issue 
can be discussed at the highest political level. This stimulates a strict time-management and the 
                                                     
40 Ireland held the presidency of the Council from January to June 2013. Lithuania succeeded Ireland and held the 
presidency from July 2013 until December 2013. 
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determination of clear priorities to realise particular trade deals. The shared responsibility over 
the trade agenda by Council presidency and Commission fosters stronger goal consensus. Finally, 
there is the observation that – when only trade ministers convene- it becomes possible to clear out 
controversies at the last minute. Respondents indicated that this was not always possible before 
the Lisbon Treaty (Interview, TO#22/25). Hence, the Presidency provides MS with an opportunity 
to set the agenda, and thus shift attention towards those issues of the CCP it considers most 
pressing. 
Informal contacts with the European Commission 
Opportunities to defend a MS’ interests are not limited to the meetings taking place within the 
confines of the Council. Much interaction takes place on a continuous, daily basis between the 
MS’ administrations and Commission officials. Such contacts involve circulating draft proposals 
and soliciting MS input on particular issues. This occurs mostly through bilateral correspondence 
over e-mail (Interview, TO#25/32). The Commission makes active use of the MS expertise to 
improve its policy. Providing detailed input in response to such requests can increase a MS 
influence in the eventual proposal defended by the European Commission. 
But contacts are not limited to bilateral correspondence. The Commission increasingly organises 
so-called “Informal Technical Meetings” (ITM). Formerly, these were called the expert meetings 
(see also Johnson, 1998) but as this concept is now commonly applied in the framework of the 
delegated acts, they changed its name to avoid confusion. The ITMs deal with the nitty-gritty of 
negotiations such as rules of origin, the development of the tariff schedules offered in trade 
negotiations or discussions on intellectual property rights. On average, there are between two and 
five such meetings each month. When the agenda for the TPC meetings become overburdened, 
more and more details of the trade agreement need to be discussed in separate meetings. What 
sets these meetings apart from the TPC is that they are not organised within the committee 
structure of the Council. It is the Commission that has full discretion on deciding when or for 
which topics it is appropriate to convene a technical meeting. Its ownership over the agenda 
holds the potential for frictions between the rotating presidency and the Commission as the 
former is normally in charge of the agenda in the TPC. 
The targeted participants at these ITMs are bureaucrats from the member states’ ministries 
specialised in that particular area. By consequence, the representatives can change each meeting. 
Unfortunately, not all MS are in a position to fly over a national expert. In addition, the lack of 
translation facilities or travel reimbursements can also constrain MS participation (Interview, 
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TO#32). For such MS, people from the Permanent Representation often take part in both the TPC 
as well as the various ITM’s (Interview, TO#28). Finally, there are also member states who do not 
attend (particular) ITM’s altogether. Attendance as well as the expertise brought to such a 
meeting is likely to determine whether a MS can successfully defend its interests in a trade 
negotiation.  
Finally, the informal nature of these meetings is also reflected in a lack of attendance lists or 
written meeting reports. This is important for two reasons: on the one hand it enables the 
Commission to discuss potentially sensitive issues without having it written down in the reports; 
on the other hand the lack of such reports makes it crucial for member states to attend the 
meeting whilst they not miss out on the provided information (Interview, TO#24). 
4.2.3. Lest we forget the European Parliament 
Up until now, not much attention has been given to the role of the European Parliament (EP). 
Clearly, the focus in my research is on the MS. Nevertheless, from the earlier discussion of the 
legal framework, it became clear that legislative authority –also in external negotiations- is shared 
between Council and EP. Discussions between the Commission and European Parliament occur 
in the INTA committee. Since Lisbon, every document that goes to the Member States should also 
go to the INTA committee. There is – in other words- full transparency. ‘Limited’ documents are 
shared with all INTA members, ‘EU-restricted’ documents are only made available to the 
president and vice-presidents of the committee, the rapporteur and the coordinators of the 
political groups. Other committees and MEPs can also request access to such documents but this 
has to proceed via INTA to DG Trade (Interview, TO#25/26).  
Since the Lisbon Treaty went into force, European Parliament has gained additional powers 
(Woolcock 2010). Still, from a legal perspective, the Council has additional means of control the 
EP lacks (e.g. in the provision and adjustment of the mandate or provisional application of a trade 
agreement) However, recent experiences have taught us that much of this imbalance has been 
rectified de facto. While formally not providing a mandate, the EP adopts a resolution prior to the 
negotiation laying down their own ‘red lines’ that the Commission better not cross (see supra). 
And whereas, the Commission could ask the Council for the provisional application of a 
concluded FTA, the EP has made it clear during the ratification of EU and South-Korea FTA, that 
it would not agree to an agreement that was already provisionally being applied (Richardson 
2012). Hence, the European Parliament is increasingly leveraging its legislative powers to obtain 
influence beyond the treaty provisions. 
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Despite this growth in importance, there are still significant differences between the Council’s 
and the EP’s influence in external trade negotiations. For international trade negotiations, 
briefings also occur through the INTA committee. These briefings occur less frequently and are 
generally shorter. Whereas the TPC deputies meet weekly for almost a full day, the European 
Parliament is briefed once a month over a day and a half. The Commission also organises 
technical meetings for European Parliament, but these are more aimed at explaining new 
developments in trade policy and their economic consequences. In sum, there is a clear difference 
between the bureaucratic decision-making within the Council preparatory bodies and the 
‘reporting’ to the EP (interview, TO#25). This confirms earlier observations by Arne Niemann, 
when studying the regulation of trade in services (Niemann 2004). Without downplaying the role 
of the European Parliament –it has become a relevant and vocal player since the TFEU – their 
input into the policy-process should not be overstated. Even if the INTA committee is briefed in a 
similar fashion as the TPC, its contribution to policy outcomes both in terms of information and 
technical expertise is of a different order of magnitude than that of the member states.  
Unlike legislation subject to the OLP, direct interaction between TPC and INTA is extremely rare. 
In theory, Member States could obtain leverage over the Commission through influencing the 
European Parliament. While feasible, this path appeared to be less relevant for the member states. 
Several respondents indicated that interaction between Member States and MEPs remained 
limited (TO # 22, #26, and #30). Unlike decisions subject to the OLP, there is no clear forum where 
the TPC interacts with the EP’s parliamentary committees. By consequence, studying member 
states’ influence over the Commission independently from the involvement of European 
Parliament will not weaken the developed research design.  
Conclusions 
Three important lessons can be drawn from these observations for the study of member state 
control over European trade policy. First of all, the trade-policy making process is a bureaucratic 
rather than a political endeavour. The tendency to organise more (informal) technical meetings to 
flesh out the nitty-gritty of trade issues as well as the limited amount of issues that go all the way 
up to the FAC Trade; both suggest a strong influence of national bureaucrats over the ultimate 
outcome. This contrasts the recurrent focus on the more politicised issues and suggests additional 
insights can be obtained from applying an administrative lens to the topic. 
From this exploratory research it has also become clear that the Member states interact 
continuously with the Commission during trade negotiations. While a large portion of this 
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interaction takes place in the weekly meetings of the TPC Deputies, informal contacts are the rule 
rather than the exception. Moreover, expert groups as well as informal meetings are convened 
that enable MS to defend their interests in the more detailed, technical aspects of the trade 
agreement. Limiting one’s focus to the formal occasions for control such as the adoption of the 
mandate or the debates on the ratification would therefore do injustice to the frequent 
opportunities MS enjoy to exert control throughout the negotiating process. 
And a final lesson to be drawn pertains to the effects of the Lisbon treaty. Whereas the Lisbon 
treaty was expected to further the integration of the CCP into the EU’s external policy, based on 
the separate FAC Trade and the role the rotating presidency plays therein, we have –as of yet- no 
clear indications of this theoretical expectation crystalizing empirically. Rather the contrary. On 
the other hand, the European Parliament has indeed increased its role conform earlier 
anticipations. Nevertheless, even in light of this growing importance in international trade 
negotiations, I still feel the exclusive focus on the member states is warranted due to the relative 
isolation of MS and European Parliament throughout the negotiations. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
SIGNALLING CONTROL 
 
ow can we measure the extent by which a MS exerts control over the Commission? As 
indicated in the opening literature review, insights from Negotiation theory are 
particularly helpful in conducting a comparative study of MS involvement in the EU’s external 
trade negotiations. This literature has greatly increased our knowledge on the large variety of 
instruments a MS can wield to defend its interests. After surveying this rich tradition, a more 
modest approach will be proposed for the operationalization of my dependent variable. Rather 
than focusing on the choice and application of various tactics -the content of a signal- I will 
advocate an emphasis on the mere incidence of signalling. There are two dimensions of such 
signals that are of particular concern when taking the developed theoretical framework into 
account and that enable me to contribute to the wider literature. 
A first aspect concerns the targets of the emitted signals. Member states can either seek to obtain 
concessions by signalling the Commission directly or coordinate with the other MS to construct 
broader support for their position. Recall from Chapter 2, that we can conceive the member states 
as being part of a hybrid principal. This is the result of the qualified majority voting procedures 
applicable for ratification of an international trade agreement. On the one hand a collective action 
by the member states is required to form a blocking minority; while on the other hand, each MS’ 
individual signals carry substantial weight as a blocking minority is easily construed. Giving the 
limited voting power of the smaller MS, we can formulate the proposition that smaller member 
states have a higher tendency to apply a collective strategy as their bilateral signals lack the 
credibility of being a viable threat.  
A second contribution of this research to the broader literature consists of providing a detailed 
inquiry into the stage of the negotiations at which MS actively signal the Commission their 
preferences. The focus on international trade negotiations allows a clear demarcation of the 
various stages of the policy-making process. An additional two propositions are thus formulated 
and tested. The second proposition is derived from the idea that signalling is an iterative process. 
By consequence, we would expect that early stage involvement should result in more signalling 
rather than less. The third proposition exploits the requirement of a collective decision from the 
H 
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Council in the approval of the mandate and the ratification of the agreement. More specifically, 
the proposition asserts that member states’ that are more active during the formal stages of the 
negotiation have a greater tendency to resort to collective strategies.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section situates the proposed approach in the wider 
literature, introduces the different components of the survey and develops the main propositions 
to be tested. The second section elaborates the method of data-collection, discusses the responses 
obtained and verifies whether the data has the necessary internal validity to test the propositions. 
The third section seeks to do exactly that: test the formulated propositions after presenting the 
most important descriptive statistics. Where the results raised concerns, additional interviews 
were conducted to explore potential explanations. The key findings are summarised in the 
concluding section. 
5.1 Signalling strategies 
Negotiating strategies by the Member States in the Council have been studied increasingly over 
the last decades as the availability of cases and the quality of data gradually improved. To 
structure the various ways through which a Member State can defend its interests, “International 
Negotiation” scholars have developed various classifications (Dür, Mateo, and Thomas 2010; 
Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Naurin 2009; Riddervold 2011). Daniel Naurin provided a concise 
framework to distinguish between four strategies based on the dual distinction between arguing 
and bargaining on the one hand and competitive and cooperative behaviour on the other hand 
(Naurin 2009, 36–38). Let us first focus on arguing. Arguing can occur in either of two forms: 
deliberation or rhetorical action. The distinction arises from the cooperative or competitive nature 
of the interaction between MS and Commission. In the former, Member State and Commission 
aim to reach a deeper understanding on a particular problem and its potential remedies. In the 
latter, a Member State tries to persuade the Commission into adjusting its views in accordance to 
the MS preferences. When resorting to rhetorical action a MS seeks to defend its own interests 
and is less open for counter-arguments. This can occur for example by highlighting domestic 
constraints or framing domestic concerns into EU interests. Deliberation by contrast builds upon 
the ability of a member state to provide answers to complex puzzles others (including the 
Commission) have not been able to solve convincingly. Here, technical expertise or legal capacity 
can enable a member state to punch above its weight (Börzel 2002; Haverland and Liefferink 2012; 
Tallberg 2008). Deliberation differs from the notion of communicative action in that the latter 
particularly focuses on ‘non-strategic’ modes of interactions (Niemann 2004, 384).  
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While arguing focuses on changing each other’s preferences, bargaining takes such interests as a 
given and seeks to advance one’s interests by constructing compromises, engaging in log-rolling 
and issue-linkage or voicing threats. Many scholars have introduced various categories to 
structure the myriad of ways through which bargaining occurs. Naurin (2009) distinguishes 
cooperative from competitive bargaining. This largely reframes an earlier distinction 
differentiating between integrative and distributive bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1991). 
Integrative -or cooperative- bargaining makes appeal to the greater good and seeks to enhance 
the size of the pie (value-creating) whereas distributive -or competitive- bargaining is aimed at 
increasing one’s slice (value-claiming). 
5.1.1 From negotiating strategies to signalling tactics 
Whereas each of these classifications has greatly improved our insights into the negotiation tactics 
within the Council, I consider them less adequate for the research question I seek to address in 
this dissertation. The above categorisations produces problems as ‘the observable tactics do not 
neatly map onto the posited dimensions’ (Dür and Mateo 2010b, 682). Rare are the cases where 
we can discern pure acts of arguing and bargaining. In most cases a MS will provide an argument 
even when bargaining.41 Likewise, classifying observable strategies like voicing a threat or a 
suggesting a compromise can be both value-claiming and value-creating at the same time. It is for 
these reasons that Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo (2010b) suggested the use of soft and hard 
bargaining strategies as alternative concepts. Soft bargaining is characterised by co-operative or 
friendly behaviour whereas hard bargaining strategies relate to conflicting or aggressive tactics. 
Based on this distinction they were able to formulate a number of actions –or tactics- that can 
unambiguously be interpreted both by respondents and researchers.  
Sharing the same concern, a proper operationalization will be derived from my theoretical 
framework. The causal model developed in Chapter 3 only pertains to the incidence of signalling 
rather than the content of the message sent. Recall, that the observed gap between the 
Commission’s proposals and the MS’ preference was responsible for triggering the release of a 
signal as instrument of control. Keeping a narrow focus on the incidence of signalling rather than 
its content can also heighten reliability. Inquiring into a representative’s contacts with 
Commission or colleagues within the Council is relatively straightforward. This is not the case 
when making a distinction in the content of the different messages sent. The harder it becomes to 
                                                     
41 This was also acknowledged by Daniel Naurin, as he had to elaborate a scheme to distinguish bargaining from arguing 
through a three-step question procedure (Naurin, 2009: 42). 
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make a meaningful distinction between the various instruments defined, the less likely the 
respondent’s answers will be accurate. Seeing that such complexity is unnecessary to address the 
main research questions of this research, the more parsimonious conceptualization is preferred. 
Signalling approaches are not entirely new within Negotiation Theory, even though they are not 
always classified as such. In studying the number of interventions made by the Member States 
during the different council working parties or within COREPER, James Cross focused on the 
incidence of a MS intervention rather than the particular issue raised or the manner in which this 
intervention took place (Cross 2012).  
From the developed framework there are two dimensions of greater importance in studying the 
incidence of signals as control and that is the target of such signalling (Commission or other MS) 
and the timing at which such signals are sent. The first dimension is relatively straightforward as 
it helps us to differentiate between those MS that predominantly signal the Commission directly 
from those that prefer to act as a collective. Such distinction is important as it would help us to 
assert the ‘hybrid nature’ of the Council as both a collective and multiplicity of principals. The 
second dimension, the stage of signalling, is important to incorporate the policy dynamic in 
international negotiations. At certain –formal- stages of the negotiation the Council needs to act as 
a collective whereas at the more informal stages no such common action is required. Each 
dimension will be discussed in further detail in the following sub-sections. 
5.1.2 Exerting control as part of a hybrid principal 
Building on the conceptualization of the Council as a hybrid principal, it is useful to make a broad 
distinction between two strategies within the survey. A first strategy is bilateral in that it directly 
targets the Commission-as-agent. The second strategy is collective in nature as it aims to signal 
both a particularistic concern as well as the broader support among the different Member States. 
As a collective, the Council mostly interacts with the Commission through the different 
formations of the Trade Policy Committee. Interventions of the MS during the different Council 
working parties or within COREPER can be a first method to signal preferences within a 
collective setting. While meetings follow a recurrent structure in which any developments in the 
EU’s multilateral and bilateral negotiations are automatically covered, Member States can still 
place a topic on the agenda by contacting the Council presidency. This can help to emphasise the 
importance of a particular issue for a member state. Most often, however, MS will consult, 
coordinate, argue and bargain amongst each other to see whether it is possible to voice a concern 
collectively (Elgström et al. 2001; Hosli 1999; Kaeding and Seck 2005).  
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Bilateral strategies, by contrast, exclusively target the Commission. This can involve private 
discussions in the margin of a Council meeting, but also entails informal correspondence over the 
phone or through e-mail. In case a MS wishes to signal that a particular issue is of extreme 
importance, the responsible Minister or State Secretary can also arrange a meeting with the Trade 
Commissioner or his/her cabinet.  
Table 2: Signalling tactics and their hypothesised strength 
    Collective Signals    Bilateral Signals 
1.a  Voicing Concern in the Council Working Party 1. E-mailing the Commission 
1.b  Placing an issue on the agenda 
2.   Networking with other MS 2. Phoning the Commission  
3.   Coordinating with like-minded states 3. Requesting a bilateral meeting 
 
When focusing on the incidence of signalling rather the content of the signal; the amount of items 
to be discerned, are limited. I distinguished between three bilateral and four collective tactics as 
indicated in Table 2. Based on the insights obtained from the qualitative interviews, I targeted 
both formal and informal means by which a MS can signal their preferences. The chosen tactics 
differ with regards to their political weight. Attributing a rank in strength to the different signals 
can further differentiate between Member States and conforms to the idea that the continuous 
interaction gives ample opportunity to signal the salience of an issue. Whereas national trade 
officials continuously raise concerns to the Commission by mail or phone, I expect political costs 
to be higher for organizing personal meetings with Commission officials to discuss a particular 
issue. With regards the various collective signals, I distinguish between voicing concerns in the 
TPC or placing an issue on the agenda on the one hand as actions of lower salience, whereas 
networking and coordinating with other MS being the stronger signals of control. Networking is 
considered of lower salience as it is devoid of a pursuit for shared commitments. 
To obtain variation in respondents’ use of different tactics, we asked respondents to indicate the 
frequency by which the identified signals are being used. This approach is quite common in the 
literature and was also used by Diana Panke who inquired MS to indicate the frequency by which 
they applied 14 different tactics using a scale from 1-4 (Panke, 2010). Similarly, to study the 
applied mix of hard and soft bargaining strategies, Dür and Mateo also employed a 5-point scale 
to inquire into the frequency by which 8 different tactics were used (Dür and Mateo 2010a). In the 
current survey, six different categories of frequency have been identified. 
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Seeing that a distinction is made between the strategies a MS can employ, the natural question to 
arise is whether there are differences among Member States to be observed and if so, which 
factors can account for these differences. One can basically distinguish between three sets of 
factors. First of all there are the characteristics of the actor engaged in the negotiation process. 
Power, culture (Adair et al. 2004) and personal traits42 are the most commonly studied factors in 
the literature. Secondly, there are the factors that relate to the negotiating context: the number of 
partners at the negotiation table, the capabilities to engage in issue-linkage and the like (Crump 
2011). And finally, there are issue-characteristics that affect which strategies are often preferred 
(McKibben 2010). The choice to focus on general policy dynamics (instead of a specific policy 
cases) and the decision to narrow down the research domain to focus solely on international trade 
negotiations reduces the amount of variation to be explained through the negotiating context or 
issue-characteristics. Therefore, the primary emphasis of the explanatory model will be on 
divergences between the actors in the negotiation process.  
The main reason for distinguishing between bilateral and collective strategies is related to the 
ease by which the Commission can disregard an individual MS’ signals of control. Collective 
strategies are distinct from bilateral strategies as they aim to signal the broader salience of the 
issue that is being raised. Therefore, we can expect that voting power matters when deciding on a 
signalling strategy. When a large Member State expresses a concern bilaterally, the Commission is 
aware that neglecting such a signal is more likely to result in a successful contestation during the 
ratification stage as a blocking minority is easily constructed around a large MS. This is different 
when a small MS signals the Commission directly. In such a situation, the Commission can more 
easily disregard this signal insofar as the threat of the small MS forming a blocking minority lacks 
the credibility that a larger MS attains automatically through its sheer voting power. This leads us 
to my first Proposition. 
Proposition 5.1: Larger Member States are relatively more inclined to engage in bilateral signalling 
strategies than smaller member states 
5.1.3 Signalling from a dynamic perspective 
A second dimension that is of interest when studying the incidence of signalling rather than its 
content is the time at which MS are active in voicing their concerns. Time plays an important role 
                                                     
42 Relevant personal traits determining strategies and their success range from experience, knowledge (Niemann 2004) to 
even humour. Regarding the latter, a respondent recalled a MS representative in the TPC who –through the use of 
humour- could ensure his interventions resonate well and for a longer time than his other peers (Interview, TO#33).   
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in the decision-making process. Researchers have tried to explain the temporal dynamics of trade 
negotiations (Crump 2011) as well as the effect of time on the applied negotiating strategies and 
their chance of obtaining a desirable outcome. Elgström & Jönsson (2000) hypothesised that 
problem-solving dominates the early stage of negotiations in the Council whereas the late stage is 
argued to be characterised more by distributional bargaining. Arne Niemann substantiated this 
hypothesis in studying the TPC (then Art. 113 Committee) over the course of the negotiations of 
the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement. He found that discussions in the pre-
negotiation phase were much more characterised by communicative action and deliberation than 
the later stages which were more open to bargaining (Niemann 2004, 2006).43 Time can also be a 
strategic factor in determining the chance of obtaining a desirable outcome during negotiations 
(Greer and Martin de Almagro 2012). From shaping the agenda to forcing late stage concessions, 
Member States vary in their use of tactics over the course of negotiations. We might expect that 
MS that are able to voice their concerns in the earliest stages of the negotiation require less control 
in comparison to the representatives that try to obtain late stage concessions when room of 
manoeuvre is limited.  
An important argument to conceptualise control as the provision of signals was the scope for 
repeated signalling. The scope for repeated signalling enables the principal to indicate the 
political salience of an issue. As a result, I expect that early stage involvement does not lead to 
less signals being sent overall, rather the contrary. That is not to say that early stage involvement 
does not matter in terms of obtaining a desirable outcome. Once a position is determined, we can 
expect the principal to keep signalling the agent throughout the negotiations to ensure its 
preferences are fully taken on board. 
Proposition 5.2: Member States which are active in the early phases of the negotiation signal more 
frequently than those respondents whose actions are centred on the later phases of the negotiation. 
But how can we differentiate between the early and the late stages of the policy-making process? 
The focus on international (trade) negotiations makes the demarcation of different phases of the 
policy process somewhat easier than many other regulatory processes. In the developed survey, a 
distinction is made between six stages as visualised in Figure 6.44 The first – but often overlooked- 
                                                     
43 A similar research on the EU MS,  indicated that the behaviour of negotiators in the early stage of the policy process is 
more conflicting whereas the late stage is more prone to problem-solving behaviour (McKibben 2013).  
44 Other scholars have often distinguished between a pre-negotiation, negotiation and post-negotiation phase (Elgström 
and Frennhoff Larsén 2010). Clearly the six phases can easily be aggregated by three consecutive pairs to match such a 
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stage takes place before discussion on a mandate starts (Stein 1988). Prior to the start of formal 
discussions, the Commission already exchanges some views with the negotiating partner. Also at 
this stage control and oversight can be important (Gastinger 2013). Debate over the mandate to be 
provided forms a second phase and represents the first formal occasion for the MS to exert (ex 
ante) control.  
Figure 6: Different stages of a trade negotiation 
 
The mandate often figures prominently in PA-studies as it marks the act of delegation from the 
MS as represented in the Council to the Commission. In the first negotiation rounds, discussions 
revolve around finding a common ground on the broader goals and ambitions for the various 
chapters of the agreement. At this point, no concrete draft texts are available. This stage 
represents the third phase of the negotiation process. It also demarcates the ‘pro-active’ from the 
‘reactive’ stages. Once drafts of specific chapters are being circulated, MS can voice their concerns 
in reaction to specific provisions. Within the reactive stages of the negotiating process, we can 
also distinguish two informal stages separated by a formal mechanism of control. The formal 
mechanism in this case is the discussion on the ratification of the negotiated agreement. The final 
phase of the negotiation refers to the eventual implementation and monitoring of compliance. 
This aspect of international negotiations has received limited attention in the academic literature 
(but see e.g. Jonsson & Tallberg, 1998). Focusing on the incidence of signalling rather than the 
                                                                                                                                                              
conceptualization. The advantage of the proposed demarcation, however, enables a clear separation of a proactive and a 
reactive stage while at the same time allowing for the distinction between the formal and informal stages of control. 
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content of the applied strategies, the main topic of interest will be the intensity by which the MS 
signal during the different stages of the negotiation. Respondents are inquired into the frequency 
by which they signal their preferences in each of these stages on a scale from 1(never) to 6 (very 
frequently).  
Next to a distinction between proactive and reactive stages, we can also distinguish between 
formal and informal stages of the negotiation process. The TFEU stipulates clearly that the 
Council -and not the member states- needs to adopt a negotiation mandate. Similarly, the 
ratification also requires explicit support from the Council. These are the two formal stages at 
which collective action is required. During the other stages of the negotiation, there is more room 
for bilateral (informal) interactions. As a result, we can hypothesise that the collective nature of 
the hybrid principal is predominant during these formal stages, whereas the informal stages 
(stages 1, 3 and 4 in Figure 6) are characterised more strongly by bilateral tactics; the type of PA- 
interaction associated with a setting of ‘multiple principals’. By consequence, we would expect 
that: 
Proposition 5.3: Member States that focus more on the formal stages of the negotiation process to exert 
control, employ a more collective signalling strategy, ceteris paribus. 
Clearly alternative propositions can be formulated relating the size of a country or the 
functioning of its administration with the stage at which a position is formulated. However, 
insofar as the main causal mechanism pertains to the functioning of the national trade 
administration, I prefer formulating and testing such hypotheses in Chapter 8.  
5.1.4 Resulting Survey Design 
The key dimensions of the dependent variable are the frequency by which a respondent has 
signalled the Commission and the stage at which this occurred. Two additional questions have 
been added to the survey to improve the quality of the dependent variable. Following the 
discussion on ‘process’ versus ‘outcome’ based conceptualizations of control (see Chapter 3) a 
decision was made to include a single question inquiring into the self-perception of successful 
control in the questionnaire. The additional leverage to be obtained from such inclusion far 
exceeds the costs. Moreover, to cope with the issue of endogeneity, a question on the ‘demand for 
control’ was included. Remember that administrative capacity could also be driven by the 
experienced need for control. If a MS’ interests align closely with those of the Commission, no 
control is required and, hence, there is limited need for administrative capacity. Controlling for 
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such a latent variable is important when asserting the main hypotheses. The resulting 
questionnaire therefore seeks to incorporate four sets of questions:  
1. Control as a process  See Appendix I Questions 1(a-g) 
2. Stage at which control is exerted See Appendix I Questions 2(a-f) 
3. Demand for control See Appendix I Question 5 
4. Control as reflected in the outcome See Appendix I Question 6 
The method through which the respondents were identified, the method of data-gathering as well 
as the responses obtained will be discussed in the following section. 
5.2 Data Collection 
The advantage of relying on respondents rather than documents as the source of information is 
predicated by its ability to capture the informal as well as the formal signals emitted. Based on the 
interviews in the previous chapter, the importance of such informal processes was reaffirmed. 
This does not only apply to interaction among the MS but more particularly to the way in which 
MS engage with the Commission. Member States commonly voice concerns over e-mail or phone. 
The Commission also regularly circulates draft texts for input or discussion. These actions do not 
appear in the meeting reports of the Council. Moreover, the workload associated with the current 
trade agenda results in the Commission organizing informal technical meetings to flesh out the 
details of an agreement or provide a more detailed briefing of the status of ongoing negotiations. 
According to Elsig (2010) the eastern enlargement has increased the importance of informal 
processes in MS-Commission interaction. Hence, a survey was developed to target national 
representatives on trade. 
5.2.1 Sample-selection and response 
From the in-depth interviews conducted in the previous chapter, it is possible to identify the main 
forums of decision-making where we can study MS actions aimed at controlling the Commisison-
as-agent. Not much action takes place at the highest political levels. The FAC (Trade) and 
COREPER convene only sporadically. When they convene it is mostly to cut the final Gordian 
knots that have not been resolved within the TPC. To obtain a better understanding of MS 
involvement in the EU’s external trade policy, it makes more sense to study the responsible 
Council Working Parties. Given the clear division of tasks between the TPC and the WPTQ, a 
focus on the former comes as a natural choice. The ITMs are an interesting arena for future 
research. However, as respondents tend to vary regularly depending on the subject of the 
meetings, and seeing that many of these subjects are of a lower political salience; I consider the 
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participants of the ITMs less appropriate for the targeted research. In summary, the survey 
sample consists of the national representatives that take part in the following three formations of 
the TPC: Full Members, Deputies and Services & Investment. The TPC Deputies can be 
considered the most important forum. Potentially, a total of 84 respondents can be identified to 
form the population of my first questionnaire. This number is not quite accurate though. Many 
(smaller) Member States are represented by the same person in multiple meetings while others 
have multiple representatives for TPC S&I. The survey was distributed in June 2013, but 
reminders were repeatedly sent until October 2013.  
Response rates on surveys conducted in European institutions are generally low. Often they are 
well below fifty per cent. A survey distributed among the staff of European Parliament was only 
able to obtain a response from 13% of the total respondents (Egeberg et al. 2013). Studies on EU 
member states within the Council reported response rates from 21% (Meert, 1997) up to 43% 
among members of the Permanent Representation (Panke 2011). One exception being Liesbeth 
Hooghe, who –upon studying socialization processes in the Commission- obtained response rates 
of 51% in 2001 and 40% in 2004 (Hooghe 2005). Evidently, limited response is a significant threat 
to engage in comparative research. To address this issue, the survey has been distributed by the 
Commission within TPC Deputies (in person) and TPC S&I (through mail). The TPC Full 
Members were contacted by me directly. Non-respondents were identified and contacted 
individually over e-mail to increase the response rate. Seeing that a number of Member States did 
not respond to such reminders, I have also contacted them over the phone.  
With an overall return of 41 filled in questionnaires, response was fairly decent, though not 
exceptional. Two factors suppressed the response rate. Firstly, most of the respondents were 
diplomats that change posts every 4 or 5 years. As a result, five respondents were only working in 
their position fairly recently and therefore declined to fill in the questionnaire. Secondly, three 
Member States formally rejected to participate in my research. Representatives were not allowed 
to return my questionnaire or grant me an interview. The relative good response rate within TPC 
Deputies as indicated in Table 3 strengthens my confidence in the quality of the obtained data.   
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5.2.2 Assessing data validity 
The respondents cover 23 of the 28 Member States. As indicated above, three Member States were 
given clear instructions not to participate in my research, two others did not respond to any of the 
mails or phone calls. For 8 countries, responses were obtained for all three formations. I consider 
the sample to be representative for the whole of the EU. From Table 3 it becomes clear that the 
distribution of the obtained sample of respondents across two relevant dimensions (column 3) 
closely matches that of the entire population (column 2). The dimensions chosen were the 
membership to the like-minded and open-minded groups45 on the one hand and the responsible 
line ministry on the other hand. This exercise had the same result when applied to the countries 
included in the sample (column 4). I am therefore pretty confident that the obtained data is 
representative of the EU MS. 
Table 3: Representativeness of the sample 
 # Member States # Responses # Sample countries 
Like-minded 15 (53%) 24 (59%) 13 (57%) 
Open-minded(a) 13 (47%) 17 (41%) 10 (43%) 
Foreign Affairs 10 (36%) 17 (41%) 9(40%) 
Economics(b) 18 (64%) 24 (59%) 14(60%) 
(a) The three non-aligned countries were added to the group of the open-minded 
(b) The group of Ministry of economics also incorporates those chaired by the Ministry of Industry 
 
Cross-validation of the survey results occurred through interviews with Commission officials and 
two MS representatives. The difficulties with doing a cross-validation of the inquired information 
originate due to the lack of a single source that can adequately assess both the bilateral ánd 
collective signals conveyed by a particular MS. While the MS can provide (partial) insights on the 
collective strategies applied by another representative, they are left in the dark as to the latter’s 
bilateral strategies. Similarly, the Commission can evaluate the accuracy of the data in terms of 
the bilateral signals but is worse positioned to provide an cross-validation with respect to the 
collective signals emitted by the MS. 
                                                     
45 Briefly formulated, the like-minded group is an informal coalition of MS advocating a more liberal trade agenda. The 
‘open-minded’ group by contrast is more pragmatic and favors the use of trade protection when it is deemed necessary. 
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In the interviews, a list of country-pairs was drafted with the question to indicate which of both 
was more active in signalling the Commission if it were possible to discern a difference at all. On 
the basis of these responses the general ordering in the data was largely confirmed. The data 
obtained from two respondents was highly questionable though and has been removed from the 
sample once the cross-validation confirmed their dubious nature.46 As a result the revised sample 
only covers 22 instead of 23 MS. 
5.3 Data Analysis 
The survey data gathered contains information related to member states’ signalling strategies 
(bilateral or collective) as well as the stage in the negotiations at which the respondents are 
particularly active in voicing their interests. Both topics are addressed consecutively in this 
section. To discuss the survey results, basic descriptive statistics will be provided first. Then the 
formulated propositions will be tested, the results are interpreted and -when appropriate- 
additional interviews were conducted to substantiate the findings or generate new alternative 
propositions. 
5.3.1 Signals of control 
Three questions will structure our discussion of the main dependent variable. Firstly, in 
constructing a single indicator of control, it is important to assess how the seven different signals 
can be aggregated in a meaningful way. Studying the impact of signalling on policy outcomes 
will be the second question. Finally, the formulated proposition on bilateral versus collective 
signalling will be put to the test. 
Concerning the strength of signals 
When combining the different signalling tactics into a single indicator of control, we can either 
grant equal weights to each of the signals or attribute a weight according to the power of the 
signal. But how can we infer whether the various signals differ in strength? If we assume that 
stronger signals also require a higher investment in terms of time and diplomatic resources, we 
would expect that stronger signals are sent less frequently whereas weak signals are sent quite 
often. As a result, it would be possible to affirm the hypothesised ranking as indicated in Table 2 
from the frequencies by which the identified signals are sent. In Table 4, you can find the 
summary statistics of the various signalling tactics identified. 
                                                     
46 Influence analysis (through dfbeta’s) when studying the main hypothesis (see Chapter 8.2.1) also singled out these 
respondents as suspicious and warranting further research. 
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Table 4: Summary statistics signalling tactics 
Signal Mean Min. Max. Standard 
deviation 
Adding an issue to the agenda 2.31 1 4 0.69 
Voicing concerns during the meeting 4.64 3 6 0.96 
Contacting other member state representatives 4.54 3 6 0.79 
Coordinating a position with like-minded States 4.41 2 6 0.91 
Communicating concerns to the Commission 
through e-mail  
4.16 2 6 0.95 
Communicating concerns to the Commission 
over phone 
3.38 1 6 1.18 
Meeting in person with Commission officials 3.54 2 6 1.07 
Signalling Index (Average) 57.21 37.14 88.57 12.22 
Signalling Index (Weighted) 58.22 38.46 93.8 12.81 
 
Overviewing the results, it becomes clear that the original ranking does not completely hold. First 
of all, adding issues to the agenda occurred least frequently. This does not reflect a high political 
costs but rather the rare need for MS to explicitly put an issue on the agenda (Interview, TO#32). 
Procedural customs determine a large part of the agenda. Meetings are structured according to a 
relatively fixed pattern which allows most issues to be accommodated. Hence the agenda rarely 
needs amending by MS. Apart from the instrument of agenda-setting, the collective signals follow 
the expected pattern i.e. voicing concerns during a TPC meeting occurs most often, followed by 
the contacting of other MS ending with the coordination of a common position. Notice that the 
differences in mean are too small to be statistically significant. With regards to the bilateral 
signals, the order between meeting a Commission official in person and contacting them over the 
phone was opposite my expectations (though not statistically significant). That e-mail was the 
most frequently used tactic confirmed prior expectations. 
A ranking derived from the data only provides a partial picture. Therefore, two officials were also 
contacted to share their interpretation of the political weight to be attached to each of the signals. 
With regards to the collective strategies the respondents confirmed the suggested ranking. 
Opinions diverged as far as the bilateral strategies were concerned. While both agreed that 
personal meetings reflect high saliency, doubts were cast on the greater costs of contacting the 
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Commission over the phone vis-à-vis the use of e-mail correspondence (TO#31). When a 
representative prefers a certain degree of confidentiality, it is safer to contact the Commission 
over the phone to avoid a paper trail. This was, however, disputed by a second respondent who 
remarked that the existence of such a paper trail enables the development of institutional memory 
and could be used as a justification vis-à-vis their superiors (TO#33). Respondents also indicated 
that personal style also plays an important role in deciding the propensity to use one type of 
signal over another. For these reasons, they suggested to distinguish bilateral tactics based on the 
hierarchical position of the target of such signalling. The potential correspondents in the 
Commission can range from a technical expert to the chief negotiator and even the 
Commissioner. 
Whereas the weights suggested in the conceptualization above were largely confirmed there is 
sufficient uncertainty to warrant caution. By consequence, I have decided to consequently report 
results using both a simple average and a weighted average when combining the various signals 
for further analysis. The attributed weights correspond with the ranking of the signals in Table 2 
(1, 2 and 3). The data was transformed to a scale from 0 (no signals) to 100 (maximum signals 
provided) and this both for the averaged and weighted index.47 The resulting Signalling Indices 
(SI) will form the main dependent variables in the ensuing analyses. As apparent from the two 
bottom rows of Table 4, there is sufficient variation to warrant further analysis on the constructed 
indicators.  
Important to note is that both Signalling Indices are positively correlated with the measurement 
of control as an outcome. Recall, that the survey incorporated a question with respect to 
respondents’ perception of negotiation success when engaging with the Commission. The effect 
uncovered was significant at the 95% confidence level. Still, caution is due as variation on the 
outcome variable was extremely limited.48 
Selecting a strategy 
The first proposition stipulates that larger member states have a higher propensity to engage in 
bilateral signalling tactics relative to the smaller Member States. A small member state’s bilateral 
signals can more easily be disregarded by the Commission as the concerned MS is less likely to 
                                                     
47 The items of the index were first rescaled to [0,5] by subtracting one from all values. Such rescaling also occurred in the 
construction of other indicators (see infra).The resulting scores were then averaged, and multiplied by 20. 
48 Of the 37 respondents that answered this question, 27 responded ‘regularly’. Of the remaining ten, six responded 
‘rarely’, the final four indicated frequently. The other answering options were not being used. 
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construct a blocking minority than a larger MS. By consequence, we would expect smaller MS to 
make more use of collective tactics as they also need to indicate the broader support for their 
position to persuade the Commission. To test the proposition, I constructed an indicator that 
takes the value 0 when only collective signals are emitted (Bilateral =0) and goes up to a 100 when 
only bilateral signals are used by the respondent (Collective =0) through the following formula: 
            [  (
                    
                    
)]; with ‘Bilateral’ and ‘Collective’ reflecting the (weighted) 
average of bilateral and collective tactics respectively. The variable ‘Strategy’ has a score of 50 
when a MS is using an equal amount of bilateral and collective strategies. 
As discussed above, two measurements of the dependent variable are used in the analysis. In the 
first formulation, signals were weighted according to their strength (Models 1 & 2). In the second 
formulation, no such weighting was applied (Models 3 & 4). To approximate a MS’ power, I 
preferred to use indicators based on voting weights rather than population or economic prowess. 
Member States derive their power in the Council through their formal votes, not because they 
have a strong economic presence. Moreover, during interviews with the Commission, references 
were made to a MS’ ability to construct blocking minorities, thereby suggesting that the 
Commission takes voting power into account when deciding whether or not to fulfil a MS’ 
wishes. Two indicators were used as a proxy for power: the raw council voting weights on the 
one hand (Model 3) and the Shapley-Shubik indicators calculated for the QMV rules applied post-
Lisbon (Shapley and Shubik 1954).49 In a final model, I also averaged the results across the various 
TPC formations to obtain one indicator per country and conducted the analysis on the resulting 
22 observations.  
The models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. For the OLS to result in 
unbiased estimates of the coefficients, it suffices that the errors are independent and identically 
distributed. Normality is not required but is important for hypothesis-testing. Due to the small 
sample, I decided to estimate the errors of the obtained coefficients through a non-parametric 
method i.e. bootstrapping (Efron 1979). Bootstrapping involves the resampling of the data-set by 
randomly drawing observations from the sample. In this process, observations can be sampled 
repeatedly. The population is to the sample as the sample is to the bootstrap samples (Fox 2008, 590). The 
resulting sample counts the same amount of observations as the original sample. This is 
important to avoid increasing the significance of results due to an inflated sample size. In total, 
                                                     
49 The indicator takes into account the latest enlargement with Croatia, values were derived from Napel, Widgrén, & 
Mayer (2013). 
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5000 replications were made for each of the estimations.50 The standard deviation of the estimated 
coefficients across these replications is the bootstrapped standard error of the coefficient.  
Table 5: Preference to send Bilateral over Collective signals 
 Respondent Country 
DV Model 1 
Weighted 
Model 2 
Weighted 
Model 3 
Unweighted 
Model 4 
Unweighted 
Model 5 
Weighted 
Model 6 
Weighted 
Power (SSI) 58.39** 
(24.87) 
-- 26.50 
(22.46) 
-- 52.54 
(32.02) 
-- 
Raw votes -- 76.99* 
(42.96) 
-- 30.85 
(36.72) 
-- 70.77 
(44.27) 
Constant 41.86*** 
(1.70) 
41.18*** 
(2.05) 
45.94*** 
(1.42) 
45.78*** 
(1.76) 
42.77*** 
(1.75) 
42.16*** 
(2.03) 
N 39 39 39 39 22 22 
Adjusted R² 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.03 
*** significant at the 0.01 significance level 
**  significant at the 0.05 significance level 
*   significant at the 0.10 significance level 
 
For the formulated proposition to be supported by the data, a positive coefficient is required. This 
would imply that respondents from powerful MS would exhibit a higher propensity to signal the 
Commission directly rather than coordinate joint positions within the Council. From the results of 
the analyses as depicted in Table 5, its becomes apparent that only in two out of six models, a MS’ 
voting power significantly affected the chosen signalling strategy. By consequence, the 
proposition that large MS signal relatively more bilaterally than small MS is not supported by the 
data. The limited explanatory power as apparent from the low R² and the sensitivity of the results 
towards alternative formulations of the dependent and independent variable warrant further 
scrutiny.  
The scatter plot below can shed more light on the underlying reason. From Figure 7 it is clear that 
the larger MS have a clear preference for bilateral strategies. This was in line with our 
expectations. However, the smaller MS vary significantly in their signalling strategy capturing 
both the minimum and the maximum values of the constructed indicator. Why are there so many 
small member states pursuing a bilateral rather than a collective strategy?   
 
                                                     
50 To calculate the number of required replications one can also use the three step approach (D. W. K. Andrews and 
Buchinsky 2000). The minimum number of replications as reported by STATA’s ‘bssize’ procedure (Poi 2004) were well 
below 5000 in the cases tested. 
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Figure 7: Signalling strategy and voting power 
 
To formulate alternative explanations, I contacted two respondents from small MS and 
confronted them with my puzzle. From these interviews, two new propositions surfaced. The first 
respondent attributed his preference for bilateral strategies as a natural consequence of its 
country’s non-alignment with neither of the two major groups that often coordinate on trade 
issues i.e. the ‘like-minded’ and the ‘open-minded’ countries (Interview, TO# 33). Being part of an 
informal coalition makes networking and coordinating a lot easier. In other words, there are 
factors that lower the threshold for (small) MS to apply collective signalling tactics. We can also 
generalise this idea into an alternative proposition. Seeing that a small MS needs to persuade a 
larger amount of MS to form a blocking minority, it might be drawn to bilateral signalling tactics 
as it requires far less networking capacity. Demand for such capacity is higher in smaller MS, 
whereas the supply –e.g. through a large representation- might be more constrained in these 
countries. 
Alternative Proposition 5.1.a: Member States that lack sufficient networking capacities are more likely 
to engage in bilateral strategies. 
Another respondent from a smaller MS indicated that his preference for bilateral contacts with 
the Commission is predicated by his prior experiences. In general, the respondent felt the 
Commission listened to their concerns and accommodated their grievances. As a result, it was 
rarely necessary to engage in collective strategies. While we assumed that it was raw voting 
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power that determined the extent to which member states are bound by the collective procedures 
in the Council, there might be a whole range of alternative factors that influence respondents’ 
signaling strategy. At a more abstract level, it would be interesting for future research to study 
the effect of representatives’ perceptions of the relation between MS and Commission as part of a 
collective principal or a multiplicity of principals. These role conceptions can be fuelled by prior 
experiences as was the case for the above respondent. If national representatives choose their 
signalling strategies on the basis of their beliefs of how the Council functions, it would be possible 
to formulate the following proposition: 
Alternative Proposition 5.1.b: Beliefs of the Council as a collective or a multiplicity of principals, 
determine signalling strategies.  
 
5.3.2 Is time of the essence? Signalling across the phases of the negotiation 
Three sub-sections can be discerned when analysing the data on MS signalling across the various 
phases of the negotiation. As always, a first descriptive analysis can help to reveal broader 
patterns. Which stages of the negotiation are characterised by intense signalling and which stages 
are rather tranquil? The second sub-section seeks to assess whether MS active in the early stage 
send fewer signals overall. In the final part, the formulated proposition regarding signalling in 
the formal and informal stages will be put to the test. 
Taking a closer look at the negotiation process 
In Table 6, you can find the mean scores of MS signalling activity during the six stages identified 
above. The data has been disaggregated for the various TPC formations, but also includes the 
overall mean and standard deviation in the bottom two rows. A quick glance at the overall means 
makes clear that Member States signal most intensely during the approval of the mandate (2) and 
once concrete texts are being made available (4). The ratification process itself (5) appeared to be 
significantly less important than the three preceding stages.51  
The dynamic of an international negotiation dictates the agenda the TPC has to deal with. Recall 
that the role of the three relevant formations of the Trade Policy Committee in the policy-making 
process differs. Whereas the TPC Full Members only deals with the most contentious, politicised 
issues, the TPC Deputies addresses the full scope of the agenda. 
                                                     
51 Differences were significant in matched t-test and Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test. 
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Table 6: Signalling activity across the various stages of the negotiation process 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Full Members 3.33 4.71 4.16 4.57 2.83 2.17 
Deputies 3.75 4.65 4.00 4.35 3.41 3.18 
Services & Investment 4.07 4.84 4.00 4.80 3.38 2.92 
TPC mean 3.81 4.73 4.03 4.56 3.31 2.92 
Standard deviation 1.43 0.77 1.24 0.72 1.37 1.44 
 
Finally, TPC S&I is more specialised and only deals with issues of services and investment. This is 
to some extent reflected in the data. Of all formations, the TPC FM was most active during the 
adoption of the mandate (2), whereas it was largely absent in the pre-mandate phase and post-
negotiations (1 & 6). What is more surprising though is the observation that even the TPC FM was 
not as active during the ratification of the agreement but rather during the negotiations.  
 
Is a word enough to the wise? 
To test the relation between the stage at which signalling takes place and the overall frequency by 
which a MS signals the Commission, we need to obtain an indicator that distinguishes 
respondents active in the early (proactive) stages of the negotiation from respondents that are 
active in the later (reactive) stages. The first three stages of the negotiation process were termed 
pro-active as it takes place before concrete texts are being made available. Correspondingly, the 
reactive stages were the following three stages identified. For the analysis, a simple sum of the 
rescaled frequency of signalling across the three stages was used to construct two indicators 
proactive (P) and reactive (R). These two measures were then transformed into a single indicator 
of pro-activeness through the following formula                      [  
     
     
]. The resulting 
scale equals 0 if a MS was only active in the three latest stages (P=0), while it equals a 100 if 
signalling only occurred in the proactive stages (R=0). In addition to a ratio-based indicator, I also 
constructed an additive index of pro-activeness.52  
                                                     
52 For this variable, the following formula was used:                                . A respondent will only 
obtain a score of a 100 if she/he has given the highest value on each of the proactive stages, while attributing the lowest 
possible scores to the reactive stages (P=15; R=0). A value of 50 will occur when P equals R. Unlike the ratio based 
indicator, for this measure it matters whether a respondent attributed a high or low score to the different stages. 
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The dependent variables are the averaged and weighted Signalling Indices (SI) formulated above. 
To test the proposition, I conducted six analyses as indicated in Table 7. The first two regressions 
used the weighted SI as dependent variable while the second pair of regressions used the 
unweighted index. The final two regressions are conducted with aggregated country-level data 
(across the different respondents). Estimates were obtained from OLS regression using 
bootstrapped standard errors following 5000 replications. 
For the formulated proposition to be confirmed by the data we would have to find a positive 
coefficient on the indicators of pro-activeness. This would imply that respondents that were 
relatively more active in the early stages scored higher on the overall SI. 
Table 7: Relation between Proactive signalling and overall control 
 Respondent Country 
DV Weighted SI Unweighted SI Weighted SI Unweighted SI 
Proactive 
(ratio) 
0.43** 
(0.21) 
-- 0.38 
(0.24) 
-- 0.79*** 
(0.19) 
0.71*** 
(0.25) 
Proactive 
(added) 
-- 0.50*** 
(0.19) 
-- 0.45** 
(0.20) 
-- -- 
Constant 34.05*** 
(11.50) 
29.57*** 
(10.20) 
35.63*** 
(12.68) 
31.82*** 
(10.88) 
14.23 
(10.01) 
17.71 
(13.65) 
N 32 32 32 32 21 21 
Adj. R² 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.28 0.24 
*** significant at the 0.01 significance level 
**  significant at the 0.05 significance level 
*   significant at the 0.10 significance level 
 
From the results, we infer that in five out of the six models the effect was positive and significant. 
This is in line with the proposition formulated above. The underlying mechanism suggested that 
mentioning an issue at an early stage does not automatically result in such interests being 
defended by the Commission in the ensuing negotiations. Indeed, it is up to the Commission to 
decide whether it will take these concerns to the negotiating table or not. Signalling one’s 
preferences in the early stages of the negotiations, enables a MS to repeatedly bring up the issue 
should this be necessary. Future research could inquire whether early stage involvement has a 
greater chance of success in the internal negotiations.  
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Collective signalling and the formal phases of the negotiations 
A third proposition stipulated that respondents predominantly active during the formal stages 
employ more collective strategies than respondents that signal mostly during the informal stages. 
For the adoption of the mandate and the ratification of the agreement collective action is required 
from the Council. By consequence we can expect that MS that focus their efforts on these stages of 
the negotiation will exhibit a greater propensity to use collective signalling tactics. 
To construct an indicator of the importance attached to the formal stages of the negotiations, the 
following indicator was constructed:           [  
                 
                 
], with Formal being a 
rescaled average of the two formal stages and Informal being a rescaled average of the other four 
stages as identified in Figure 6. In the regression model, I also included the Shapley-Shubik index 
(see supra) as a control variable. The proposition was tested using observations at the level of the 
individual respondent as well as using country-averaged data. As customary, OLS was applied 
with standard errors being bootstrapped from 5000 replications. The results are depicted in Table 
8.  
Table 8: Collective action and the formal stages of the negotiation 
 Respondent Country 
DV Weighted Equal weights Weighted Equal weights 
Formal - 0.50** 
(0.22) 
-0.47** 
(0.18) 
-0.67 
(0.47) 
-0.52** 
(0.26) 
Power  58.78** 
(27.48) 
28.13 
(21.44) 
35.25 
(31.40) 
10.36 
(21.32) 
Constant 66.94*** 
(11.02) 
69.48*** 
(9.18) 
76.86*** 
(24.01) 
73.15*** 
(13.32) 
N 32 32 21 21 
Adjusted R² 0.15 0. 14 0.26 0.26 
*** significant at the 0.01 significance level 
**  significant at the 0.05 significance level 
*   significant at the 0.10 significance level 
 
A first observation to be made when interpreting the results is the increase in explanatory power 
in comparison to the models ran when testing the first proposition. In three out of four models, 
respondents that were more active in the formal stages exhibited a greater propensity to use 
collective rather than bilateral tactics. The deviant results from the third column might be 
explained by the over-determination of the regression model. Estimating two coefficients and a 
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constant with only 21 observations is not without pitfalls. Still, the coefficient was significant at 
the 89% confidence level.  
The obtained results might be a consequence of beliefs regarding the nature of the relation 
between MS and Commission. Respondents that are very active during the formal stages are 
more inclined to perceive the nature of the Council as a collective principal and adjust their 
signalling strategies accordingly. This explanation resonates well with the alternative proposition 
formulated earlier where respondents’ perception on the ‘true identity’ of the hybrid principal 
determines the dominant signalling strategy. I do not consider the causal path running the 
opposite way as it seems unlikely that a representative would decide to be active in a particular 
phase of the negotiations due to his/her preferences to engage in bilateral or collective strategies. 
Further research is required to substantiate the empirical leverage of this explanation. 
The main findings 
This chapter rounds up the discussion of the main dependent variable that is ‘control’. The 
interviews conducted in the previous chapter fostered our understanding of the fora in which MS 
can defend their interest at the European level. The importance of informal decision-making 
dynamics warranted a survey approach. After overviewing the literature, a decision was made to 
focus on the incidence of signalling rather than the content of such signals. This focus is 
appropriate given the developed theoretical framework and the limited need for further 
complexity. Response to the survey was fairly decent and the data proved to be representative of 
the EU member states.  
Three propositions were formulated and tested using the data gathered. The first proposition 
referred to the effect of voting power on signalling strategies. Voting power could not be 
associated with the preferences of a respondent to pursue bilateral versus collective tactics. 
However, alternative hypotheses could be formulated with respect to the various causes of 
(small) MS signalling preferences. Thus it was suggested that MS also require the necessary 
capabilities to engage in collective strategies. Membership to (informal) coalitions could be an 
important factor thereto. Respondent’s personal experiences or their belief regarding the relation 
between MS and Commission were suggested as another alternative explanation. 
A second proposition looked at a MS’ relative activity in the proactive versus the reactive stages 
of the negotiation and suggested that pro-activeness would lead to more signals. This 
proposition could not be rejected by the data. Mentioning an issue in the early stages of the 
negotiation, does not automatically lead to an adjustment in the Commission’s behaviour. The 
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iterative process of signalling grants more opportunities to ‘proactive respondents’ than to those 
that focus primarily on the reactive stages of the negotiation process. 
A third and final proposition addressed the relation between the stage at which a respondent 
signals and the preferred signalling strategy. Seeing that the adoption of the mandate as well as 
the ratification of the agreement requires a collective decision within the Council, it was posited 
that those respondents that are most active during these formal stages have a higher propensity 
to engage in collective signalling strategies than the respondents that place greater emphasis on 
the informal stages of the negotiation process. This proposition could not be rejected by the 
collected data. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
NATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATIONS 
hen trying to assess the impact of a member states’ administrative capacity on its ability 
to control the European Commission, two large conceptual question arise: “How can we 
observe and measure control?” and “Which administrative features deter or foster control over 
the Commission?”. Having addressed the former question in chapters 4 and 5, we now turn to the 
latter question. Administrative capacity was defined by the ability of a member state to accurately 
derive the country’s interests and monitor whether the negotiations as conducted by the 
European Commission serve such an interest. Inability to do so, results in endogenous 
information asymmetry placing the agent in a position to neglect the unvoiced preferences of said 
member states. To reduce such endogenous information asymmetry, the functioning of the 
domestic administration plays a vital role. It is here, that the concept of administrative capacity 
has to be introduced. The main challenge at hand is to identify relevant measures that can shed 
light on such capacity.  
The first step in doing so is to increase our understanding on how member states’ formulate a 
national position in external trade negotiations? Being one of the most studied policy domains in 
International Political Economy (IPE), theories abound on the drivers of a nation’s trade policy. 
From this accumulated knowledge, it has become clear that mobilised interests in society play an 
important, often constitutive, role. However, authority remains with the state, and thus 
ultimately governments need to strike a balance between the various interests to be pursued; a 
decision that in most democracies requires approval of a legislative body. As a result, when 
comparing trade policy-making in different countries, the analytical focus has often been placed 
on the legislative system. The amount and size of the voting districts, discipline within political 
parties or the electoral system (proportional representation versus a winner-takes-all), all have 
been related to a preference for or against trade liberalization. In other words, through variation 
in the legislative system these studies have sought to explain trade policy outcomes.  
The emphasis on the legislative system is a natural consequence of early scholars’ familiarity with 
the American policy-making system. Unlike the United States the European member states have 
delegated authority over external trade policy to the European Union. By consequence, national 
parliaments have no direct role to fulfil insofar the trade negotiations do not touch upon the 
W 
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member states’ competencies. Approval of legislation is the responsibility of the Council and the 
European Parliament. From the interviews in Chapter 4 it has become clear that the member 
states interact with the Commission through national trade experts that are embedded in a 
bureaucratic rather than legislative structure. To understand variation in MS policy formation 
processes it is therefore more appropriate to study the trade administrations within the MS rather 
than their parliamentary systems.  
Unfortunately, little is known on the decision-making process that takes place within the national 
trade administrations. Through this exploratory inquiry, I hope to further the development of a 
comparative political economy that focuses more extensively on variation in administrative 
functioning. To achieve this goal, the chapter will require four sections. In the first section, a brief 
overview of the political economy of trade is presented identifying the various factors that have 
been shown to be relevant in understanding the formation of a policy position. It concludes by 
pointing at a deficiency in the existing literature i.e. the limited attention given to the executive 
power. In the second section, the available comparative analyses will be discussed, resulting in a 
topic list for exploratory research. The third section elaborates the exploratory case study design, 
discusses the case selection and the selection of respondents. The results of the fieldwork 
conducted are discussed in the fourth section. A conclusion follows. 
6.1 Formulating a position on trade 
So how does a country determine a position on a specific trade policy issue? Gourevitch’s second 
image reversed approach popularised the argument that domestic interests are shaped in 
anticipation of or in reaction to the effects of international policy changes (Gourevitch 1978). 53 To 
explain domestic policy preferences, IPE-studies have looked at both societal and state actors as 
drivers of trade policy.  
The role of interest groups in trade policy has long been acknowledged in the literature. Early 
research by Schattschneider (1935) and Kindleberger (1951) already emphasised the importance of 
mobilised interests in society. By combining the power of economic modelling and rationalist 
interest-based approaches in political science, a new strand of literature emerged that became the 
starting point of one of the first dominant research paradigms in IPE i.e. ‘Open Economy Politics’ 
                                                     
53 That is not to say the international level is overlooked in IPE-studies. Rather the contrary, the interplay between the 
domestic and the international level is the central focus of two-level games (Putnam 1988) which -in the case of the 
European Union- have been expanded to three-level games (Collinson 1999; Frennhoff Larsén 2007). Given the exclusive 
focus on policy-making in the member states, I will consider the international (extra-EU) level exogenous to my analysis. 
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(OEP) (Bates 1997). This paradigm stresses: ‘a uni-directional conception of politics as flowing from 
individuals to interstate bargaining’(Lake 2009, 225). It generally begins with the identification of 
interests within society and continues to look at how domestic institutions affect the aggregation 
of such interests ultimately resulting in a policy position defended at the international level. The 
combination of an explicit comparative focus with a political economic explanation of the policy-
formation process has enabled the identification of a wide array of institutional determinants of 
trade policy. In line with the OEP paradigm, I will first provide an overview of the various 
interests in society active on trade policy. Consequently, the second section zooms in on the 
comparative analyses of the institutional setting through which these interests are aggregated 
into a policy position. 
 
6.1.1 Identifying societal interests 
Societal interests can only weigh on policy outcomes if they can overcome their collective action 
problem. Businesses and civil society organizations will do so if the costs of organising one selves 
are offset with the potential gains to be achieved (Olson 1971). The collective action problem helps 
us to think in terms of concentrated or diffuse interests and how costs rather than benefits trigger 
mobilization (Tovar 2009). As most economic trade models on which the endogenous tariff 
literature was based, implied gains for the public at large but costs for a small group of actors, it 
was long time assumed that the resulting lobbying landscape was one dominated by protectionist 
interests (see e.g. Ehrlich 2009). The remaining question was to identify who lobbies for such 
protection. Or rather, which groups in society are harmed by trade liberalisation?  
Three prominent international trade models have been used extensively in the literature to 
identify the societal cleavages around which mobilization occurs (Alt et al. 1996).54 The first of 
these draws on the Heckscher-Ohlin model for trade and argues that protectionist pressures arise 
around factoral cleavages (Stolper-Samuelson theorem). That is: in capital abundant countries, 
the sectors relying primarily on labour to produce their goods tend to loose from opening up the 
domestic market to competition (Dutt and Mitra 2005; Milner and Kubota 2005; Rudra 2002). This 
                                                     
54 One could also identify societal cleavages at the geographic level. Geographic proximity reduces transaction costs and 
facilitates the overcoming of the collective action problem. Using regional NUTS2-level data, it was thus shown how 
geographic concentration in regions could account for the variation in political activity (Busch and Reinhardt 2000, 2005). 
Whereas the idea of regional concentration of industries has been a staple in studies on ‘New Economic Geography’, the 
theory does not lead to clear predictions about the particular groups in society that gain or lose due to trade liberalization 
(Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999; Krugman 1998). 
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model can explain the strong resistance by the agricultural and textiles sector to trade 
liberalisation on both sides of the Atlantic. A second model focuses on the limited mobility of 
workers between various sectors in the economy. In assuming that production factors are sticky 
and hence mobility across sectors is constrained, the Ricardo-Viner model could explain why 
societal interests are mobilised across sectorial cleavages. Lack of inter-sectorial mobility makes it 
so that the prospect of losses is felt by both investors and labourers within a specific sector. 
Labour mobility serves as a conditioning factor between both models and can be exploited to 
assess along which cleavages mobilisation on trade will occur (Hiscox 2001; Ladewig 2006). In 
case mobility is high, societal cleavages emerge between capital and labour. By contrast, when 
inter-sectorial mobility is low, cleavages form along sectorial lines. The third, Increasing Returns 
to Scale trade model enables explanations of the widespread occurrence of intra-industry trade. 
Despite the uncertainty on the distributional effects of intra-industry trade, scholars have related 
the occurrence of trade in similar goods to a heightened mobilization for protection (Kono 2009).  
While these economic models are good at explaining why certain industries remain sheltered 
from international competition, their performance wanes in light of the unprecedented 
liberalization we have witnessed during the eighties and nineties. Part of the explanation has 
been the underestimation of exporters to overcome their collective action problem (Chase 2003; 
Manger 2009). Through reciprocal bargaining, exporters face the prospect of a concentrated 
benefit and could act as a counterweight to protectionist pressures (Bailey, Goldstein, and 
Weingast 1997; Destler 1986).55 Moreover, due to the risk of trade diversion, exporters could also 
be confronted with a concentrated loss if foreign competitors –due to a trade agreement- face 
lower market barriers for their exports (Dür 2007b). 
But also the view that rising imports imply a threat to the domestic economy has been scrutinised 
in recent studies. In a globalised economy, production is increasingly fragmented with different 
parts produced across the globe. The large increase in trade over the second half of the twentieth 
century has been caused by the surge in international fragmentation (Yi 2003). To export, one 
must import. Firms that have outsourced the labour intensive parts of the production process 
now face concentrated benefit from the removal of barriers on such goods. Opposing the import-
                                                     
55 In the literature, a debate ensued which aspect of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, if any, was instrumental to 
explain the United States’ move to liberalisation. In addition to the reciprocity-argument, alternative accounts focus on the 
district size argument. Because the president represents the entire country, it has been argued that delegating authority to 
the Presidency limits the effects of log-rolling dynamics that can push the Congress towards protectionism (see e.g. 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Magee 2010) For a critique, however, see (Hiscox 1999) 
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competing firms, are retailers and firms that have outsourced part of their production that stand 
to benefit from a reduction of domestic trade barriers (Eckhardt 2013).  
And finally, amidst the ascendance of the social trade agenda, we have witnessed an increasing 
involvement of civil society organisations (Young 2007). Following the ‘Battle of Seattle’, the 
breakdown of the negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the rejection of 
ACTA by European Parliament, one cannot neglect the importance of civil society organizations 
in trade policy. In response to the increasing involvement of civil society organizations, Brian 
Hocking pointed at the evolution of trade policy-making from a ‘club’ to a ‘multi-stakeholder 
model’ where the latter is more suited to ‘embrace the expanding range of constituents with an 
interest in trade policy’ (Hocking 2004, 25). Whereas NGO’s are included more frequently in 
policy processes, such inclusion does not necessarily imply influence. Andreas Dür and Dirk De 
Bièvre (2007) inquired into the causes of the (lack of) NGO’s influence. Their findings suggest that 
lack of a mandate, the pursuit of unrealistic aims and the outside lobbying activities at the 
agenda-setting stage limit the effectiveness of their lobbying.  
In conclusion, the societal actors involved in trade issues have become extremely diverse. 
Inevitably not all voices can be heard equally loud. How various interests are aggregated is of 
critical interest to understand preference formation on trade policy. 
6.1.2 Aggregating domestic interests 
While the preferences of mobilised interest groups might push into a specific direction; this does 
not necessarily explain a country’s revealed policy preferences. In the end, interests groups do not 
have the authority to draft and approve legislation. Such authority remains with the state and it is 
here that we can discover variation among countries. Straddling the fields of IPE and 
Comparative Political Economy, scholars have increasingly studied the effects of different 
political institutions on the trade policy (preferences). In these predominantly quantitative 
studies, institutions often act as a filter or a buffer for the influence of societal pressures. The way 
in which societal interests are aggregated at the political level determines whether or not the state 
enjoys autonomy.  
In the models thus developed, society and state predominantly interact in parliament and within 
political parties. As a proto-typical example, it is worth to consider the ‘Protection for Sale’- 
model. Here, a policy-maker weighs the benefits (s)he can obtain (either pecuniary or electoral) 
from providing protection to societal actors with the overall reduction in aggregate welfare that 
concurs with such protection (Grossman and Helpman 1994). The factors determining the relative 
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weight of state and society are politico-institutional factors (Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga 
2009). Electoral systems (Rogowski 1987), party discipline (Hankla 2006; McGillivray and Smith 
1997) and constituency size (R. E. Baldwin 1985; Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994) have all been 
associated with an increased autonomy of the state. The causal mechanism driving much of these 
hypotheses focuses on the heterogeneity of interests that are to be aggregated within a public 
actor. In case of larger heterogeneity, the responsible official needs to internalise the negative 
externalities that arise when providing protection to one specific interest at the cost of others. 
Constituency size is the most commonly used example. As the US President is elected by the 
entire country he is considered to be more attuned to the public interests as opposed to particular 
interests and hence in favour of free trade.56 A senator is –on average- elected by a larger 
constituency than a representative from the House of Representatives and therefore it has been 
asserted that the Senate is less protectionist (Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997; but for a 
critique see Karol 2007). The argument for party discipline works in a similar way. Strong 
discipline implies that political parties need to internalise the negative externalities that arise 
when providing protection to the interests of one party member’s constituents to the detriment of 
others. Strong party discipline enables a party’s leadership to squelch particularistic demands. 
While most of these studies focus on one specific trait of the political system, others have 
suggested a more holistic approach looking at different characteristics simultaneously. Sean 
Ehrlich for example focuses on the concept of access points. Access points are defined as 
“policymakers with power in a particular policy sphere who are susceptible to interest group lobbying” 
(Ehrlich 2007). A growing number of such access points increases demand for electoral and 
financial support, allowing more interest groups to successfully engage in lobbying activities. 
Others have studied the number of veto-players as an intermediating factor to explain the relation 
between unemployment and protection from trade (Henisz and Mansfield 2006). Thus, it was 
shown that political systems with many veto points are more able to resist demands for 
protection. 
All of the explanatory models above were inspired by the American political system and 
transposed to a wider context of OECD (and developing) countries. Whereas a focus on the 
                                                     
56 It is important to keep in mind that the assumption that free trade contributes to aggregate welfare is just that: a 
simplifying assumption based on an economic argument. As with any assumption, it may well be questioned both from a 
political (Sen 2005) as well as an economic perspective (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001).  
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legislative system makes perfect sense from an American perspective57, when studying the 
European member states its adequacy severely diminishes. The member states have delegated 
authority over the CCP to the European Union. As a result, national parliaments have no direct 
involvement in the trade policy-making insofar the negotiations remain within the remit of the 
exclusive competency. Direct control by national parliaments only occurs when leapfrogging 
their respective governments (Kerremans 2011a; Nielson and Tierney 2003). Whereas control can 
be exerted across the chain of delegation, we are more likely to discover meaningful variation by 
focusing on the most proximate principal of the Commission i.e. the governments that are 
represented in the Council.  
Building on the comparative tradition described above, is therefore not particularly useful when 
aspiring a comparative analysis between the European member states. Instead, an explicit focus 
on the functioning of national executives would provide more leverage. 
6.2 Towards a comparative approach in studying trade administrations 
But how does the functioning of a trade administration varies from one member state to the next? 
The limited information on this subject warrants an exploratory, qualitative research design (see 
6.3). The first stage in the explorative investigation is the determination of a ‘topic list’: a 
relatively stable set of questions that will be used in each of the interviews. To elaborate the topic 
list, other work in executive politics and comparative public administration can provide more 
leverage. In the end, four topics of inquiry are selected. Each topic will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
6.2.1 Topic 1: Involvement of different public actors  
Trade is a horizontal policy meaning its decisions affect and are affected by a range of other 
policy domains. As a result a wide range of Ministries can assume authority over (parts of) the 
drafting of a position. The regulation of competition on the internal market and the tackling of 
market barriers abroad are of great importance to a wide range of economic actors in society. By 
consequence, it seems only naturally that the Ministry of Economy is involved in decision-making 
on trade. In assessing the propensity of the EU to use its market power for the achievement of 
foreign policy goals, Meunier and Nicolaïdis concluded that “increasingly, the EU does exploit its 
                                                     
57 In the United States, US Congress retains full authority over external trade. The decision to grant the President the 
authority to negotiate on its behalf, the so-called ‘Fast-track’-authority, is limited in time and conditional on congressional 
approval. At the time of writing, the USTR has not been enjoying such fast-track authority since July 2007. 
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formidable trade power to pursue non-trade objectives through conditionality” (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 
2006:922). This sentiment was corroborated by Martin Holland as he noted “(..) trade has become 
pervasive, touching almost all aspects of EU policy, both internal and external (..)” (Holland, 2002: 140). 
As a result, we can expect that trade is also of potential concern to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA). In addition to the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other state 
actors are also affected by developments in trade policy. The levying of customs duties has long 
been a task of the finance and taxation ministries. State support for agricultural producers is 
highly contested in international politics compelling the involvement of the Ministry for 
Agriculture. For a comprehensive trade agreement, the European Commission involves up to 10 
of its Directorates General (EuropeDirect, personal communication, March 2011).  
Knowing which ministry assumes authority over trade can foster greater understanding of the 
internal policy formation process and ultimately the positions taken. The literature on 
‘Bureaucratic politics’ has emphasised that interests of a public actor can also be derived from the 
bureaucracy within which one is located, that is: ‘where you stand is where you sit’ (Allison and 
Halperin 1972; Clifford 1990; Halperin and Clapp 2006). A first topic of inquiry for the 
exploratory analysis shall therefore be the involvement of various public actors in the decision-
making process.  
6.2.2 Topic 2: Coordination mechanisms 
Given the multitude of interests a state can pursue, and given the equally great variety in public 
actors to defend such interests, coordination mechanisms are important to understand the 
outcome of the internal decision-making process. In the area of public administration the 
importance of horizontal coordination is uncontested as it has been claimed to be ‘the holy grail 
of public administration’ (Peters 1998). The way in which the MS coordinate EU policies at home 
displays considerable variation (Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000). Coordination does not only 
matter to understand the policy positions taken, but also affects the speed by which a policy 
position can be formulated (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007; Johansson and Raunio 2010; Panke 
2010a; Schout and Jordan 2005, 2008).  
As suggested in the previous discussion topic, there are potentially many ministries involved in 
trade policy-making. Studying the internal coordination processes might thus shed new light on 
e.g. the trade-off between foreign policy and economic goals (see also Copeland 1996). While I do 
recognise the possibility of centralised trade administrations that assume full authority over 
trade; still, even in these cases, it might be interesting to understand whether and how they 
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interact with other ministries. In this regard, the (dis)advantages of having an isolated trade 
department has also attracted scholarly attention (Ozdem and Struett 2009). A mapping exercise 
of the coordination processes of trade administrations was executed by Jordana and Ramío (2003) 
for 12 Latin-American countries. They thus defined three categories of coordination based on the 
existence of a formal coordinative body and its ability to reconcile diverging interests. 
Applications of such coordination to the case of national trade administrations in the EU member 
states are still missing. EU studies on coordination processes in trade have focused mostly on the 
various Directorates-General of the European Commission (Frennhoff Larsén 2007; Levermore, 
Gibb, and Cleary 2000). National coordination of EU trade policy still remains uncharted 
territory. One more reason warranting the following pilot studies. 
 
6.2.3 Topic 3: Human resources 
The aspect of a public administration that has attracted most attention in comparative political 
analyses is the human or financial capital of which the ministry or department disposes. The 
number of staff in the permanent representation (Damonte and Giuliani 2012; Giuliani 2003; 
Kassim et al. 2001) or the available staff and budget of responsible line ministries (Panke 2011). 
One specific type of capacity is of particular interest here: that is the ability to engage in evidence-
based policy making or policy analytical capacity (Howlett, 2009). The importance of integrating 
(academic) research in trade policy has been emphasised in recent research (see e.g. Tussie, 2009). 
The use of impact assessments as a tool for governance is but one example thereof (Radaelli, 
2007). The quality of input brought into the policy process and the manner in which such data has 
been critically assessed and aggregated determines to a large extent whether an administration 
can accurately derive their interest in a trade negotiation.  
Hence, I will focus on human resources in a broad sense. That implies not only the quantity of the 
trade officials involved in the policy process, but also the training they enjoy, the overall 
experience retained and the robustness of the policy network in case a trade official should leave 
the network.  
6.2.4 Topic 4: Relation state-society 
The aforementioned institutional approaches to IPE, studied how variation in parliamentary 
systems affect the extent to which the state could act autonomously from societal interests. 
Succinctly formulated in the protection-for-sale model, policy-makers balanced the contributions 
from particular interests with the reduction in aggregate welfare. In the discussion thus far the 
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relation between state and society has been one of conflict where either societal interests or state 
interests prevail. 
The increasing role of non-state actors in the policy process has often been interpreted as 
implying the decline of the state (Strange 1996). State and society are, however, not always 
involved in an antagonistic relationship each trying to get the upper hand in a struggle for power. 
Peter Evans (1997) suggested that –while the eclipse of the state might be a possibility- the 
relationship between state and society also exhibits synergies. Skocpol and Finegold’s account on 
Herbert Hoover’s term as minister of commerce, exemplified an era in which a more cooperative 
relationship between business partners and government had been enhanced at the initiative of the 
Minister (Skocpol and Finegold 1982). 
State-society relations have been subject to much research and a plethora of categorizations have 
been suggested. Atkinson and Coleman (1989) distinguished between eight types of state-society 
relations depending on the mobilization of interests, the autonomy of the state and the degree of 
concentration of authority. Next to state-centric and pluralist (or society-centric) models, they also 
focused on corporatism and concertation58 as additional models of state-society interaction. Work 
by Peter Evans (1995) confirmed the intricate relationship between the state and society in Korea 
as he linked it to their industrial development. A relationship he termed ‘embedded autonomy’. 
With this concept he emphasised the autonomy of the state as opposed to capture from society 
while at the same time being thoroughly embedded in said society.  
These four topics form the core around which the interview questions are built. In Appendix III 
you can find the complete list of questions. Keep in mind that these questions varied slightly 
across countries to account for the different context and allow respondents to verify, elaborate or 
expand on earlier responses. Having identified the different dimensions of the trade 
administration that will be explored, the next section will elaborate the research design and more 
specifically the member states selected for the pilot studies. 
6.3 Research design  
To obtain a deeper insight into the functioning of national trade administrations, an exploratory 
research design will be applied. A series of qualitative pilot studies were conducted to gain a 
                                                     
58 This type of state-society relations is a collaborative policy-making network where both the state enjoys autonomy and 
societal interests (and most specifically, business associations) are well represented at the same time. As a typical example 
of a country where concertative networks are common, Atkinson and Coleman referred to Japan during its rapid 
economic development. 
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detailed understanding of how the different member states formulate their position on matters of 
trade. The goal of these pilot studies is to derive a series of indicators which can be gathered for 
all 28 member states in a later stage of my research. With that purpose in mind, I selected three 
member states (Belgium, Estonia & Spain) in an exploratory diverse case study design in the hope 
of finding as much variation in as possible (Gerring 2007; Seawright and Gerring 2008, 300–301). 
An additional, supplementary case was added in a later stage (Poland). Three variables guided 
the case-selection. Firstly, the date of accession: on the process of Europeanisation we would 
expect older member states to have adjusted their trade administration more to the multi-level 
decision-making system. A second indicator is size: differences in economic and political weight 
can give rise to different modes of organizing the trade administration due to economies of scale 
or a larger heterogeneity of economic interests to defend. And finally, I expect that differences in 
the type of interests to defend (trade liberalization or trade protection) could affect (or be the 
result of) the way an administration is organised. To classify member states, information was 
drawn from Elsig (2010: 788) where the author mapped the ideological position of the different 
(old and new) member states on the basis of the member states’ reactions to the Commission’s 
Green Paper Questionnaire on anti-dumping reform (European Commission, 2006).  
Table 9: Country selection for pilot studies 
 Belgium Spain Estonia Poland 
Date of Accession 1952 1986 2004 2004 
Size Medium Large Small Large 
Ideological position Mixed Protective Free Trade Mixed 
Centralisation Decentralised Centralised Decentralised Centralised 
Coordination ambition Comprehensive Selective Selective Comprehensive 
 
As an additional control to ensure that the selected cases cover a large diversity in national 
systems of trade coordination, I used two indicators from the large cross-comparative research of 
Kassim (2003) as expanded by Gärtner, Hörner, & Obholzer (2011). Within this research, member 
states are categorised on the basis of two dimensions i.e. centralization and the ambition of 
coordination. Centralization reflects the presence of specialised institutions within the centre of 
government responsible for coordination. Centralised systems are characterised by a desire to 
speak with a single voice. The other dimension, ‘coordination ambition’, points to the degree in 
which member states pursue coordinating a position on all issues tabled for discussion 
(comprehensive) or only on a limited number of such issues (selective). From the table above, it 
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becomes clear that the selected member states, Belgium Spain, Estonia and Poland, differ 
according to the three dimensions and also capture all four possible configurations of 
centralisation and coordination ambition. 
Semi-structured interviews are the preferred method to gather data. The ability to deviate from a 
fixed lists of questions, the possibility to cross-validate previous findings while maintaining focus 
is desirable to systematically map variation across the cases. The topic-list used to structure the 
interviews has been elaborated above. Data gathering took place in Spain (Madrid), Belgium 
(Brussels), Estonia (Tallinn) and Poland (Warsaw) between May and November 2012 through a 
series of face-to-face interviews. I received assistance from Miss Katarina Sazonkina in the data-
gathering process. She was responsible for the Polish interviews which were conducted following 
the same topic list. In total, twenty-six interviews were thus conducted which lasted between 41 
and 83 minutes. Respondents were selected to cover the most important ministries. In the 
majority of cases, the interviewee was the head of the concerned policy unit, ensuring both a 
comprehensive understanding of their role in the broader policy process as well as the experience 
to provide ample examples.  
6.4 Results 
The cases of Spain, Belgium, Estonia and Poland will be discussed in sequential order, focusing 
on the four topics distinguished above. A comparative discussion follows at the end and 
elaborates the broader comparisons to be drawn across the cases. 
6.4.1 Spain 
[A] Public actors involved 
In Spain, external trade policy falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy. Within 
the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, a Secretary of State (Secretario de Estado) is responsible 
for all matters trade. One directorate general is responsible for dealing with external trade 
(Dirección General de Comercio e Inverciones (DGCI)) while another one focuses on matters of 
internal trade. Trade policy has never had its own ministry since Spain’s accession to the EU. 
Instead, it has always been headed either by a State-Secretary or a secretary-general (Interview, 
TO#8). The Secretary of State also represents Spain during meetings of the FAC Trade. This used 
to be different before Lisbon when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Prime Minister would often 
be the responsible delegate. 
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To construct a position on trade, the DGCI relies on a range of sub-directorates to provide the 
necessary input for the various chapters of the trade agreement under negotiation. More 
specifically, the sub-directorates on agriculture, industrial goods and services are responsible for 
deriving the Spanish position for their respective sectors. In addition, there is a separate cell that 
focuses on issues of trade defence and tariff measures. This cell also provides assistance with 
regards to more technical issues such as rules of origin (Interviews, TO#4/5). Finally there are also 
a set of sub-directorates organised along geographical lines. 
External trade –like foreign affairs- belongs to the exclusive competency of the Spanish State. 
However, a number of areas which feature prominently in trade negotiations (e.g. Agriculture 
and Fisheries) could necessitate coordination with sub-national entities. In correspondence with 
the ministry of fisheries, it was made clear that there is a clear differentiation between the federal 
and regional competences (Personal communication, 31/05/2012). This suggests that authority on 
trade is highly centralised within a single ministry which is not contested by regional and federal 
ministries.  
[B] Internal coordination 
Within DGCI, the sub-directory for EU affairs is responsible for coordinating and defining the 
Spanish position on European trade issues. In weekly meetings, the representatives of each sub-
unit provide their contribution to the formulation of the Spanish position. Conflicts and priorities 
are largely dealt with through these internal coordination meetings (Interview, TO#2/3/7). In 
other words, coordination largely takes place within the secretary and between the relevant sub-
directorates concerned. 
Authority on trade is highly centralised within the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. 
Even though boundaries between competencies are strongly respected, the horizontal nature of 
trade policy necessitates at least some degree of coordination across ministries. This coordination 
is largely informal and occurs first and foremost at the level of the different sub-directorates. In 
determining the Spanish position on trade in agricultural goods, the sub-directorate is in constant 
contact with the Ministry of agriculture and fisheries (Interview, TO#5). Likewise, the location of 
the trade administration within the same building as the Ministry of Industry also facilitates the 
exchange of information.  
Moreover, due to the intense interaction with sectorial organisations (see below), the scope for 
potential conflicts is even more limited. Significant overlap between the organisations consulted 
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by the various sub-directorates and those consulted by the other ministries, odds are slim that an 
inter-ministerial conflict arises.  
When a conflict does arise, it is mainly due to the setting of priorities. To resolve such conflicts, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs steps in as a mediator. Such cases are quite rare and can be quickly 
resolved through informal meetings (Interview, TO#8). 
[C] Human Capital 
Staff within the Ministry consists mostly out of civil servants with a specialised economic 
training. These técnicos comerciales y economistas de estado are selected through an exam for which 
the passing rate varies between 10 and 15 %. The second largest group within the trade 
administration consists out of trade diplomats (diplomados comerciales). In both cases, the entrance 
exam is focused on macro- and micro-economics but differ largely in the depth of topics to be 
mastered. The requirements for trade diplomats in terms of economic expertise are less 
challenging (Interview, TO#2). A third, significantly smaller group is the SOIVRE. This corps is 
tasked with quality assessments of imports and exports and often has a background in the more 
exact (bio-) sciences. Their expertise within the trade department is largely located in the SPS and 
TBT arrangements. 
Overall, the average experience is well above 10 years. As one respondent replied: “It almost 
takes two, three years before you can really contribute” (Interview, TO#4). While this can be a 
challenge for the trade diplomats who are involved in a rotation system, respondents indicated 
that the mobility of staff can also facilitate the creation of knowledge networks. In the first place 
this occurs between the different sub-directorates, but opportunities also exist to act as a trade 
liaison officer in alternative ministries or to be part of a foreign mission as a trade official. 
Personal networks are easily created this way (Interview, TO#2). Recently, a new cell has been 
created that deals exclusively with the assessment of trade policy through the analysis of (trade) 
data. This was deemed helpful to foster the professionalization of the ministry and undergird 
policy choices with impact assessments (Interview, TO#3). 
[D] State- society 
Following the strong division of tasks within the trade administration, most sub-directorates have 
constructed their own network to engage with private actors. There is, however, a fixed list of 
some 30 sector-wide organizations that are given a privileged status. These organizations are 
acknowledged as representative of the Spanish interest in a given sector and are therefore 
consulted frequently for defining the Spanish interest in trade policy debates. Contacts with these 
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associations are frequent and informal. Often it takes the form of a quick phone call, but meetings 
are also regularly established. Active lobbying from individual firms occurs less frequently as 
they lack the legitimacy on which the sector wide associations can rely (Interview, TO#7).  
Similar to the Civil Society Dialogue initiated by the European Commission, the Spanish 
administration has increased its consultation with civil society organizations. To this end, it 
established the Comisión Consultiva de negociaciones comerciales internacionales since 2008. This 
commission acts as a platform to exchange information on the general direction of European 
trade policy. It convenes minimum twice a year and is the main consultative body with the 
broader civil society. Taking part in these meetings are labour Unions, NGO’s, business interests 
and academics (Interview, TO#3). 
6.4.2 Belgium 
[A] Public actors involved 
The Belgian trade administration is characterised by a strong degree of fragmentation. 
Competencies on trade are divided horizontally across different ministries and vertically between 
the federal and regional level. Main authority is situated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
that coordinates the national position. The Directorate General for European Affairs (DGE) within 
this ministry organises coordination meetings, participates in the various formations of the Trade 
Policy Committee and acts as the main contact person with the European Commission.  
One ministry is of particular importance thereto, that is the ministry of Economy. In the past, 
authority on trade was located within this ministry. Nowadays, it still retains a large part of the 
technical expertise on trade and continues to play an important role in the policy-making process. 
Next to providing input on the more technical issues, they also prepare and monitor trade 
defence and represent the Belgian position in different council working group meetings (e.g. the 
WPTQ, various ITMs or the Market Access Advisory Committee).  
But also the regions play an important role. Since the Lambermont agreement of 2001, authority 
on trade policy was shifted from the federal government to the three regions (Wallonia, Brussels 
and Flanders) of Belgium. While the regions have extensive competencies on trade policy, the 
emphasis is largely placed on trade promotion. They have full authority over the international 
network of trade representatives. The regions are also involved in defending the economic 
interests of their region within the DGE coordination meetings. The coordination process between 
regions and federal ministries is horizontal as all attend these meetings as equals (Interview, 
TO#10). Other ministries, like the Ministries of Agriculture (also regionalised) or the Ministry of 
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Justice take part in the coordination if there are specific issues that are of particular concern to 
them. 
 [B] Internal coordination 
It is important to start the discussion on the Belgian trade administration, by emphasizing that 
DGE is a directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of organizing coordination 
meetings on a range of European policies. For trade, this is done by a small sub-unit i.e. DGE5. 
This unit is in no way comparable to the Spanish DGCI. With only some 5 employees it fulfils a 
largely coordinative function.  
The central locus of trade policy-making in Belgium is the coordination meeting of DGE. These 
take place on a Thursday before each meeting of the Trade Policy Committee. For these meetings, 
all regional and federal ministries (cabinets and administrations) are invited. Mailing lists are 
being used that include liaison officers in all ministries (both regional and federal). By 
consequence if issues would pop up in which e.g. the ministry of culture has an interest at stake, 
they can participate at coordination meetings (Interview, TO#9). Based on the items on the 
agenda, the ministries decide whether they will attend to defend certain positions. While over 
thirty people are invited to such meetings, regular attendance (outside the chairs) is limited to the 
regional trade administrations, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Foreign affairs and the Agricultural ministries (between 10-15 people) (Interview, TO#12). 
Attendance to and frequency of these meetings varies according to the agenda. Decisions are 
generally taken by consensus. In case this cannot be achieved in such a coordination meeting, a 
working group composing of the different ministerial cabinets is convened to strike a deal at the 
political level. In case they cannot agree, Belgium abstains from any vote. According to a senior 
respondent, this has not occurred over the last 10 years (Interview, TO#10) 
The strength of the (informal) network is crucial for Belgian policy making. All information DGE 
obtains from the Commission is circulated to a ‘trade-mailing list’ involving all experts on trade 
in the different departments (Interview, TO#10/24). Input and reaction from other ministries are 
essential in deriving the Belgian position. Agendas of, and positions taken in these working 
group meetings are also circulated to other ministries and open for feedback.  
In addition to participation in the coordination meeting, DGE can also create ad-hoc working 
groups to monitor a specific trade issue in more detail. In case of the ACTA agreement, staff from 
the ministry of Justice was joined by trade experts of the ministry of economy and DGE to draft a 
detailed report on the strengths and weaknesses of the ACTA agreement for the Belgian economy 
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(Interview, TO#10). Coordination also takes place to a lesser extent within the regional ministries 
charged with trade (Interview, TO#12) 
[C] Human Capital 
The decision to hire staff is the responsibility of the separate ministries. By consequence, it is 
difficult to speak of a general entrance exam or a general profile of the staff employed. As DGE is 
mainly staffed by diplomats, the administration is subject to recurrent changes. At the time of 
conducting the interviews, two staff members of DGE were in the process of leaving the unit to 
assume a position in one of the Belgian foreign missions. However, much of the positions to 
which they rotate to (or from) are trade-related and senior staff often comes back to the national 
administration. 
Most of the delegates representing their ministries have long standing experience in the area of 
trade. In addition, the majority of policy units in the various ministries dealing with trade also 
consist of more than one staff member, enabling on-the-job training in the shadow of a more 
experienced expert. This does not apply to all ministries though. Especially representatives from 
ministries that have only recently been involved in the trade coordination process are limited in 
staff. At the time of my fieldwork, the Flemish trade administration consisted out of a single 
expert responsible for overviewing all aspects of the trade agenda. At the same time, he was in 
charge of coordinating with societal actors, representing the region and coordinating among the 
different Flemish ministries (Interview, TO#12). 
D] State-society 
Interactions between state and society occur at the discretion of the different ministries. The 
general starting point in a new trade negotiation are the ‘Interministerial Economic Conferences’ 
(IEC) which act as an important first step in formulating the nation’s economic interests. These 
IEC’s are a –relatively- recent initiative by the Ministry of Economy which have become standard 
practice for each (large) trade negotiation the EC proposes to initiate. The senior official 
responsible for trade within the ministry started organizing these meetings, as he considered it 
appropriate to use the available expertise and capacity within his administration to develop a 
comprehensive overview of the economic interests at stake in potential negotiations (Interview, 
TO#11). Starting from a statistical analysis of available data, business associations are invited to 
provide input in defining and refining the offensive and defensive interests Belgium has in the 
negotiation under study. Other ministries are also invited to attend these conferences, although 
they have a small incentive to do so, as they also participate in the eventual coordination 
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meetings at DGE (Interview, TO#12). The report that comes out of such an IEC is an important 
tool to define the Belgian interests at an early stage of the negotiation and act as an important 
reference point throughout the negotiations. 
Making abstraction of the IEC, consultations with stakeholders are largely organised at the 
discretion of the involved administrations. Each ministry relies on its own network and 
correspondingly consults most intensely with those groups active in their respective domain. 
Consultations occur frequently at the initiative of the ministry. Most of the time, these involve 
national business associations, only rarely do discussions occur with individual or multinational 
corporations. The Ministry of Economy also disposes of a large database of registered firms to 
assess the salience of specific initiatives. This database can also be used pro-actively to solicit 
input from potential stakeholders in the absence of a vocal business association. For a specific 
trade dispute, the administration used this register to contact companies (many of them SMEs) to 
inquire into the Belgian interests at stake (Interview, TO#11). Since DGE has a largely 
coordinative function, direct input from business associations is somewhat limited.  
Also at the regional level, large business associations are active within the policy process. The 
main institution with whom the Flemish administration engages is VOKA.59 Through cooperation 
with the policy unit within VOKA, the administration obtains more detailed information on the 
priorities and interests of Flemish business (Interview, TO#12). More recently, attempts were also 
made to integrate the expertise of the Flemish trade promotion agency ‘Flanders Investment and 
Trade’ in the Flemish policy network. The underlying motivation being that they are confronted 
most directly with the concerns and questions of the –often smaller- exporting firms.  
6.4.3 Estonia 
 [A] Public actors involved 
Prior to the accession, Estonia had a separate ministry of trade. Repeated reforms have continued 
to decentralise competencies on trade resulting in various ministries being responsible over 
different parts of the agreement. Currently, the main authority on trade policy lies with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Representatives in TPC Full Members and TPC Deputies also 
hail from this unit. With regards to trade in services, it is the ministry of economy that takes the 
                                                     
59 This is a large umbrella organization covering many different sectors and counting over 18.000 companies among its 
members, covering 29 business associations and over 65% of Flemish employment. 
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lead. By consequence the TPC S&I is attended by two representatives. Also trade defence and the 
representation in the WPTQ is the responsibility for the ministry of Economy. 
In general, competences are clearly distributed according to the various chapters of a trade 
agreement. The Ministry of Agriculture provides input when it concerns the products belonging 
to the first 24 chapters of the Harmonised System product classification. Non-agricultural 
manufactured goods, Technical Barriers to Trade and trade in services belongs to the ministry of 
economy. The chapter on Intellectual Property Rights belongs to the department of justice. Public 
procurement is covered by the Ministry of Finance. And insofar as tariff rates are concerned, the 
Estonian administration depends on a separate agency: the Customs and Taxation Board 
(interview, TO#14). The number of ministries actively involved can go up to 6 or 7 when we are 
dealing with a deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (interview, TO#12). 
[B] Internal coordination 
Coordination for the TPC meetings is the responsibility of the MFA. Internally, they have divided 
the workload in geographic areas. One person covers for example all the Asian trade negotiations 
(Interview, TO#13).When the agreement comes up in the TPC, or as soon as concrete texts are 
available, it is the responsibility of this official to draft a position and request input from the 
relevant ministries. Internal coordination largely occurs through telephone or e-mail 
correspondence. Generally this takes the form of a ‘cookie’. For each point of the agenda a brief 
history along with a draft position is prepared. The ministries can then suggest adjustments or 
provide input where so requested (Interview, TO#14). 
Only exceptionally do –bilateral- meetings occur. The process is also more closed and ministries 
rarely openly discuss or overrule positions formulated by other ministries (Interview, TO#12). 
Whereas all the respondents were familiar with the MFA, they barely know the other trade 
experts in the different ministries. The Estonian process of coordination is more closed in 
comparison to the Belgian case, as it is left at the discretion of the MFA to decide which ministries 
are to be contacted for input (Interview, TO#15). However, for most issues, there is a clear 
division of tasks between the ministries. In the end it could therefore very well be that there are 
an equal amount of ministries involved in the Belgium coordination process.  
In the eventuality that conflicts arise, no formal methods of conflict resolution could be recalled. 
Conflicts are exceedingly rare not only due to the clear division of tasks, but also due to the 
common adherence to an ‘open-minded, liberal trade agenda’. Adjustments to the 
aforementioned cookies often take the form of a further specification or a more technical wording.  
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[C] Human Capital 
Within the MFA, policy officials are all diplomats. This implies that they change position every 
three years. This presents a challenge to the acquisition and retention of expertise and experience 
on trade policy-making (Interview, TO#13). Alternative career paths are being investigated to 
address this issue and enable rotations within a specific policy field.  
With the exception of the MFA, most trade officials are public servants. They have relatively 
stable careers within the ministries. One respondent indicated she was already in charge of trade 
policy for over 20 years. If she would leave the office, the administration would be hard pressed 
in finding a suitable replacement (interview, TO#17).The trade cell in these ministries often 
comprises of one or two staff members knowledgeable on the particular trade topics. Within the 
ministry of economy, four people were still working on the EU’s trade policy (including trade 
defence).  
Moreover, respondents indicated that policy formation on trade policy issues is but one of the 
many tasks to be fulfilled. An Estonian respondent explained that almost 50% of her workload 
consisted out of implementation work. This does not only involve assessing the conformity of 
new trade regulations with national law or overseeing its implementation but also public service 
provision. As the expert in their field, they are also the main spokesperson for the public at large. 
Officials are often approached with questions from businesses about applicable trade rules or 
need to update the ministry’s website (Interview, TO#14). Finally, for those ministries in which 
trade only plays a minor role, it also occurs that staff is involved in multiple policy networks. In 
that case, the civil servant’s time needs to be spread across different topics.  
 [D] State-society 
To consult with societal stakeholders, the MFA organises a round-table twice a year. At these 
events, the administration presents the main important developments in trade policy and invites 
societal stakeholders to voice their concerns or interests. 
Outside of these round-table meetings, input from society is often limited. Acknowledging the 
importance of input from business associations, the respondents frequently reach out. 
Unfortunately, little response ensues (Interview TO#14). The small scale of the country makes the 
financial basis to sustain a business association with sufficient policy capacity on trade too narrow 
(Interview TO#14/16/18). The main exception is the Chamber for Commerce and Trade. This 
umbrella organization supports trade policy in two ways. Firstly by providing input on many 
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recurrent issues, but also more structurally by inquiring its members preferences on trade 
through a (web-) survey.  
However, at the same time respondents acknowledged that in a small country like Estonia, one 
can easily identify the affected firm(s) responsible for bilateral exports based on basic statistics. In 
that case a quick phone call can help to identify the firm’s -and thus the national- interest 
(Interview, TO#14).  
6.3.4 Poland 
[A] Public actors involved 
In Poland, the Department of trade policy within the Ministry of Economy prepares the Polish 
position with regards to the EU’s external trade policy. Even though the Treaty of Lisbon led to 
the inclusion of foreign investment in the EU’s CCP, a different department remains responsible 
for investment (Interview, TO#19). For international trade negotiations, internal coordination 
between the various departments within the ministry is required. 
Other ministries are also involved in the policy-making process. Similar to the Belgian and 
Estonian cases, various ‘secondary’ ministries have trade departments that contribute to the 
formulation of the Polish position in trade. The Ministry of Agriculture is such a public actor that 
regularly contributes to the policy formation process. Also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a 
role, although this is largely a coordinative function to ensure coherence across the various 
European policy debates in which Poland is involved (Interview, TO#20). The Ministry of Finance 
as well as the Treasury also contribute regularly. The latter’s involvement is required when trade 
from state-owned producers is affected by a trade negotiation. 
Finally, the Polish Parliament has to be consulted in advance of defending a position at the 
Foreign Affairs Council (see infra). While they have an opportunity to raise questions on the 
positions defended, their consent is only required when a piece of legislation needs to be 
approved. 
 [B] Internal coordination 
Two different coordination processes are in place depending on the level of the discussions.  
(1) For the TPC meetings the line ministry i.e. Ministry of Economy is responsible for the 
coordination process. The applied process is quite similar to the Belgian case albeit less open for 
participation. Once the agenda for the upcoming TPC meeting is known, a draft position is 
developed within the Ministry of Economy. This draft position is then forwarded to all the 
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relevant ministries and agencies for additional input. Based on the provided input, a new position 
is drafted which is circulated again to the other trade experts. These can –if so desired- still 
request adjustments during a coordination meeting which convenes on the Thursday before the 
scheduled TPC meeting. In the event that the conflict cannot be resolved during this meeting, the 
issue is referred to an interministerial body. Respondents indicated that this only rarely occurs 
(Interview, TO#19, #21).  
(2) In preparation for COREPER II and FAC meetings, coordination follows a different procedure. 
Here, the Komitet do Spraw Europejskich (KSE) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumes 
responsibility for the coordination process. By law, all meetings of COREPER and Council need to 
be prepared by this committee. This committee also informs the Polish parliament of the 
formulated position before the meeting in Brussels take place. Coordination within the KSE 
occurs at the Ministerial level. In this case, the line ministry forwards a draft position to the KSE 
who invites comments from all Directors in the different ministries responsible for EU policies. 
These directors, then, need to consult internally to identify any concerns. The risk in this 
procedure lies in the many chains that need to be passed before the trade experts are actually 
consulted. A respondent explained: “it occurs quite often that we receive a draft instruction at 8.30 in 
the morning and we have 30 minutes time to voice concerns or to propose some modifications” (Interview 
TO# 21). Moreover, a proposal for modifications requires ministerial approval tightening the time 
constraint. By consequence, secondary ministries try to influence the policy formation process 
within the line ministry in advance of the KSE coordination. The majority of this coordination 
takes place through written procedures. Again, only few instances of internal conflict came to 
mind. 
[C] Human Capital 
As a large part of the decision-making process occurs in a decentralised matter, to grasp the 
available human capital within the Polish administration requires a case-by-case assessment of 
the involved ministries. As highlighted above, the Department of trade within the Ministry of 
Economy has the largest responsibilities and expertise in trade and consists of some 26 members. 
With the exception of a few people who acquired experience in foreign posts (Geneva, Paris or 
Brussels), the majority of current staff are young graduates with limited prior experience within 
the public administration (Interview TO#19). Trade departments in other ministries are 
considerable smaller. There are some 7 staff members within the ministry of agriculture working 
on trade subjects. In the MFA, only a coordinative function is applied and the number of staff is 
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correspondingly quite limited. Here, most experts have a background in international economic 
relations. 
[D] State-society 
The coordinating units (both within the Ministry of Economy and the KGE within MFA) rarely 
consult directly with societal stakeholders. This is left to the sub-directorates within the ministry 
of economy and the secondary ministries. Polish respondents indicated a limited input from 
business associations. Mainly because they are not aware of what is going on. Hence, the quality 
of input could be substantially improved. A respondent recalled when trying to solicit input that: 
“they really did not have much to say apart from claiming: ‘well, it is very complicated … the Ministry 
should do what is best for our interest. We do not have the knowledge, the expertise’ ” (Interview, TO#21). 
Other respondents were less clear-cut with regards to the way in which interaction with societal 
interests take place. When reflecting on the overall functioning of the administration, a 
respondent was generally positive but pointed out that: “There is a lot of copy-paste. It would be nice 
to involve more direct major stakeholders” (Interview TO#19). When input is limited, policy positions 
are generally constructed on the basis of previous knowledge. 
The limited involvement of societal actors confirms earlier findings by McMenamin who, upon 
studying Polish business associations argued that Polish business associations had to be built 
from the ground up after former communist rule and are thus not accustomed to actively 
lobbying their government (McMenamin 2002). 
6.4.5 Summarizing the exploratory case-study analysis 
The case-studies reveal considerable variation across the different topics identified. The findings 
are summarised in Table 10 and will be discussed in more detail below. 
With regards to the involvement of different public actors the most apparent distinction 
between the various cases is the degree of centralization of trade authority and trade expertise (1). 
In Spain, trade policy authority is largely centralised in one State Secretary. In Poland, the 
Ministry of Economy wields considerable authority while at the same time being dependent on 
other ministries for input on trade issues; finally in Estonia and Belgium the MFA is largely 
responsible for coordinating a national position and representing the country in the TPC. With 
regards to the scope for overlapping competencies (2), this was clearly limited. Nevertheless, in 
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the case of Belgium, such scope exists due to the regionalisation of trade authority.60 In Poland 
minor overlap was present with regards to the coordination and representation.  
The second topic identified was the coordination processes among the affected ministries. Here, 
variation can be observed on three dimensions. Firstly, there is the method of coordination and 
the extent to which such coordination is formalised (3). In Belgium and Poland weekly meetings 
take place in person a day before the TPC Deputies convene. In Estonia such coordination largely 
occurs through e-mail and phone correspondence. In Spain the decision to consult the other 
ministries is facultative and is the responsibility of the sub-directorates general. A second 
dimension of variation in the coordination process concerns the nature of coordination (4). In 
Spain, the line ministry had substantial discretion in the choice whether or not to incorporate the 
provided input in a resulting compromise position.  In Poland, an explanation was required from 
the line ministry when deciding not to take the input on board.61 Coordination in such case takes 
on the form of a consultation. In Estonia, the different positions were largely aggregated without 
much discussion. Here, the ministries formulate a joint position through coordination-as-
aggregation. Finally, the Belgian coordination process is one of ‘horizontality’, that means that all 
ministries be it regional or federal are treated as equals. A consensus needs to be struck between 
the various ministries. All participants to the meeting can openly discuss each issue it considers of 
relevance to their ministry. Input is thus not merely aggregated by the coordinating body but put 
up for discussion. This represents coordination-as-negotiation. Thirdly, variation could be noted 
regarding the manner in which conflicts are solved (5). Whereas the Estonian respondents could 
not recollect formal mechanisms, there was a clear procedure to be followed in the Belgian and 
Polish case. In Spain a mechanism existed, but this felt more like an informal rule of procedure. 
The reason for such ‘vagueness’ is the limited number of cases where internal discord would 
amount to highly political discussions. 
                                                     
60 The open, horizontal, method of coordination ensures that any regional interest can be defended in DGE’s coordination 
meetings. There are for example the regional ministries of agriculture or the regional ministries of culture and education 
that can attend the coordination should they so desire. The existence of a separate ministry for trade policy at the level of 
the regions creates overlapping competencies without strengthening the policy network. 
61 However, if e.g. the ministry of agriculture does not agree with the provided explanation, it can still invoke (ministerial) 
conflict resolution procedures (see infra) 
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Table 10: Summary of qualitative fieldwork 
 Spain Belgium Estonia Poland 
Public actors     
1. Centralization High Low Low Medium 
2. Competencies Clear division Overlapping competencies Clear division – risk of gaps Overlap in coordination 
Coordination      
3. Method of coordination  Ad hoc at discretion of sub-
directorates 
Formalised weekly meetings MFA asks input – mail and 
phone correspondence 
Formalised weekly meetings 
4. Nature of coordination Consultation - reaffirmation Negotiation  Aggregation  Consultation & negotiation 
5. Conflict resolution MFA mediates Ministerial discussion no 
strong coordinator to decide 
Ad hoc Ministerial coordinating body 
(KGE) 
Human Capital      
6. Quantity Large Medium Very small Medium 
7. Training & experience Technical and diplomatic 
corps, life-long career in trade 
possible 
Diplomats ( MFA) & 
Civil servants  
Diplomats ( MFA) & 
Civil servants 
Civil servants, limited 
experience 
State-Society     
8. Presence of business 
associations 
High High Low Low 
9. Interaction Mixed Mixed State State 
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Next to the involved ministries and the coordination process, variation was also found with 
respect to the available human resources in the administrations. Here, the contrast between small 
and large MS did play a role. Whereas in Spain, Belgium and Poland policy units in different 
ministries consist of multiple experts, this proved to be less the case in Estonia. In addition to the 
number of staff (6), the time such staff can devote to matters of trade policy-making also varies. 
Differences also existed with regards to the amount of experience and training that officials could 
gather ‘on-the-job’ (7). The obligatory rotation for diplomats was repeatedly cited as a challenge 
to build up and maintain expertise. In most of the cases, this problem was remedied by rotating 
within similar positions such as the missions in Geneva, at the WTO or embassies to important 
trading partners.  
A fourth and final topic concerns the manner in which the trade administration interacts with 
societal stakeholders. From the fieldwork, it became apparent that there is a large difference 
between the member states both in terms of the capacity of business associations to provide 
useful contributions to the policy process as well as the way in which the administrations engages 
with societal actors. The focus of existing IPE scholarship on the dominant, constitutive role of 
interest groups somewhat wavers in light of the Estonian and Polish cases. Whereas the limited 
involvement of Estonian business associations could easily be explained based on the relatively 
small size of the economy, the Polish case suggests a more profound cleavage (8). Research has 
shown that societal organisations are less involved in policy-making in the Eastern member states 
(Sissenich 2010). The cases confirm this finding. Moreover, variation was also discovered in the 
manner in which state-society interaction takes place (9). In almost all of the cases policy makers 
decided to consult with stakeholders and often decided on a case-by-case basis whether or not to 
follow the advice of the interest groups. A finding which echoes earlier research by Cornelia Woll 
when describing the Commission’s relation with business associations (Woll 2006).  
Conclusions 
How does a trade administration derive its interest in a given negotiation? To address this 
question, we have first looked at the available IPE literature identifying the limitations of existing 
(comparative) approaches. While acknowledging the importance of societal interests, it remains 
unclear how these interests are aggregated in a trade administration. Insights from legislative 
processes are not particularly useful in this exercise. For these reasons, an exploratory case study 
drawing on semi-structured interviews was deemed appropriate. The topic list was determined 
on the basis of Comparative Public Administration literature and –when available- applications to 
trade policy. 
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Ultimately, four cases were selected, Belgium, Estonia, Spain and Poland. The interviews in these 
member states have enabled me to paint a more detailed picture of how a member state derives a 
position in external trade negotiations. Moreover, in comparing the four cases, interesting 
patterns emerged pointing into potentially interesting directions for the ensuing 
operationalization of administrative capacity in general and deriving capacity in particular. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY: CAPTURING THAT ELUSIVE 
VIRTUE 
 
he fieldwork conducted in the previous chapter already revealed that, to grasp the capacity 
of an administration to monitor the Commission and derive their own interests, we cannot 
limit our focus to the responsible line ministry. In many member states, the trade administration 
is not a monolithic entity but rather a complex network of experts dispersed across a wide range 
of public and private actors. As a result, relying on straightforward measures like the line 
ministry’s budget or the number of staff it employs; creates a bias in favour of the centralised 
administrations. In order to account for this diversity, a more holistic approach is required. To 
this end, the notion of the policy network will be used as a mnemonic device. The first section 
elaborates the added value to be obtained from such a conceptualization. The second section will 
focus on identifying the factors contributing to the performance of the trade administration or 
rather the trade policy network. Where appropriate, the underlying assumptions regarding the 
drivers of network performance have been specified. The resulting outcome of this discussion is a 
survey-instrument and a set of five propositions that help to gain additional insight into the 
obtained survey data. 
The data-gathering process will be explained in the third section. Due to limited response on the 
original web-survey, a reduced version of the questionnaire was gathered through phone 
interviews. In the fourth section the gathered data will be described and the proposition will be 
put to the test. The resulting findings will be summarised in a final section. 
7.1 Mapping the trade administration as a policy network 
From the literature overview and the fieldwork discussed in the previous chapter, it has become 
clear that to grasp an administration’s capacity it does not suffice to limit one’s focus on the 
attributes of the responsible policy unit. To account for the variation in organizational forms, the 
conceptualization of the administration as a policy network will be used as a starting point 
(Atkinson and Coleman 1989). The search for comparative measures of monitoring and deriving 
T 
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capacity is thus preceded by the question ‘what determines network performance?’ But let us first 
elaborate the concept of the policy network.  
Policy networks are considered here not as a specific functional form or a metaphor but as a 
general template, a generic model or algorithm from which we can deduce a plethora of 
organizational forms (Isett et al. 2011, 168). The choice for this interpretation of policy networks, 
rather than using the more popular ‘network governance’ approach, is driven by its wider, 
inclusive perspective. Policy networks as interest intermediation is considered a ‘concept which 
applies to all kinds of relations between public and private actors. For the governance school, on the 
contrary, policy networks only characterize a specific form of public-private interaction in public policy 
(governance), namely the one based on non- hierarchical co-ordination, opposed to hierarchy and market as 
two inherently distinct modes of governance’ Börzel (1998: 255). The different actors involved in 
trade-policy making (both public and private) are related through a large variety of hierarchical 
and non-hierarchical relationships. Confining the analysis to study only the latter type of network 
ties would reduce the empirical validity of the concepts being used.62  
Drawing inspiration from the method of social network analysis, it is possible to distinguish the 
three primary components of the policy network; these are the nodes, attributes and ties. The 
nodes correspond to the different actors potentially involved in the network. The attributes reflect 
the different characteristics of these actors and, finally, ‘ties’ refer to the relation between the 
different nodes.63 By inquiring into the actors involved, their characteristics and the relationships 
between them, we can form a complete picture of the functioning of a (trade) administration. This 
is depicted graphically in Figure 8. The examples are loosely based on the variety discovered in 
the pilot studies of the previous chapter and seek to provide a simplified, stylised depiction of the 
policy network. 
                                                     
62 I prefer, however, to refrain from using the notion of ‘governance’ for an additional, more pragmatic reason. Already 
from its inception, governance has carried many interpretations and connotations, a problem also recognised by many of 
its main proponents (see e.g. Börzel, 1998, 2011; Rhodes, 1996). One such interpretation that has been used quite 
frequently in the literature is the focus on governance as the opposite of government (Bell and Hindmoor 2012). In this 
view, governance reflects a ‘continuum ranging from the most dominated by the state to those in which the state plays no role’ 
(Pierre and Peters 2005, 11). This is at odds with the positive-sum game that characterises much of the interaction between 
state and society. The stronger inclusion of non-governmental players does not mark the retreat of the state (Strange 1996) 
or the advent of a governance without government (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), rather it marks a change in the role of 
the state in the policy process. The state increasingly fulfils the role of a meta-governor, assessing potential weaknesses in 
the policy-network and seeking adequate remedies (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). 
63 Social Network Analysis usually distinguishes only between ties and attributes (Scott, 2013). A node does not vary and 
is only observed once it is connected to the rest of the network through a tie. Hence, ontologically we can focus only on 
ties and attributes and neglect the concept of nodes. However, for conceptual purposes, it is easier to discuss nodes and 
ties separately.  
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Figure 8: Deriving administrative indicators from the policy network 
 
In the examples, we assume three ministries (squares) too hold some authority or expertise on 
trade policy. These are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Economy (ME) and 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MAgr). The representative at the European level can monitor the 
Commission through a variety of sources. In the depicted schedule three such sources were 
indicated i.e. participation at the TPC, attendance to the ITM’s and consulting with European 
Parliament (EP). The societal interests (circles) also play an important role in the policy network 
as they can provide more information regarding the likely effects of a trade agreement on their 
welfare. Variation among the cases is visible with regards to the ministry representing the 
member state, the existence of a coordination process (the middle panel) and resource 
munificence. The latter is indicated by a darker colour.  
When looking at the actors involved in the policy network, their capacities and the relations 
between them, we can map a plethora of characteristics of the trade administration. (1) By 
focusing on the number of public players who play a constitutive role in deriving or defending 
national preferences, a measure of (de)centralization can easily be obtained. The example in the 
left panel of Figure 8 represents a highly centralised administration – as we have seen in Spain- 
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whereas the central panel depicts a more decentralised system such as Belgium. (2) Horizontal 
coordination or lack thereof becomes apparent when studying the ties between the public actors 
in the policy network and can range from a complete lack of inter-ministerial coordination to 
weekly coordination meetings. (3) As the pilot studies have shown, variation also exists with 
regards to the business association’s resources and the quality of their input. (4) Additional 
dimensions of administrative variation can easily be derived if we take into account that 
attributes might also distinguish between regional or supranational traits, fiscal capacity, 
legitimacy etc. These examples serve to illustrate that by focusing on the nodes, ties and 
attributes, it is possible to construct a wide range of second-order indicators regarding the trade 
administration.  
Having presented the argument that the variety of administrative forms can be captured by traits 
of the network, the crucial challenge remains to identify which measures contribute to high 
administrative capacity? Applied to the context of a policy network, we can rephrase our question 
as to: What determines network performance? Performance is defined here in much the same 
way as ‘administrative capacity’ i.e. based on the functions the administration needs to perform 
(Provan and Milward 2001). A network thus performs well if it can monitor and accurately derive 
the domestic interests at stake. While the notion of network performance is quite old (see e.g. 
Provan & Milward 1995), it has taken some time before public administration scholars have 
turned their attention to the subject. Based on the literature, the following section will elaborate 
which factors foster network performance (see e.g. Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi 2009).  
7.2 Operationalizing administrative capacity 
Despite its growing importance64, most authors studying network performance have focused on 
networks for policy implementation rather than policy making (Lecy, Mergel, and Schmitz 2013). 
By consequence, some of the factors of network performance that are being forwarded below find 
less (empirical) support in the existing literature. Simplifying assumptions are therefore made to 
enable a clear selection of variables.65 For each of these variables, a concrete set of questions is 
derived based on the pilot studies elaborated in the previous chapter.  
                                                     
64 see e.g. Kenis & Provan 2009; Provan & Kenis 2008; Voets, Van Dooren, & De Rynck 2008 
65 Evidently all of the assumptions made, can be subject to discussion. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the 
existing measures of administrative capacity all assume the existence of a central administration thereby creating a bias 
vis-à-vis the many decentralised trade administrations. 
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The key characteristic explaining endogenous information asymmetry was the administrative 
capacity of a member state. Remember that we identified two components of such capacity. On 
the one hand there was the act of monitoring the Commission while on the other hand there was 
the act of deriving the national position in an on-going trade negotiation. Each will be discussed 
below.  
7.2.1 Monitoring capacity 
To monitor the agent during a negotiation, the principal-agent model has emphasised the 
importance of various reporting mechanisms. In line with the network approach elaborated 
above, the frequency by which these sources are consulted relates to the existence and strength of 
the ties. For many external trade negotiations, member states cannot monitor the Commission 
directly as trade is an exclusive competency of the EU. This also applies to so-called Deep and 
Comprehensive FTA’s where topics touch both member states’ and union competency. For these 
agreements, the trade components of the agreement are negotiated separately from the issues that 
fall under MS competency (EuropeDirect, personal communication, April 18, 2013). Member 
states, therefore, depend primarily on different indirect channels to obtain information on the 
agent’s behaviour. Seeing that each of these sources can divulge new information, a larger 
diversity of sources can help to clear out the information asymmetry between principal and 
agent. 
Assumption 1: A larger diversity of sources consulted with regards to the Commission’s action in 
negotiations contributes to a higher monitoring capacity. 
To map the proficiency of the information network on which a national administration draws, it 
is primordial to identify the various sources that can be consulted to obtain additional 
information on the actions and efforts made by the Commission during negotiations. Based on 
the interviews in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, I could identify thirteen sources that can be classified 
in four groups. 
(1) The most important source of information on the negotiations is the European Commission. 
Through the briefings of DG Trade within the TPC meetings, the member states can obtain first-
hand information with regards to the status of the negotiations, the positions taken and the 
strategies applied. More recently, informal technical briefings (ITMs) are also organised in the 
wake of a negotiation round. Attendance to such briefings tends to vary and since no written 
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report is being supplied, absence can easily lead to an informational disadvantage (Interview, 
TO#23/25).66 Respondents indicated that, in general, the Commission maintains an open 
relationship with the member states and provides ample information. However, at the same time 
they had the impression that the Commission only discloses information that it considers 
relevant, occasionally retaining sensitive information (Interview TO#23/28).  
(2) The Commission provides the same information to all principals. While not discriminating in 
its communication vis-à-vis the different principals, member states can obtain (additional) 
information through informal, bilateral contacts with Commission officials (Interview, TO #25; 
Panke, 2010: 803). But also other European institutions, such as the Council secretariat or 
European Parliament, might act as a source of information.  
(3) The permanent representation as well as other line ministries can participate in various 
meetings of the council working parties where information can be gleaned with respect to trade 
negotiations. By consequence, also domestic actors can contribute to a MS’ overall monitoring 
capacity. Among those domestic actors are also societal stakeholders that catch wind of 
developments in trade negotiations and provide additional information regarding the 
Commission’s actions. 
(4) Finally, the EU’s external trade partners are also a -more sensitive- source of information. A 
respondent confirmed that direct interaction between the negotiating partner and member states 
occurs and can –at times- lay bare internal conflicts, weakening the negotiating position of the EU 
(Interview, TO#25). Having an international presence in the partner country can potentially help 
to glean additional information on the Commission’s actions through its negotiating partner 
(Interview, TO#27). 
To transform this discussion into a concrete set of questions, respondents were asked to indicate 
the frequency by which they consult a wide variety of sources when monitoring the 
Commission.67 More, diverse sources of information improve a member state’s oversight on the 
Commission during the negotiations. Similarly, the frequency by which such sources are 
consulted affects the ability of a MS to monitor the Commission and correctly estimate its room of 
manoeuvre. In other words, the MS need to obtain as many pieces of the puzzle as possible in 
                                                     
66 Unfortunately, no attendance records are kept of these meetings and to collect a sufficiently representative sample of 
meetings would imply data-collection well beyond the time frame of this research. 
67 The strength of a tie has been repeatedly been measured through the frequency of interaction in the literature (Friedkin 
1980; Sandström and Carlsson 2008) 
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order to fully understand what the Commission is (not) doing. The above overview results in a 
list of questions on which respondents were asked to indicate the frequency by which they were 
consulted to monitor the Commission (see Appendix I, Question 3).  
7.2.2 Deriving Capacity 
‘On two occasions I have been asked, "Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong 
figures, will the right answers come out?’ Charles Babbage (1864: 67)  
In terms of deriving capacity, we can focus on three characteristics of the policy network that can 
affect its performance. A first characteristic is related to the participation of relevant stakeholders 
to the policy process. This concerns both societal and public actors. The omission of important 
stakeholders – structural holes- can result in a weaker performance of the policy network. A 
second characteristic pertains to the capacity of the involved actors. Finally, the ability to solve 
internal conflicts is also important to understand whether an administration is able to 
approximate the ‘ideal position’. 
Structural holes 
Asking the question of who participates in the policy network presents a first step towards the 
analysis of the network’s proficiency in deriving a position. Potentially more important in light of 
my focus on a MS’ ability to derive their interests in a trade negotiation is the question: ‘Who is 
not participating?’ The exclusion or absence of specific actors in the network affects both the 
ability to derive domestic interests as well as the ability to monitor the Commission.  
In formulating a position, failure to tap into the available expertise or information of a policy 
actor will result in sub-optimal policy positions. Such ‘structural holes’ represent a first factor 
through which endogenous information asymmetry can occur (Burt 1992). This can happen in the 
absence of both a public or private actor that holds significant expertise over a specific part of the 
policy issue. The effect of structural holes on network performance has shown varying results 
depending on the purpose of the network.68 For a policy network, I will assume that, on average, 
more structural holes results in a weaker deriving capacity as deviations from the ‘optimal 
position’ are more likely to occur.  
                                                     
68 Depending on the definition of performance, scholars have hypothesised and confirmed a positive effect (Berardo 2009) 
and an ambiguous effect (Sandström and Carlsson 2008). Whereas structural holes constrained innovation, it was less 
effective at inducing efficiency. Heterogeneity inhibits cooperation, as it constrains the development of a common 
language. Since the trade policy network in and of itself only harbours a limited degree of heterogeneity, I think the 
efficiency gains from a smaller network are limited in comparison to the potential gains to be accrued from expanding the 
number of actors involved. 
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Assumption 2: Lack of structural holes increases deriving capacity. 
To turn this variable into a survey question, an approach similar to the measurement of 
monitoring capacity can be used. Here too, a “roster-choice-method” is applied whereby potential 
respondents are provided with a list of various sources which can be consulted. The pilot studies 
conducted in the previous chapter enable me to form an elaborate picture on the different (groups 
of) actors that can contribute to the formulation of a policy position.  
So which are the sources that can help an administration to identify its interests at stake? As 
apparent from the qualitative fieldwork, multiple ministries are involved in trade policy-making. 
Policy coordination can be restricted to different sub-directorates within a large centralised 
administration or with other ministries. Since the targeted respondents to the survey are national 
trade officials (see infra), I include a question to identify the unit at which the respondent is 
located. An additional follow-up question was included asking respondents to name a maximum 
of four ministries that they consider relevant actors in the area of trade. This was deemed 
appropriate to help identify potential respondents that had not been reached yet. 
But also societal interests are important in the formulation of a policy position. To grasp the 
extent of their involvement, it is interesting to look specifically into what can be considered ‘less 
mobilised’ agencies and organizations. The reason to do so is that most member states have 
some form of institutionalised coordination with large umbrella organizations such as the 
Chambers of Commerce. By consequence, I expect only limited variation to be found if we inquire 
into their overall contacts with societal actors. To assess the inclusiveness of the policy network, a 
stronger emphasis on smaller, less mobilised interests might be more rewarding. From the 
international political economy literature on trade policy (see Chapter 6.1), we can identify three 
groups of interests that fall under this category and require more attention when formulating 
trade policy. These are the concerns of exporting firms, the non-governmental organizations and 
small and medium sized enterprises. (1) To assess the inclusion of exporters’ interests, I have 
inquired specifically for the integration of the agencies charged with trade promotion in the 
policy process. Each member state still retains the authority to engage in activities that enhance 
the export capabilities of its economy. This also involves helping firms overcome the hurdles they 
face when trying to access foreign markets. Export promotion agencies are confronted on a daily 
basis with the difficulties and interests of exporters and are therefore in an excellent position to 
understand the barriers, interests and challenges of such potential exporters. (2) Non-
governmental organisations are also traditionally left out of the trade-policy process (Dür and De 
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Bièvre 2007; Hocking 2004). (3) Finally, small and medium sized firms and especially those in the 
services industry have been reported difficult to involve in the policy network. (Interview, TO 
#23/28).  
In addition to public and private stakeholders, a final group of actors that is of interest to this 
study is the involvement of political representatives in the policy network. Unlike the other 
stakeholders, ministers and their cabinet do not necessarily provide additional expertise, but can 
grant more political purchase when negotiating in the Council. Distributional policies like trade 
often involve trade-offs to be made. Clearly, what is considered an optimal trade-off varies across 
time and across societies. The political representation- either in the executive or in national 
parliaments- can play an important role as an arbitrator that decides which trade-offs a society is 
willing to make. In a network analysis of eleven municipal administrations, it was found that 
politicians are quite peripheral to the network (Alexander, Lewis, and Considine 2011). It would 
be interesting to assert whether this also applies for a national policy network. From the pilot 
studies, much variation in time and space can be found with respect to the autonomy of the 
bureaucracy from its political patrons.69 The full formulation of the concerned question can be 
found in Appendix IV Questions 5 and 6.  
Human Resources 
The relation between human resources and performance of the network is best clarified by the 
quote at the beginning of this section. In case the information inserted in the policy network is 
inaccurate, it is less likely that the resulting outcome will approximate the ideal position, even in 
the absence of structural holes. When Charles Babbage was explaining the first computer, two 
politicians confronted him with the question whether the machine might produce correct answers 
if the wrong numbers were inserted. Unfortunately, when the quality of information inserted into 
the policy network is low, so will be the result. In terms of the performance of policy networks, a 
recent literature review discerned a positive effect of the available staff on network performance 
                                                     
69 At the Belgian coordination meetings both cabinets and the administrations of different ministries are invited to 
participate and contribute to the formulation of a position (TO#9, Brussels, 1 August 2012). In Estonia the possibility for 
political influence was less direct as briefings were more informal and often occur only at the request of the concerned 
cabinet (TO#17, Tallinn, 22 November 2012). Finally, in Spain, a State Secretary (Secretario de Estado) is in charge of trade 
policy. He disposes of a proper cabinet which also takes part in internal coordination sessions organised by a specific sub-
directorate of the state secretary. 
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(Walker and Andrews 2013).70 Having sufficient staff at your disposal to follow-up on-going 
debates, to gather and process the wealth of information, and to assess the ramification of 
different alternative proposals; all can contribute to a MS’ deriving capacity.  
The munificence of human resources is determined by two factors: the number of effective 
working hours available and the efficiency by which such time is used. The former increases the 
amount of information that can be gathered and processed simultaneously and enables 
specialisation whereas the latter affects the speed by which such data is gathered and enables a 
more correct assessment of the value of the acquired information. This applies both to public and 
private actors.  
Assumption 3: More human resources increase a member states’ deriving capacity 
Regarding the availability of sufficient human resources, the interviews revealed that the absolute 
number of staff only tells part of the story. Especially in smaller member states, the provision of 
public services can take up a large portion of the trade official’s disposable time. Specialization is 
not always a feasible option. To obtain a better understanding of the different roles fulfilled by 
each unit and to grasp the time devoted to policy-making, a question is included with regards to 
respondents’ time-use. 
The amount of working hours a trade administration can devote to the formulation of a domestic 
position and monitor the Commission does not tell anything about the efficiency by which these 
tasks are performed. From the pilot studies, two issues prove particularly relevant here i.e. (a) the 
accumulation (and retention) of experience, and (b) the provision of training. Regarding the 
former, we found that acquiring and retaining human capital is a particular problem when key 
positions are taken by diplomats as they often need to rotate positions every five or six years. 
Regarding the amount of training enjoyed, a question was included to inquire into the number of 
training days in which a trade official participated. While it is less likely that developed countries 
like the EU member states lack the necessary legal or technical expertise to follow contemporary 
trade discussions, differences might still be observed. This can, for example, be reflected in their 
ability to engage in evidence-based policy making (Howlett 2009). The growing importance of 
                                                     
70 In a configurational analysis of network performance, resource munificence did not constitute a necessary condition for 
network performance. That is not to conclude that resources did not play an important role, but rather that its effects are 
more differentiated (Raab et al., Forthcoming: p. 26).  
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impact assessments as a tool for governance emphasises the significance of a (technical) capacity 
also in developed economies (Radaelli 2009).  
All the above observations are equally applicable to societal actors. Many small business 
associations lack the staff to monitor every development in European policy. They miss the legal 
or technical expertise on trade regulations or face difficulties in soliciting sufficient input from 
their broader membership. Here, internal coordination, the presence of a policy unit with 
sufficient trade expertise or even financial capabilities to outsource these functions to law firms, 
are important drivers for the input national administration can expect from private actors. The 
pilot studies revealed that such input is often lacking or of low quality. In combination with the 
frequency of consultation, it is therefore interesting to include a question in the survey polling the 
quality of the information trade officials obtain from business associations. As the targeted 
respondents of the survey are trade officials in the domestic administrations, questions related to 
societal actors’ available resources cannot be adequately addressed. Instead, information was 
gathered with regards to their assessment of the input provided by the stakeholders in society. 
The corresponding questions can be found in Appendix IV Q9-13. 
Coordination Processes 
A final trait of the policy network that can affect its performance is the way in which the various 
public and private actors combine the available information. Coordination is crucial for a cros-
cutting policy such as trade. Expertise is often dispersed across a wide range of actors. The 
intensity of coordination has been shown to positively affect network performance (Cristofoli, 
Markovic, and Meneguzzo 2014). Coordination processes determine how different perspectives 
are combined into a single coherent position. All of the actors involved in the policy network 
possess only a small part of the equation that needs to be solved in order to derive the optimal 
position. By consequence effective coordination is required to make all the pieces of the puzzle 
fall into the right place.  
Assumption 4: Effective coordination improves deriving capacity 
But what determines effective coordination? The three dimensions of coordination elaborated in 
the pilot studies can provide leverage. These concern the nature of coordination, the frequency 
and method of coordination and the availability of a formal method for conflict resolution. 
Regarding the nature of coordination, I made a distinction between coordination-as-aggregation 
and coordination-as-negotiation. The former occurs when a central coordination unit merely 
combines the input from the different ministries, whereas the latter applies to cases where 
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coordination results in adjustments to prior positions and compromise solutions on the basis of 
internal negotiation. The degree to which different public actors can contribute or alter positions 
varies across the countries examined. While authority and competencies are respected in most 
cases, it is only natural that interests do collide and require coordination. From the pilot studies, it 
became clear that we can find large variation in the scope and intensity of coordination. For 
example, during coordination meetings in Belgium each ministry can raise an issue or voice a 
concern. In Spain the autonomy of the lead ministry is widely respected and instances in which 
secondary ministries sought to change a position were quite rare. Poland was somewhere in the 
middle. I expect coordination-as-negotiation to enhance deriving capacity as most trade 
discussions have a distributional impact (some gain, while others lose). Assessing the relative 
weight of each of these arguments can only become apparent through internal discussion and 
debate.71 
A similar distinction applies to the relation between societal interests and public actors. 
Coordination-as-aggregation in this context conforms to the idea of policy-makers as transmission 
belts of societal interests. Here, the policy-maker calculates the resultant of the different societal 
forces to which it is exposed and delivers that policy. By contrast, coordination-as-negotiation can 
be likened to a concertative relation between state and society. In such a situation, interest groups 
have sufficient capacity to provide useful input, while the state retains a high degree of autonomy 
and power is highly concentrated (Atkinson and Coleman 1989). I associate such a state-society 
relation with higher deriving capacity for the following reason: if we assume that all interest 
groups have an inherent tendency to overstate the importance of their interest, the administration 
must remain sufficiently autonomous and critical when engaging with mobilised interests to 
avoid capture. This might even imply consulting additional actors in society that have not been 
able to mobilise. At the same time, the input from societal actors remains important for the policy-
maker to derive a position. Public-private interactions in the policy network vary in nature. 
Earlier discussions made clear that the mode of interaction does not always conform what has 
been described as ‘pressure politics’ (Woll and Artigas 2007). Businesses do not only pressure 
policy officials, rather the contrary. On many occasions public officials contact private actors for 
information. According to Woll and Artigas, this is partly driven by the regulatory turn in trade 
                                                     
71 Keep in mind though that overlapping competencies might also result in inefficient administrations due to the 
requirement of twice the amount of human resources. 
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policy. The survey will inquire into the initiator of public-private interaction as an approximation 
of the nature of interaction (pressure politics or concertation). 
A second aspect of coordination that can affect an administration’s deriving capacity relates to the 
method and frequency at which coordination takes place. The pilot studies revealed that some 
member states convene in person to discuss and prepare a national position, while others only 
coordinate a position through e-mail correspondence. I expect that personal meetings enable 
more discussion and can thus contribute to deriving capacity. In addition, such personal 
(informal) meetings can also generate the necessary trust among participants of the policy 
network to enhance coordination (Provan and Kenis 2008).  
The third aspect of coordination pertains to the existence of formal methods of conflict resolution. 
Seeing that in many cases conflict resolution was the subject of ‘ad hocery’, and seeing that the 
procedure was often a corollary of the broader coordination process, I decided not to include 
additional questions on this subject. The resulting survey can be found in Appendix IV Questions 
7, 8 & 14. 
7.2.3 Formulating propositions 
Based on the discussion of the pilot studies in the previous chapter, and given the broader 
literature on member states’ capacity, it is possible to formulate a series of propositions. The first 
two propositions are related to the size of the country. Often it is assumed that larger countries 
have a natural advantage over their smaller counterparts. The costs of attending a negotiation 
round abroad, the ability to maintain foreign trade missions, or the financing of various impact 
assessments; each is less constraining for member states with a large budget.  
Table 11: Propositions regarding Administrative capacity 
Proposition 1 Larger member states have higher monitoring capacity than smaller member 
states 
Proposition 2 Larger member states have higher deriving capacity than smaller member states 
Proposition 3 Former communist member states have a lower deriving capacity than member 
states with a market based economy 
Proposition 4 Trade administrations led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have lower 
deriving capacity than administrations led by an economic Ministry. 
Proposition 5 Member states with high monitoring capacity also dispose of high deriving 
capacity 
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The third and fourth propositions exclusively concern deriving capacity. The third proposition 
relates past communist rule to divergent deriving capabilities. The underlying causal mechanism 
is the involvement of interest groups. From the pilot studies, we found that both Estonia and 
Poland are confronted with limited input from societal stakeholders. This observation was not an 
isolated instance as earlier studies have suggested a flattened civil society in the wake of the 
communist era (McMenamin 2002). Through more systematic data-gathering, we can assess 
whether this finding can be generalised to a broader population of national trade policy 
networks. 
A fourth proposition posits that MS that are led by the MFA have lower deriving capacity. The 
causal mechanism underlying this assertion is related to the challenge of high staff turnover. 
During my fieldwork I was repeatedly confronted with the issue of rotating diplomats. This 
problem manifested itself in respondents’ refusal to participate in my survey due to lack of 
experience or in the observation that trade officials were often ‘moving targets’ rotating in and 
out of the administration. Trade administrations led by the MFA are confronted with a challenge 
that is less pertinent for administrations where the lead-ministry is populated by civil servants.  
A fifth and final proposition seeks to inquire into the relation between both components of 
administrative capacity. When elaborating the theoretical framework in Chapter 3- the hypothesis 
was formulated that higher monitoring capacity is associated with higher deriving capacity. In 
other words, cases of ‘asymmetric capacity’ were deemed improbable as both tasks were 
performed by the same policy network.  
 
7.3 Data Collection 
Whereas monitoring is mainly the responsibility of the MS representatives in Brussels, the 
determination of a national position is something that largely takes place domestically. The 
respondents for monitoring and deriving capacity only overlap in the function of the TPC 
representatives. As a result, the battery of questions related to monitoring was inserted in the 
survey measuring the member state’s signalling tactics. For an overview of the data-gathering 
process and the resulting responses, I refer the reader to the third section of Chapter 5. 
For the second sample the population is less clear-cut as it concerns all staff working on trade 
issues. To obtain sufficient responses I originally targeted snowball sampling. This choice of 
method has one main disadvantage; and that is the difficulties obtaining a representative sample 
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of the population. If only one of multiple ministries involved answers the survey, the survey can 
create biased results. The challenge is to reach the different cliques that are isolated from each 
other. Due to respondents being asked to indicate other involved units, it is also possible to 
determine the saturation point of the snowball method. This questionnaire was translated into 
French and German and made available as an online survey. I distributed the link to the different 
national trade administration with the request whether it would be possible to circulate the 
survey within the administration. On the basis of organograms, I looked for contact information 
of the director responsible for the trade policy unit or –when unable to find it- contacted the 
corresponding TPC Member. After repeated invitations, response was still abysmal. Only eight 
member states responded with two or three responses.   
By consequence an alternative strategy was employed to collect data for the operationalization of 
deriving capacity. This alternative strategy comprised of selecting a limited number of questions 
of the larger survey to ensure that earlier obtained data could still be used for further analysis. 
These questions were also selected with the goal of reducing potential respondent-bias. That is, 
questions should have a high probability of obtaining the same answers within the MS regardless 
of the trade official to be interviewed. In the end, five topics were selected: I inquired into (1) the 
number of ministries with whom the line ministry coordinates on a continuous basis (more than 
once a month), (2) an estimation of the total staff members within the policy network, (3) the 
quantity and quality of societal input, (4) the method of coordination and (5) the existence of 
administrative constraints (bureaucratic hurdles, staff turnover). The questions used for the 
phone interviews can be found in Appendix V.  
To gather this data, I conducted 12 telephone interviews which lasted between 10 and 25 minutes 
depending on the amount of follow-up questions that were required to apprehend the national 
coordination system. For those member states that participated in the survey, I used the filled-in 
questionnaires to derive the indicators.72  Ultimately, responses were obtained for 22 member 
states, out of which twelve through telephone interviews, eight by the web-survey and two based 
on the qualitative pilot studies. They cover small and large, old and new member states and can 
be considered representative of the whole EU.  
 
                                                     
72 Since I used the exact same questions for the interviews, I consider pooling can be done without a major risk of creating 
biases.  
142 
 
7.4 Data-analysis 
7.4.1 Monitoring capacity 
Monitoring capacity was operationalised through the frequency by which the respondents made 
use of a variety of sources to monitor the Commission during the negotiations. To obtain a first 
impression of the importance of the thirteen sources of information identified in the survey, Table 
12 provides summary statistics for each source. Four findings are worth pointing out. First and 
foremost, the briefings by DG Trade, both in the TPC as well as the ITM are crucial sources of 
information. That the TPC functions as an important forum to exchange information between 
Commission and member states was already quite well-known and is re-affirmed by the data. 
Table 12: Summary statistics: Monitoring Capacity 
Monitoring Source  Mean Min Max Variance 
a. Briefings within the TPC 5.26 4 6 0.88 
b. Informal Technical Meetings 4.87 2 6 1.26 
c. Bilateral contacts with Commission officials 4.18 1 6 1.14 
d. Other DG’s within the Commission 2.69 1 6 1.10 
e. Council Secretariat 3.03 1 5 1.11 
f. European Parliament 2.85 1 5 1.08 
g. Other Member State Representatives 4.69 2 6 0.92 
h. Colleagues from within the (line) ministry 5.21 1 6 1.09 
i. Colleagues from other ministries 4.54 1 6 1.19 
j. Permanent representation 5 2 6 1.14 
k. Your embassies abroad 3.72 1 6 1.23 
l. The external negotiating partners 2.69 1 6 1.24 
m. private stakeholders 4.11 1 6 1.13 
 
Monitoring 1 61.27 24.62 90.77 14.04 
Monitoring 2 51.72 17.14 88.57 15.51 
 
The importance attached to the Informal Technical Meetings is quite surprising. Seeing that these 
meetings take place outside the formal context of the Council and seeing that their frequency has 
increased; it would be desirable to inquire deeper into the role of these ITMs. A second 
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observation that catches our attention is the important role played by domestic policy actors such 
as private stakeholders, colleagues in the line ministry and the permanent representation. This 
can be interpreted as a consequence of the close interrelatedness between monitoring and 
deriving. That is: respondents might have interpreted the question as an inquiry into the sources 
used to evaluate the gap between the MS’ preferences and the Commission’s negotiating position 
rather than just obtain information on what the Commission is doing. In light of such 
interpretation, input from societal actors, line ministries and the permanent representation are 
indeed vital components. A third observation pertains to the limited dependence on the other 
European institutions. European Parliament, Council Secretariat and the other DGs within the 
Commission are consulted considerably less frequently. The fourth and final observation worth 
emphasising is the large variation in member states’ importance attached to various methods of 
monitoring. The ITM’s, other DG’s within the Commission, foreign embassies and external 
trading partners harbour the largest variation.  
In constructing an aggregate indicator of monitoring capacity, two measures were calculated. One 
was a simple average of all thirteen items.73 The second measure is a more conservative indicator 
removing all items that might have been subject to misinterpretation or that risk overlap with the 
dependent variable.74 For both cases, the Cronbach’s alpha was quite high with values of 87% and 
84% respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency with higher values 
suggesting that the various items used to construct the scale, measure the same latent construct 
(monitoring capacity).75 In a similar fashion as the Signalling Indices, the monitoring indicators 
were rescaled to correspond to a scale from 0 to 100. 
To test the first proposition i.e. that larger member states are better able to monitor the 
Commission during external negotiations, I ran a series of bivariate regression models with 
bootstrapped standard errors (5000 iterations). As independent variables, I used the log of 
population and GDP per capita. Data was obtained from the World Development Indicators of 
                                                     
73 The reason not to apply weights is simply because I have no a priori assumptions as to the value of the various sources. 
For the 39 respondents, only two did not complete the entire list of questions regarding monitoring. Of all the listed 
monitoring sources, 3 items were not answered by all respondents. Data was imputed for these cases using all the other 
items as independent variables. 
74 The items excluded were those related to the domestic administration and those that also featured in the dependent 
variable. These have been marked in grey in Table 12 
75 I also applied data-reduction techniques to inquire whether it would be possible to distinguish sub-dimensions of 
monitoring capacity. However, the resulting components did not make much sense from a theoretical perspective.  
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the World Bank. The results in Table 13 report the obtained coefficient as well as the bootstrapped 
standard error.    
Table 13: Bivariate regressions Monitoring capacity and size 
 Monitoring 
(Respondent) 
Monitoring (2) 
(Respondent) 
Monitoring 
(Country) 
Population 2.19 
(1.80) 
1.47 
(1.94) 
0.64 
(2.24) 
GDP/Cap 0.81 
(1.45) 
0.95 
(1.61) 
0.93 
(1.52) 
Information (ISP) 0.12 
(0.26) 
0.05 
(0.28) 
0.071 
(0.29) 
 
The lack of any significant result clearly illustrates that monitoring capacity is not explained by 
the size of a MS or its level of development. This is important, as it suggest that countries, do not 
gain an advantage in monitoring what the Commission is doing because of size-related effects. In 
a sense, this does not need to surprise. Whereas multiple staff members can help in formulating a 
policy position or assist in the consultation of relevant stakeholders in society, the additional 
information to be obtained by attending a TPC or ITM meeting with multiple staff members is 
limited. While the available budget may play a role in multilateral negotiations, for the majority 
of cases we can expect monitoring capacity to be affected more by the skills of the national 
representative assuming that position.  
The table also reveals that monitoring capacity is not correlated with the ‘Information’ variable of 
Stephanie Bailer’s Power Skills Information data. This may be due to the temporal and topical 
disjoint between the current trade representatives investigated and the respondents of her survey 
(Bailer 2004). This suggests –to some extent- that it was indeed sane to gather separate data and 
not apply existing data to new settings.  
7.4.2 Deriving capacity 
To structure the discussion on the gathered data for a MS’ administrative capacity, I will focus on 
the three main components identified above. The first pertains to the involvement of public and 
private actors. The size of the network affects the amount of information an administration can 
draw upon when drafting a position. More information will result in the identification of a larger 
variety of issues where control may be warranted. The second group of variables that were 
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collected relate to the available human resources an administration disposes off. A third and final 
set of indicators aim to grasp the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism. For each of these 
variables, you can find the summary statistics in the table below. 
Table 14: Summary statistics Deriving capacity (country-level) 
 Mean Min Max Standard Deviation 
Quantity societal input (inv) 3.30 1 5 1.36 
Quality societal input (inv) 3.35 1 5 1.16 
Ministries 3.47 2 5 1.15 
Workload 3.89 1 5 1.22 
Staff Turnover 2.49 1 5 1.23 
Human Resources 24.08 7 60 14.95 
Administrative Hurdles 2.63 1 5 1.42 
Coordination 1.11 0 2 0.74 
Balancing offensive-defensive 2.22 1 5 1.33 
Initiative consultation society 3.75 1 5 1.34 
 
For each set of indicators, a sub-section is devoted to: 
 discuss the obtained data, 
 test the main mechanism behind the formulated propositions (where appropriate), 
 select or construct an indicator for the subsequent analyses 
This third goal is aspired to reduce the amount of variables a bit further. That way, we can avoid 
conducting ten different analyses each time a hypothesis is formulated that involves deriving 
capacity. At the end of the section, an overall assessment will be made regarding the second, third 
and fourth proposition. 
Number of actors involved in the network 
With respect to the performance of the policy network, the argument was presented that a lack of 
structural holes contributes to a MS’ deriving capacity. For that purpose, we included questions 
on the involvement of different ministries as well as the input from societal stakeholders. From 
Table 14 it becomes clear that –on average- the MS consult three (and a half) ministries regularly 
on trade issues. In most of the MS these are the Ministry of Economy, MFA and Ministry of 
Agriculture. In addition to these, the Ministries of Finance, Justice and Health were also 
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mentioned frequently in the phone interviews. The Ministry of Finance often held authority over 
(the levying of) customs duties, investment and public procurement. The Ministry of Justice is 
mainly involved with intellectual property rights.76  
Three questions are of particular importance when looking at the involvement of societal 
stakeholders: these are the quantity of input obtained, the usefulness or quality of the input 
provided and finally whether consultations occur by initiative of the state or through mobilised 
interest groups that lobby the administration. If we look at the summary statistics depicted in 
Table 14 it becomes clear that –on average- the MS confirmed that they do not obtain sufficient 
input from societal stakeholders. Moreover, the bottom row also indicates that the majority of 
respondents agreed with the statement that when engaging with societal stakeholders, it is the 
administration that takes the initiative (65% answered ‘yes’ or ‘yes, but’). Given the constitutive 
role often attributed to mobilised societal interests in political economic analyses, these findings 
are interesting for two reasons: firstly, it suggests that we need to question the generalizability of 
the central role attributed to mobilised interests in EU trade policy. That is not to say that interest 
groups do not matter, rather that their importance or input should not be taken for granted as 
their involvement can vary from country to country. Secondly, it further stresses the importance 
to understand how positions are determined -not in insulation from- but in the absence of 
mobilised interests. The pilot studies conducted in the previous chapter can already present some 
explanations. The scope for path dependencies was already suggested by the Polish Trade official 
that spoke of ‘copy-pasting’. Alternatively the role of ideology and tradition was brought up in 
the case of Estonia where respondents often referred to their tradition of openness as facilitating 
policy-making through the existence of a ‘default position’. A final example concerns the role of 
data, research and impact assessments in formulating trade policy positions. In each of the pilot 
studies, reference was made to the use of (basic or detailed) trade data as an important starting 
point to identify national interests. The organization of a new data unit in Spain to conduct 
impact analyses or the use of a detailed firm-level database in the case of Belgium can further 
support the policy-making in the absence of mobilised stakeholders.  
Above, the proposition was formulated that former communist member states are more 
constrained in their deriving capacity due to the challenges they face in obtaining input from 
                                                     
76 Respondents also mentioned the importance of the Ministry of Health when Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary measures were 
part of the discussion. The Department of Immigration occasionally plays a role when mode 4 in services trade is being 
negotiated.  
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mobilised interests. At the same time, the amount and quality of input from societal organisations 
was also expected to be a function of the size of the MS. The effect of size and a communist 
heritage are tested in a set of linear regressions. 
Table 15: Explaining the amount and quality of input from societal organisations 
 Quantity State Initiative Quality 
Size -0.45** 
(0.20) 
-0.36** 
(0.15) 
-0.35** 
(0.17) 
Communist 0.86** 
(0.41) 
0.85** 
(0.41) 
0.53 
(0.48) 
Constant 1.06 
(0.83) 
1.93** 
(0.75) 
1.67** 
(0.65) 
# Observations 22 22 22 
Adjusted R² 0.27 0.18 0.17 
*** significant at the 0.01 significance level 
**  significant at the 0.05 significance level 
*   significant at the 0.10 significance level 
 
To test the third proposition, a dummy variable (Communist) was used that equals one if the MS 
has a communist legacy. The size of a member state was measured through the log of the total 
population. The log transformation was deemed appropriate as I expect its marginal effect to be a 
decreasing function of size. That is, for smaller MS the effect of an increase in size is larger than 
an equal (absolute) increase for larger MS. Coefficients are estimated through OLS with standard 
errors obtained through bootstrapping 5000 samples with replacement.  
From the results listed in Table 15, we can deduce that larger MS were indeed less confronted 
with the challenge of obtaining sufficient input (model 1). Moreover, respondents from larger MS 
were more inclined to reject the statement that societal stakeholders lacked the required expertise 
to provide useful input as apparent from the third column. In summary, size matters in the 
amount and quality of input trade administration can expect from interest groups. As apparent 
from the fieldwork in Estonia the magnitude of a country determines whether an active network 
of business associations can be sustained.  
The results from Table 15 also indicate that administrations in former communist member states 
suffer from a low quantity of input and are more inclined to take the initiative to consult with 
business associations, rather than await their reaction. In other words, the idea of a flattened civil 
society in former communist member states is confirmed by our data – even when controlled for 
the size of the member state.  
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In the remainder of this dissertation, I will use the number of ministries and the input from 
societal stakeholders as variables for the diversity of the policy network in terms of deriving a 
position. Societal input is a combination of the quantity and quality indicator described above. 
The data is inversed again so that a higher level of ‘societal input’ corresponds to more quality 
input rather than less. The formula used was the following:                     [  
                    
 
], ranging from 0 if the respondents completely agreed with the statements that 
quality and quantity of the input provided by societal stakeholders was constrained and a 100 if 
they completely disagreed with these statements. Summary statistics can be found in Appendix 
II. 
Human Resources 
The main causal driver behind the hypothesised relation between country size and deriving 
capacity are the available resources an administration has at its disposal. Three variables were 
singled out as relevant in our reduced survey. The first is an estimation of the total number of 
staff located in all of the ministries that are regularly consulted on trade issues. Here, I have 
asked respondents to provide a rough estimate. As much data of the web-survey proved to be 
unreliable (respondents’ estimates often pertained to the size of the entire ministry not just the 
policy unit for trade) data on the number of staff was severely constrained.  The resulting thirteen 
observations are quite limited for further analysis. Nevertheless, the scatter plot below shows the 
strong relation between a MS’s size and the availability of Human Resources.  
Figure 9: The number of Trade officials and population 
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This adds support to the second proposition which stated that larger member states have a higher 
deriving capacity. To deal with the large number of missing observations, I extrapolated missing 
values by drawing on the strong correlation with (the log of) population. Clearly, restraint is 
necessary when using the imputed indicator for inferential analysis.  
A second question was incorporated in the reduced survey to solicit whether respondents felt that 
the functioning of the trade administration was hindered because they had to ‘do the same or 
more work but with fewer resources’. From the summary statistics, it is clear that the majority of 
countries confirmed this to be the case (74% of the MS replied ‘yes’ or ‘yes, but’). But caution is 
required when interpreting these results. Social desirability bias may stimulate lead officers to 
overstate the gravity of the issue. Whether the increasing workload is a consequence of the 
supranational nature of the CCP, budgetary pressures or the broadening and widening of the 
trade agenda cannot be answered with the available data and might be a subject for further 
inquiry. 
Finally, a third indicator for human resources focuses on the retention of experience and expertise 
within the administration. More precisely, respondents were inquired whether staff turnover 
presented a challenge for the operation of the trade administration. On this issue, MS were less 
conclusive with only 5 out of 19 respondents agreeing with the statement. The main motivation 
for including this question was related to obligatory rotation to which many diplomats are 
exposed. As most diplomats are located within the MFA, the proposition was formulated that 
member states in which the MFA assumed central authority would suffer from a limited deriving 
capacity. The first step to assess this proposition is asserting that MFA-led countries suffer more 
from staff turnover than their economic counterparts. To this end, a Wilcoxon Ranksum test was 
performed as normality assumptions cannot be maintained with such a small sample size. The 
results revealed that MFA-led member states are indeed affected more aversely by staff turnover. 
This difference was barely significant at the 90% confidence level. Important to note, however, is 
that in our coding the Dutch trade administration was classified as led by the MFA. In the recent 
past, trade policy has always been a part of the ministry of economy. Reclassifying the ministry 
results in a significant Wilcoxon Ranksum test up to the 98% confidence level.  
Which indicators shall be used for subsequent analysis? I expect the question pertaining to 
workload not to be particularly useful as variation was extremely limited. Only 2 respondents did 
not confirm that ‘having to do the same or more work but with fewer resources’ represents a 
challenge for the administration. Lack of variation might be due to the bad formulation of the 
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question or social desirability bias. For these reasons, I will predominantly make use of the 
number of staff and staff turnover. 
Effective coordination 
To measure a MS’ deriving capacity also four different indicators were identified to grasp the 
effectiveness of the coordination process. A first pair, concerns the method of coordination, a 
second pair to the perceived effectiveness thereof. I will discuss the variables in that order. 
The method of coordination consists of two factors: on the one hand there is the coordination 
among public actors, while on the other hand there is the method through which an 
administration coordinates with societal interests. Coordination among public actors was 
categorised using three levels of intensity. The lowest level (0) applies when the line ministry 
decides whom to consult and through which method. A second category pertains to those 
member states where regular meetings in person are organised but where these meetings take 
place on an ad hoc format. In other words they are not formalised. The highest category applied 
to those member states that convene on a weekly basis in person. In line with the discussion 
outlined above, I assume that more intense coordination facilitates decision-making.  A second 
aspect of the method of coordination was the manner in which state and society interact. Above, 
we already touched upon this issue briefly in discussing the question as to who takes the 
initiative to consult with societal stakeholders. To enable the construction of a single indicator we 
transformed ‘state initiative’ to match the three-level measurement of coordination among public 
actors. This was accomplished by combining both affirmative and both rejecting options. The 
overall indicator capturing the intensity of coordination (CoordMethod) is constructed as the sum 
of both components, multiplied by 25 to match a scale from 0 to 100. 
The second pair of indicators focuses on the results of coordination or at least the challenges 
experienced with respect to internal coordination. The first item inquires whether MS face 
difficulties balancing offensive and defensive interests while the second states that the 
functioning of the administration is constrained through administrative hurdles. Summary 
statistics on the identified challenges can be found in Table 14. Combining both variables enabled 
the construction of a second coordination indicator: 
                (  
                     
 
). A higher value on this indicator corresponds with 
limited coordination-related problems. The correlation between CoordMethod and Coordresult 
was positive and significant at the 90% confidence interval. This suggests that the intensity of the 
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coordination process reduces the probability that a MS is facing problems balancing its offensive 
and defensive interests or faces constraints due to administrative hurdles. 
Testing the propositions 
In the previous sub-sections, the main causal drivers behind the second, third and fourth 
proposition were largely affirmed. To fully assess the propositions, the table below provides the 
correlations between the above-defined indicators of deriving capacity and the size of the MS 
(proposition 2), its communist legacy (proposition 3) and the line ministry responsible 
(proposition  4).  While monitoring capacity proved to be unrelated to the size of a member state, 
this appears not to be the case insofar as deriving capacity is concerned.  
To test the second proposition, a series of bivariate regression analyses were run using the 
logarithmic transformation of population as the independent variable. As per usual standard 
errors were bootstrapped. The results indicated in the first row of Table 16 show that the size of a 
country had an important effect both on the potential for structural holes (societal input) and the 
amount of human resources at the administration’s disposal.  
Table 16: Explaining Deriving capacity  
 Structural holes Human Resources Coordination 
 Society State Staff Turnover CoordMethod CoordResult 
Size 10.60*** 
(3.60) 
-0.19 
(0.34) 
8.90*** 
(2.39) 
0.27 
(0.18) 
-4.03 
(3.90) 
-3.14 
(2.51) 
MFA -7.37 
(11.60) 
0.44 
(0.59) 
-2.95 
(8.64) 
0.94* 
(0.54) 
11.01 
(9.89) 
8.14 
(9.40) 
Communist -20.35† 
(11.50) 
0.05 
(0.64) 
-3.13 
(10.24) 
-0.39 
(0.65) 
9.29 
(10.39) 
-7.74 
(10.60) 
# Observations 22 16 13 19 19 19 
With respect to the proposition on the lead ministry, differences between the means were 
reported [mean(X|MFA=1) – mean(X|MFA=0), whereby X refers to a variable of deriving 
capacity]. Similar statistics are calculated to assess differences between former communist and 
market economy MS.  For each difference, I have indicated the standard deviation of the 
differences. Significance was determined through a Wilcoxon Ranksum test. The limited number 
of observations, made a non-parametric estimation technique appropriate. The symbol † implies 
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that the effect was found significant in a matched t-test but was rejected on the basis of the non-
parametric test. 
Assessing the third proposition i.e. whether the former communist member states are constrained 
in their deriving capacity, we found a lower input from societal stakeholders. This variable had 
no impact of the other indicators of deriving capacity. Hence the overall effect on deriving 
capacity is somewhat limited. Similarly, responsibility over trade policy by the MFA increased 
the problem of staff turnover, but did not affect any of the other indicators of deriving capacity. In 
summary, the third and fourth proposition cannot fully be discarded as the identified causal 
mechanism proved to be valid. The overall effect on deriving capacity is subject to interpretation. 
7.4.3 Overall administrative capacity 
What is the relation between deriving capacity and monitoring capacity? In elaborating the 
conceptual framework in Chapter 3, the hypothesis that both components of administrative 
capacity are negatively related was considered highly unlikely. Chances of high monitoring 
capacity while having limited deriving capacity and vice versa were argued to be slim as both 
functions are performed by the same administration and thus high deriving would also imply 
that there is an internal demand for better monitoring. The table below contains a set of bivariate 
coefficients with bootstrapped errors (500 replications). The analysis has been conducted at the 
country-level to limit the odds of finding spurious correlation due sample properties. 
From the results, it is clear that monitoring capacity and deriving capacity do not correlate 
significantly with each other. One exception is the number of ministries. More ministries involved 
in the policy network coincide with higher monitoring capacity. Whereas the overall lack of a 
significant relation has no concrete repercussions in the study of the relation between 
administrative capacity and control, it does raise the question whether the data obtained from 
both surveys are consistent. If both datasets measure the characteristics of the same trade 
administrations, we should also be able to find some overlap in the variables; a matter of 
triangulation. 
Such overlap between both data-sets can be found in the questions regarding societal 
stakeholders. One of the items of monitoring capacity concerned the input obtained from societal 
stakeholders. That was also one of the reasons to construct a conservative ‘monitoring2’ indicator. 
The correlation between the ‘Societal Input’ indicator developed to measure deriving capacity 
and the aforementioned item of monitoring capacity proved to be positive and significant at the 
95% confidence level.  
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Table 17: Monitoring and Deriving capacity 
 Societal 
Input 
Ministries Staff Staff 
turnover 
CoordMethod CoordResult 
Monitoring 0.46 
(0.64) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.82 
(0.61) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.34 
(0.49) 
0.22 
(0.40) 
Monitoring2 0.43 
(0.56) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.77 
(0.51) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.45 
(0.63) 
-0.01 
(0.48) 
# Observations 17 14 12 15 15 15 
 
Summarizing the findings 
What determines endogenous information asymmetry? Or phrased differently, which aspects of 
the administration enable an administration to monitor the Commission and accurately derive a 
nation’s interest in a given trade negotiation? Based on the observations from the pilot studies, 
the need to conceptualise the trade administration as a policy network was suggested. To 
understand the factors that enable an administration to monitor the Commission and derive its 
interests, we have turned our focus to the concept of network performance. As indicated by 
Pollitt (2012) the challenge for CPA is to derive clear measures that are unambiguously related to 
increased performance. In order not to expand to far outside the scope of this dissertation, I have 
made simplifying assumptions relating particular traits of the network to increased performance. 
Thus a set of questions was formulated inquiring into on the prevalence of ‘structural holes’, the 
available human resources and intensity of internal coordination that characterised a MS’ trade 
policy network. 
Data for monitoring capacity was gathered in the same survey as the dependent variable (see 
Chapter 5). To measure deriving capacity a separate list of questions was developed. Originally, 
this data was to be gathered through a web-survey targeting the multitude of trade officials in the 
different ministries and trade policy units. Unfortunately, response was limited and an 
alternative method was pursued involving telephone interviews with senior trade officials within 
the national trade administrations. By consequence, the ultimate data gathered is less detailed 
and comprehensive as originally envisioned.  
Nevertheless, from the ensuing descriptive analyses, we discovered substantial variation among 
the member states’ administrative capacity suggesting scope for useful inferential study. With 
regards to monitoring capacity, we found that in addition to the European Commission, MS are 
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largely dependent on the domestic administration. Moreover, it was also interesting to note that 
this capacity was not significantly correlated with the size or the level of development of the 
member state from which the respondent hailed.  
Variation also existed among the MS with regards to deriving capacity. This capacity could partly 
be explained by the size of the country and to a lesser extent by the existence of a communist 
legacy. The results also indicated that most MS would have preferred more input from societal 
stakeholders and that it is mostly the state that consults relevant stakeholders rather than being 
pressured by lobby groups. This finding calls the primacy of mobilised interests as foundations 
for trade policy decisions into questions and suggests that there is substantial scope for state-
centric explanations.  
The key question remaining, however, is whether such divergent capacity has an effect on 
member states’ ability to exert control over the Commission during external trade negotiations. 
That will be the subject of the next chapter. 
  
155 
 
CHAPTER 8: 
ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND 
CONTROL 
 
n this final, capstone chapter an answer will be offered for the central research question of this 
research: Does larger endogenous information asymmetry result in limited control over the 
Commission? In addition to the main hypothesis, we can formulate additional hypotheses on the 
basis of the developed theoretical framework and corresponding conceptualisation. To do so, I 
will build on the three variables that were constructed in the discussion of the dependent 
variable: the overall amount of signals emitted, the negotiation strategies used and the timing of 
said signalling during the negotiations. 
As the literature has already been reviewed, and seeing that the conceptualization, 
operationalization and descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables occurred 
in the previous chapters, we distinguish only three sections in this chapter. In the first section, the 
hypotheses are formulated and situated in the broader literature. The second section refreshes the 
key dependent and independent variables and tests each of the formulated hypotheses and 
discusses the results. The third and final section summarises the main findings. 
8.1 Substantiating the hypotheses 
8.1.1 Administrative capacity and control 
The main relation of interest to this dissertation concerns that between the member states’ 
administrative capacity and the use of control. Higher administrative capacity reduces the scope 
for endogenous information asymmetry between principal(s) and agent and thus enables the 
emission of more signals to control the agent. The causal mechanism driving this relation is the 
assumption that the occurrence of signalling is conditional on the observation of a gap between 
what the Commission is proposing and what the member states are aspiring.  In assessing the size 
of the gap, not only does a trade administration need to accurately derive their interests at stake, 
but it also needs to monitor what the Commission is doing on their behalf and with which vigour. 
The larger the discrepancy between the Commission’s actions and a MS’ interest, the more likely 
the national representative will emit a (strong) signal to the Commission to ensure its interests 
I 
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will be defended satisfactorily. Thus it was argued that the mere act of monitoring does not 
constitute control, but is an important condition for control to take place. 
Hypothesis 1a Monitoring capacity reduces endogenous information asymmetry and increases control of a 
principal over its agent. 
In Chapter 3, it was also argued that a higher ability to accurately derive a nation’s interest in a 
given trade negotiation will increase the propensity by which a MS will signal the agent. The 
argument to assert this relation was based on the assumption that limited deriving capacity is 
most likely to result in an underestimation of the cases where a position ought to be taken. 
Whereas the gap might be overstated due to a lack of deriving capacity, I have argued that the 
number of cases of false negatives is likely to trump the amount of false positives. The empirical 
research from the previous two chapters further supports this assumption. There, it was shown 
that trade officials often have to solicit input from societal stakeholders themselves to formulate a 
position, suggesting that lack of such input diminishes a MS’ ability to identify the potential 
preferences to be signalled. Moreover, the new trade agenda has provided a challenge to the 
administrations not only in assigning responsibilities, but also to motivate other units to provide 
the desired input. In the majority of member states, the line ministry is dependent on input from 
other ministries. The latter’s eagerness to devote scarce time and resources to these issues, 
determines to a large extent whether a position is determined and how specific that position is.  
Hypothesis 1b Deriving capacity reduces endogenous information asymmetry and increases control of a 
principal over its agent. 
Overall, I expect monitoring capacity to be the closest approximation of a MS’ overall 
administrative capacity. In the discussion of the various sources consulted in monitoring the 
Commission, it appeared that MS also emphasised the important role of various public and 
private actors in the process. By consequence, respondents may have interpreted the concept of 
monitoring not in the strict sense of observing the Commission’s actions, but rather in a broad 
sense: i.e. monitoring the gap between what the Commission is (or might be) doing and what the 
MS considers desirable. In such a scenario, the obtained indicator of monitoring capacity also 
captures part of the explanatory power of deriving capacity.  Simultaneously, due to a number of 
challenges encountered with the gathering of the data on deriving capacity, a number of short-
cuts were made that reduce the accuracy and reliability of the obtained data. 
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8.1.2 Administrative capacity and strategies 
The second dependent variable developed and discussed in Chapter 5 was the strategic choice to 
signal bilaterally or collectively. Where the first two hypotheses only concerned the capability of a 
MS to signal, one can equally well conceive of capabilities that enable a member state to use one 
strategy over another. It has been shown for example that the presence of expertise within an 
administration allows a representative to persuade others through argumentation (Haverland 
and Liefferink 2012; Tallberg 2008). In a similar fashion, it could be possible to identify 
administrative traits that enable a member state to signal the agent directly or through collective 
action. 
The preference of a trade official to use one strategy over the other could not be explained 
satisfactory by the voting power of the member states. Part of the explanation offered was that, 
rather than power, it takes a capable administration to signal bilaterally or collectively. More 
specifically, we could hypothesise that to engage in collective strategies, the member states also 
require a degree of networking capacity. Daniel Naurin has operationalised this concept and 
measured a MS networking capabilities through peer-evaluation i.e. inquiring other member 
states how well networked a particular MS is (Naurin 2007). Whether such ‘network capacity’ is 
also an emanation of the domestic decision-making process can be questioned.  
If we focus on the data regarding a MS’ administrative capacity that was collected within the 
remit of this research project, it is difficult to formulate a concrete theory-based hypothesis. Why 
would monitoring lead to a preference for collective or bilateral signalling strategies? And can we 
think of aspects of deriving capacity that might lead to a preference for one or the other strategy? 
This points to a limitation of the proposed conceptualisation i.e. the exclusive focus on the 
capabilities of the domestic administration while neglecting the skills, network and reputation of 
the member states’ representation. In summary, based on the chosen conceptualization and 
operationalization of administrative capacity, I do not expect to find a relation between 
administrative capacity and the preference for one strategy or the other. 
Hypothesis 2a: Neither monitoring nor deriving capacity has a significant effect on the strategies pursued. 
 
8.1.3 Administrative capacity and stage of control 
A final relation subject to inquiry is that between administrative capacity and the stage at which a 
MS is most active in signalling the agent. When studying the dynamics of the negotiations, 
variation can be found on two dimensions. On the one hand, variation exists among respondents 
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regarding the importance they attach to the formal stages of the negotiation process, while on the 
other hand it is possible to differentiate among respondents based on their preference (or ability) 
to be relatively more active in the proactive stages than in the reactive stages of the negotiation 
process. The demarcation between the proactive and the reactive stages was made on the basis of 
the availability of concrete negotiation texts that could be subjected to discussion. 
When studying the capacity of trade administrations, it is this latter distinction that is of greater 
importance than the distinction between the formal and informal stages. Early involvement in the 
negotiation process was deemed important because: “If instructions arrive too late or even fail to 
arrive at all, the activity level of states remains low, since many points are already resolved in advanced 
stages of negotiations and won’t be reopened for the latecomers” (Panke 2010a, 813). For this reason, 
Panke argued that proactive involvement is an important prerequisite for the useful application 
of small MS’ ‘counterbalancing strategies’. However, even if smaller MS face difficulties to weigh 
in the late game due to their limited voting power, this does not imply that they are more active 
in the early stages of the negotiation. In terms of the delay in receiving negotiation instructions, 
Panke’s research revealed substantial variation among the smaller EU MS. If we assume that the 
timing at which a representative voices its interests affects its ability to attain desirable outcomes 
–and thus effectively upload domestic preferences, it is important to know how administrative 
capacity can contribute thereto. 
Using distinctions between small or large MS obscures the assessment of the underlying causal 
mechanisms. Why might we expect a small MS to signal earlier (or later) than a large MS? 
Adhering to the focus of this dissertation I will zoom in on the traits of the administration in 
search for an explanation why MS signal predominantly proactively or reactively. More 
specifically, I have elaborated three causal mechanisms through which I expect administrative 
capacity to affect the speed by which a MS formulates a position.77 Each of these mechanisms can 
also be used to explain why small (or large) MS predominantly signal early or late in the 
negotiation process. 
The first mechanism identified is the availability of sufficient Human Resources. The amount of 
staff working on trade issues is likely to affect the speed by which a policy position is formulated. 
Having an abundance of resources enables e.g. the organisation of a conference with relevant 
                                                     
77 The assumption that the speed of formulating a policy position is also translated into being relatively more active in the 
‘proactive’ than the ‘reactive’ stages of the negotiation, can be subject for debate. I do not see any reason why a MS would 
delay the signalling of a position once it has been formulated. 
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stakeholders before each negotiation. But it also enables specialization whereby a single staff 
member can focus on one particular component across many trade agreements. By consequence a 
policy position is formulated relatively quickly, even when it concerns highly technical matters. 
Finally, human resources also enhance parallel processing capacity; i.e. the amount of dossiers 
that can be dealt with simultaneously. Monitoring the developments in a single negotiation is a 
lot simpler than monitoring five negotiations at the same time. 
Clearly, we expect limited human resources to be a more pressing constraint for smaller MS. In 
such an administration, the trade official often performs multiple tasks ranging from 
representation and policy-making to the provision of public services as indicated from the field 
work in Estonia. Moreover, representatives often need to cover multiple policy domains of which 
(external) trade is only one.  
Hypothesis 3a: The smaller the trade administration, the stronger its tendency to signal during the 
reactive rather than the proactive stages. 
A second mechanism focuses on the difficulties or challenges a MS faces in formulating a 
position. Inefficient coordination can slow down the policy-making process. If the dispersion of 
information is hindered, the various stakeholders cannot provide timely input. Similarly, the 
existence of various administrative hurdles and procedures can also slow down the policy 
formation process. The amount of interests to be aggregated affects the speed at which a position 
is formulated. According to this mechanism, we would expect that larger MS require more time 
to formulate a position as it takes time both to organise a broad debate with public and private 
actors and to aggregate the various interests voiced in a coherent position. Such preference 
heterogeneity makes policy-making in larger states more cumbersome (Alesina and Spolaore 
1997, 2003). By contrast, in a smaller MS, the determination of an interest is a lot more 
straightforward. There are fewer firms, ministries or associations to consult and the potential for 
conflicting interests is also a lot lower. This can enable a smaller MS to formulate a position quite 
quickly. One Spanish respondent added credence to this hypothesis when musing over the cases I 
had selected for my pilot studies. He commented that it probably is a lot easier to formulate a 
position as a small country due to absence of so many interests to reconcile (Interview, TO#8).  
Hypothesis 3b: The more a trade administration faces difficulties in coordination, the stronger its 
tendency to signal during the reactive rather than the proactive stages. 
Finally, during the qualitative fieldwork a discrepancy became apparent between the 
predominant view in the IPE of trade from which we would expect policy-makers to be 
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subjugated to a continuous barrage of societal pressures, and the political reality where often 
societal actors are largely absent and where the trade official needs to actively solicit input. In the 
quantitative results, it was confirmed that in the median member state, it was the administration 
that initiated contacts with private stakeholders and not vice versa. Based on this finding, we can 
hypothesise that the more an administration takes the initiative to consult its stakeholders, the 
faster it can formulate a policy position.  
This mechanism somewhat favours the smaller MS as it is easier to identify and consult the 
relevant stakeholders. Clearly, large MS can also initiate consultations, but in a large MS business 
associations have larger policy units that are more actively trying to influence policy. Here, the 
policy-maker can also await their input.  
Hypothesis 3c: The more a trade administration takes the initiative when consulting with private 
stakeholders, the stronger its tendency to signal during the proactive rather than the reactive stages. 
8.2 Data analysis 
Data on the dependent and independent variables has already been discussed extensively in 
chapters 5 and 7 respectively. Information regarding the data-gathering process and descriptive 
statistics on the obtained data can also be found in these chapters. 
8.2.1 Administrative capacity and control 
To test the relation between administrative capacity and control, I will proceed in two steps. First 
the relation between monitoring capacity and signalling will be the subject of inquiry. In a second 
stage, the question whether variation in terms of deriving capacity can help explain a MS 
propensity to signal is tested on the basis of the gathered data. Considering that this analysis 
concerns my main hypothesis, a step by step approach was deemed appropriate to enable 
sufficient room to assert the robustness of the results obtained and elaborate its findings. In both 
cases the dependent variable, control, is measured through the Signalling Index (SI) developed in 
the fifth chapter. Two versions were thus constructed: one with equal weights for the different 
tactics, another one weighted each tactic conform their political weight as indicated in Table 2 of 
chapter 5. 
Monitoring Capacity 
To measure monitoring capacity, representatives were inquired to indicate how often thirteen 
different sources were consulted to obtain information regarding the Commission’s negotiating 
behaviour. Sources ranged from the European Institutions over the domestic administration to 
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the international partner with whom the Commission was negotiating. Two versions of the 
independent variable were constructed. The first was a simple mean of the indicated frequencies 
(Monitoring); the second was a more conservative measurement and excluded all items that could 
be related to either the dependent variable or the deriving component of the administrative 
capacity (Monitoring2). For both the dependent and the independent variable, indicators were 
rescaled to range from 0 to 100. Two additional control variables are added to the linear 
regression model to ensure that the relation we aim to study is not confounded by other 
explanatory factors. 
The first control variable to be included is a MS’ voting power. The Shapley-Shubik indicators for 
power were used for this purpose. This helps to provide a more conservative assessment of the 
effect of monitoring capacity. A second variable is included in the model to control for ‘common 
method bias’. Common method bias occurs when including both questions on the dependent and 
independent variable in the same measuring instrument (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This problem is 
quite pertinent to the study of the performance of public administration (Meier and O’Toole 
2013). There is a chance that any results found in our regression analysis may be the result of such 
bias. More specifically, if respondents exhibit a tendency to overstate (or underestimate) their 
efforts at signalling control, they are also more likely to overstate their efforts with regards to 
monitoring. To control for the potential bias this creates, I calculated the mean scores given by the 
respondents with regards to their activity level in the various stages of the negotiation as an 
approximation of respondents’ over-or underestimating bias. The variable to correct for potential 
common method bias was named CMB and is used as a second control in the regression model.  
The models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Due to the small 
sample, I decided to estimate the errors of the obtained coefficients through a non-parametric 
method i.e. bootstrapping.78 Each regression was thus estimated using 5000 replications where the 
bootstrapped samples were constructed with replacement and retained the same size as the full 
sample. Following a first regression, I assessed the existence of outliers. Three observations were 
flagged as requiring further investigation. A qualitative inquiry (see Chapter 5) confirmed that in 
two of these cases the answers of the respondent were questionable. They were removed from the 
sample. Important to emphasise is that their removal only weakened the results rather than 
strengthening the findings. The dfbeta plot and its interpretation can be found in Appendix II(3).  
                                                     
78 This notwithstanding, post estimation of the models revealed that the null hypothesis of normally distributed error 
could not be rejected. Neither could we reject the hypothesis of homoscedastic errors.  
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Table 18: Monitoring capacity and Control 
 Model 1 
(unweighted) 
Model 2 
(unweighted) 
Model 3 
(weighted) 
Model 4 
(weighted) 
Model 5 
(unweighted) 
Model 6 
(unweighted) 
Monitoring 0.274*** 
(0.105) 
/ 0.232** 
(0.104) 
/ 0.423*** 
(0.140) 
/ 
Monitoring 2 / 0.239*** 
(0.081) 
/ 0.207** 
(0.082) 
/ 0.268* 
(0.138) 
Power 128.034*** 
(48.584) 
136.676*** 
(48.43) 
157.369*** 
(48.475) 
164.533*** 
(48.768) 
121.295* 
(67.588) 
131.199* 
(72.138) 
CMB 0.193 
(0.120) 
0.207** 
(0.112) 
0.162 
(0.122) 
0.173 
(0.115) 
/ / 
Constant 24.762*** 
(12.848) 
28.06*** 
(9.031) 
29.097*** 
(8.669) 
31.673*** 
(8.913) 
26.794*** 
(8.984) 
38.619*** 
(8.328) 
Adjusted R² 0.373 0.370 0.353 0.354 0.315 0.220 
Observation
s 
39 39 39 39 22 22 
*** significant at the 0.01 significance level  
**  significant at the 0.05 significance level 
*   significant at the 0.10 significance level 
 
Ultimately, six regression models were tested. In the first two models the dependent variable was 
the unweighted SI (Models 1 & 2). The following set of regressions used the weighted indicator SI 
as an alternative dependent variable (Models 3 & 4). The final two models were estimated using 
country-averaged data (Models 5 & 6). Due to the small sample size, I have decided to leave out 
the CMB control variable for these final two models.79 The results can be found in the table below. 
In each of the models, the findings clearly illustrate that a respondent’s -or a member state’s- 
monitoring capacity contributes to the overall signals emitted. In other words, a principal that is 
able to limit its endogenous information asymmetry vis-à-vis the agent, will exert more control 
over that agent. Moreover, this effect was quite strong with standardised coefficients between 
0.25 (model 3) and 0.44 (model 5). 
This finding is robust when correcting for size and the potential for common method bias. Voting 
power as measured through the Shapley-Shubik index was also significant in all but one of the 
models. We can therefore confirm that higher voting power has a positive effect on the frequency 
by which a MS will signal the Commission. Clearly, voting power captures much more than just 
formal might. It also covers a lot of size-related aspects, some of which are reflected in traits of the 
                                                     
79 An alternative formulation of the model was also estimated using only monitoring capacity and CMB as independent 
variables. Regardless of the choice of the SI or monitoring capacity, the CMB had no significant effect (while monitoring 
still had). 
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domestic trade administration. In the following subsection, the effect of three such factors will be 
tested when analysing deriving capacity. The control for CMB was significant in a one out of four 
models suggesting that results might be a little susceptible to common method bias. Nevertheless, 
even when controlling for this problem, the results for monitoring capacity were still significant. 
The relation can also be observed from the added variable plot depicted below. This graph, also 
called the partial regression plot, is useful to indicate the additional explanatory power to be 
obtained from one regressor if controlled for the other explanatory variables in the model.   
Figure 10: Added Variable plot Monitoring capacity and Control 
 
Finally, a short note on the potential of endogeneity is at its place here. In chapter 3, the 
possibility that a MS’ administrative capacity could also be the result of limited signalling was 
aired. The latent variable stimulating both dependent and independent variable in this case is the 
varying demand for control that the member states experience. Formulated differently, MS that 
do not need to exert much control, are also unlikely to maintain large administrations. While, 
data was gathered with respect to the ‘demand for control’ (see Chapter 5), this proved to be 
uncorrelated with both the dependent and the independent variable. As a result, I refrained from 
incorporating the ‘demand for control’ in the model. 
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Deriving Capacity and Control 
To study the relation between deriving capacity and control, I will make use of the three core 
concepts that were also identified in the previous chapter. These are the diversity of the policy 
network, the available human resources, and the effectiveness of the coordination process. For each of 
these concepts, two variables were constructed whose effect on a MS propensity to signal the 
Commission will be tested.  
The first set of variables selected to measure the diversity of the policy network, concerns the 
input from societal stakeholders as well as the number of ministries involved in the coordination 
process. Societal input is an indicator that combines both the amount of input obtained from 
societal stakeholders as well as an assessment of business associations’ technical expertise. To 
operationalise the second concept - availability of human resources- I will make use of the 
number of staff of the administration and the extent to which job turnover presents a challenge 
for the administration. The third set of independent variables captures both the method of 
coordination as well as the effectiveness of such coordination. For the former, an indicator was 
constructed that captures the intensity of inter-ministerial coordination as well as state-society 
interaction whereas the latter variable grasps the extent to which MS face difficulties in balancing 
offensive and defensive interests and the extent to which they are constrained by administrative 
hurdles.  
Table 19: Deriving Capacity and Control 
 Dependent Variable= SI (unweighted) 
Society State Staff Turnover CoordMethod CoordResult 
Deriving 
capacity 
0.20* 
(0.11) 
3.37 
(4.24) 
050* 
(0.29) 
-0.48 
(2.77) 
-0.10 
(0.21) 
0.061 
(0.18) 
Constant 49.61*** 
(4.94) 
42.89** 
(17.25) 
50.64*** 
(4.76) 
60.26*** 
(9.04) 
64.40*** 
(16.33) 
55.02*** 
(11.37) 
Adj. R² 0.13 -0.04 0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
# observations 17 14 12 15 15 15 
*** significant at the 0.01 significance level  
**  significant at the 0.05 significance level 
*   significant at the 0.10 significance level 
 
Seeing that deriving capacity was predominantly measured at the level of the member state (and 
not the respondent) we will test the relation between the distinct components of deriving capacity 
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and control on the basis of country-aggregated data. In the analysis, I have decided to conduct 
bivariate analyses to avoid problems of multi-collinearity as the sample size is very small. The 
size of the MS’ economy affects both the level of societal stakeholders’ involvement in trade 
policy as well as the number of staff an administration hosts. Again, OLS was used to estimate the 
coefficients. The errors were bootstrapped using 5000 iterations. 
The results indicate that of the six independent variables (one for each column), only two led to 
significant results. The input obtained from societal interests as well as the staff employed, are the 
two factors that help explain a MS propensity to signal the Commission during external trade 
negotiations. The lack of significant findings with respect to the indicators may be explained 
through the complexity of obtaining an accurate measurement of deriving capacity. The level of 
detail in the data ultimately gathered differs significantly from the original aspirations and this 
for both the involvement of other public actors as well as the intensity of the coordination system. 
The lack of a significant finding does not imply there is no relation to be discovered. Rather, we 
can only observe that based on our data we could not discern such a relation. Therefore, caution 
is required in interpreting the results. More research is appropriate to substantiate (confirm or 
reject) these findings. 
8.2.2 Administrative capacity and strategies 
Above, the hypothesis was formulated that –based on the developed theoretical framework- no a 
priori relation was expected between administrative capacity and a preference for a particular 
negotiating strategy. To assert whether a relation exist between both variables, we will make use 
of the (unweighted) ratio of bilateral over collective signals as the dependent variable. A higher 
value thus corresponds with a preference to signal bilaterally. The explanatory variables are the 
same as those elaborated in the previous section.  
Monitoring capacity 
When testing the relation between monitoring capacity and signalling strategies, it is of particular 
importance to use the constrained monitoring indicator. That is to avoid any overlap between the 
bilateral contacts a MS has with the Commission to solicit information regarding the negotiations 
and the contacts whereby the Commission is the target of a MS’ tactics. 
In Figure 11, an added variable plot is depicted, visualising the relation between a respondent’s 
monitoring capacity and its preference to signal bilaterally. From the results, it is clear that higher 
monitoring capacity increases the relative preference of a respondent to apply bilateral tactics. In 
a bootstrapped OLS regression we found this effect to be highly significant at the 0.1% confidence 
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level. Moreover, the size of the uncovered effect was also large with a standardised coefficient of 
0.51. 
Figure 11: Added variable plot Monitoring capacity and Signalling strategies 
  
So how can we make sense of this relation? One potential explanation may be that the observed 
effect is a consequence of the iterative process of signalling. Monitoring capacity improves a MS 
ability to assess both the actions of the Commission as well as the remaining room of manoeuvre. 
This can favour bilateral signalling as a strategy when the representative fears that using this 
information publicly may jeopardise his negotiating position as other principals may start a 
countermove. In other words, higher monitoring capacity gives a MS a competitive edge over its 
competing principals, an advantage that can trigger a greater preference for bilateral strategies.   
An alternative explanation for the uncovered relation might be the opportunities high monitoring 
capacity creates to engage in arguing. Time is limited in the TPC meetings to start an argument. 
When monitoring diligently, direct informal contacts may enable a representative to leverage his 
excellent knowledge about the agent’s actions, whereas such arguing would not be possible in a 
collective venue.  
 
167 
 
Deriving Capacity 
To test the relation between deriving capacity and MS’ signalling strategy, I have ran a set of 
bivariate regressions using the (unweighted) SI as the dependent variable. The coefficients, the 
bootstrapped standard errors and the number of observations are reported in Table 20. As is clear 
from the table, none of the different measures of deriving capacity correlated significantly with a 
MS’ signalling strategies.  
Table 20: Deriving capacity and Signalling strategies 
 Dependent variable = Signalling Strategy 
Society State Staff Turnover CoordMethod CoordResult  
Deriving 
capacity 
0.03 
(0.03) 
2.54 
(1.60) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.13 
(0.80) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
# observations 17 14 22 14 15 15 
Why does deriving capacity not trigger a higher preference for bilateral signalling, whereas 
monitoring capacity does? It could be related to the type of information concerned. Being able to 
derive one’s interest more accurately does not give a MS a competitive edge over competing 
principals that have a divergent opinion.  
I also assessed whether other capabilities of an administration correlated with the strategic 
preferences of the respondents. In the development of the hypotheses, I briefly touched upon the 
potential relation between a member state’s networking capacity as a factor that can enable its 
representatives to signal collectively. The data for networking capacity was derived from Daniel 
Naurin’s EUI Working Paper (Naurin 2007).  However, in a simple regression, I found the 
coefficient to be insignificant. The most obvious explanation is the incongruence in time and 
across policy domain. Naurin’s measure might not capture the networking capacity of 
contemporary trade administrations. More research is thus required to address the relation 
between the administrative traits and a MS preference to signal bilaterally or collectively. 
8.2.3 Administrative capacity and Proactive signalling 
Are there specific characteristics of the administration that enable a MS to signal its preferences in 
the earlier stages of the negotiation? Based on the alleged impact this may have on negotiation 
success, inquiry was deemed appropriate. Above, three hypotheses have been formulated. In 
short, I expect sufficient human resources, the effectiveness of the coordination process and active 
consultation of societal stakeholders to result in a faster position being formulated and thus in 
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‘proactive signalling’. Recall from the discussion of the six different phases of the negotiation that 
I grouped the first three stages together as the pro-active period as it takes place before concrete 
texts are being made available. Correspondingly, the reactive stages were the following three. For 
the analyses, both an additive- and ratio-based indicator of pro-activeness was created which 
equals 0 if a MS is only active in the three latest stages, while it equals a 100 if signalling only 
occurred in the proactive stages. In the analyses below, the added indicator was used. 
Three independent variables were identified in formulating the hypotheses: the available human 
resources, the effectiveness of coordination and the active consultation of societal stakeholders. 
To assess the effect of the available resources, we used the imputed number of staff (HR). For the 
other two variables, we can use the rescaled variables CoordResult and Initiative (see 7.4.2). As per 
usual, estimates were obtained through OLS estimation, with the standard errors derived from 
5000 bootstrapped samples. The results of all the regressions can be found Table 21.  
Table 21: Administrative capacity and Pro-active signalling  
 Model 1 
(Country) 
Model 2 
(Country) 
Model 3 
(Country) 
Model 5 
(Respondent) 
Model 6 
(Respondent) 
Staff 0.31*** 
(0.10) 
0.18 
(0.11) 
-- 0.27* 
(0.15) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
Initiative 0.20*** 
(0.06) 
-- 0.11 
(0.08) 
0.19*** 
(0.05) 
-- 
CoordResult -- 0.16* 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
-- 0.17** 
(0.08) 
Constant 35.80** 
(5.50) 
41.04*** 
(7.04) 
48.16 
(6.56) 
37.93*** 
(5.85) 
42.00 
(6.82) 
N 16 14 14 26 23 
Adj. R² 0.47 0.15 0.12 0.26 0.12 
*** significant at the 0.01 significance level  
**  significant at the 0.05 significance level 
*   significant at the 0.10 significance level 
 
The limited number of observations is a consequence of the missing observations on the side of 
the dependent and independent variables. From the results of the country-level regressions, it is 
clear that the size of the administration has a significant and positive effect on proactive 
signalling of the Commission. More staff enables a position to be formed earlier in the negotiation 
process and can thus enable proactive signalling. This result was not robust when accounting for 
the effectiveness of the coordination process. Encountering difficulties in coordination 
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significantly delays the stage of the negotiations at which a MS will predominantly signal its 
preferences (model 2 & model 6). Difficulties in coordination were suggested to be a size-related 
problem that could provide an advantage to smaller MS. However, it is important to keep in 
mind though that the results from Table 16, did not confirm larger member states to face more 
challenges in coordinating a position. While the coefficient had the hypothesised sign, this 
relation was not significant. Also the third variable -MS taking the initiative to consult 
stakeholders- proved to affect the stage at which MS predominantly signal the Commission 
(Model 1 & Model 5). A more proactive approach in engaging with societal actors, results in a 
stronger emphasis on the early, rather than the late stages of the negotiation process. 
While support was found for the main hypotheses, the insignificant effects found in Model 3, 
suggest additional research is desirable to complement these findings.  
Concluding discussion 
After exploring and describing both the dependent and the independent variables, this final 
chapter formulated and tested the main hypotheses of this dissertation. What conclusions may we 
draw from these results?  
First and foremost, the results indicate that administrative capacity matters. (1) Monitoring in 
particular has a significant impact on the amount of signals emitted to the Commission. The 
observation that monitoring capacity is not related to the size of a MS, suggests that also smaller 
MS have the potential to put their stamp on EU trade policy if they possess the required 
monitoring capacity. (2) The results also indicate that deriving capacity matters when explaining 
the amount of control a MS can exert. The relation between state and society appears to be a 
critical success factor. The amount and quality of input obtained from societal organizations 
explains the propensity by which a MS will signal their interests. Whereas countries vary in the 
presence of (large) business associations that can provide such input, the fieldwork has revealed 
various methods through which an administration can address such ails. The availability of 
human resources also affected the amount of signals emitted. Size still matters. However, caution 
is warranted in interpreting these results. It is important to reiterate that maintaining a large 
administration comes at a price. Increasing administrative capacity might not be worth the 
additional cost if it cannot be offset by additional gains.  
Nonetheless, there are some low hanging fruits to be reaped. The largest explanatory power was 
derived from monitoring capacity, an indicator that is not related with the size of a MS. The role 
played by the representatives in the TPC is therefore vital to understand the potential impact a 
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MS can have. The selection of and support provided to these representatives in their daily 
operation can be a first starting point to strengthen the trade administration. Similar 
improvements can be identified with respect to the retention of expertise within the policy 
network, the training of key societal actors or the organisation of coordination meetings.  
The main relation of interest was that between administrative capacity and control. This 
notwithstanding, two additional sub-themes addressed in this chapter were the preference for 
bilateral versus collective strategies and the member states’ activity in the proactive versus the 
reactive stages of the negotiation process. While the framework supporting these analyses was 
not developed as rigorously, the findings are nevertheless interesting for further research. A MS 
monitoring capacity correlated strongly with a preference for bilateral signalling tactics. On the 
other hand, the analyses have shown that the number of staff, the efficiency of the coordination 
process and taking the initiative when consulting societal interests, can help in explaining why 
certain MS can signal proactively while others become more active in the later stages of the 
negotiations.  
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CONCLUSION: 
A MATTER OF PRINCIPALS  
 
 ‘Rien ne recule plus le progrès des connoissances, qu'un mauvais ouvrage d'un 
auteur célèbre: parce qu'avant d'instuire, il faut commencer par détromper’ 
MONTESQUIEU, De l’Esprit des Lois, Livre XXX. Ch. XV. 
 
oes administrative capacity increase member states’ ability to exert control over the 
Commission in external trade negotiations? Or phrased in the terminology of the principal-
agent model: Can endogenous information asymmetry explain variation in the control exerted by 
the different principals? The research presented in this dissertation suggests that there is a clear 
relation to be distinguished between the administrative capacity of a trade administration and its 
propensity to signal the agent.  
While far from considering myself ‘un auteur célèbre’, the opening quote by Montesquieu raises a 
key question at the end of this dissertation: What may we learn from this research and should we 
continue building upon its findings? The conclusion provides an excellent opportunity to take 
stock of the lessons to be drawn and contemplate where it might take us in subsequent research. 
To do so, I have decided to write from a more personal perspective. 
The first two sections provide a retrospective lens and summarise the ideas developed in this 
dissertation as well as the lessons learnt. The first section revisits the gaps identified in the 
literature and elaborates from a theoretical perspective how this research tries to fill the identified 
voids. The second section elaborates the findings that emerge from the empirical analyses. This 
applies both to the insights derived through the challenges of the research process as well as its 
results. The third section, will take a prospective angle and looks beyond the conducted research. 
Here too, the paths for further research are structured along an empirical and a theoretical 
dimension. The former seeks to look for additional areas where the applied research framework 
carries the potential to generate interesting new insights, whereas the latter presents the findings 
that fell outside the scope of the developed framework but warrant further analysis.  
 
D 
172 
 
1. The ideas developed  
At the start of this dissertation, the question was raised whether a member state’s administrative 
capacity affect its ability to exert control over the Commission in international trade negotiations. 
Whereas different research traditions shed light on parts of the puzzle in accordance to their 
particular analytical focus, individually, none provided sufficient leverage over the posited 
research question. To provide a compelling answer, cross-fertilization between these different 
strands of literatures was deemed desirable and necessary. More specifically, by combining 
insights from comparative public administration (CPA), negotiation theory and the principal-agent 
model (PA), I hypothesised that member states vary in their propensity to signal the Commission, 
and that this variation can be explained by the performance of the national trade administration.  
Below, I will first elaborate the contribution of this research to the concerned literature. 
Consequently, additional insights to be obtained from cross-fertilisation with the other research 
traditions will be elaborated when appropriate. 
Principal-agent 
 (1) Contribution to PA: Rather than conceptualising the member states as part of a single 
collective principal i.e. the Council, I have argued that it might be better to consider the Council 
as some type of hybrid principal; wavering between a collective and a multiplicity depending on 
the (real or perceived) veto power of individual member states. The existing approaches to study 
the relation between the member states and the Commission are thus complemented by opening 
up the toolbox of ‘multiple principal’- models. Doing so enables a meaningful study of member 
states’ attempts for control quasi-independently from one another. Drawing insights from models 
with multiple principals was also important to enable a meaningful integration of the three 
research traditions distinguished. 
(2) PA and Negotiation Theory: In a setting of multiple principals, a reconceptualization of 
‘control’ was desirable to enable differentiation among the MS. Mechanisms of control that have 
featured prominently in existing research, such as the mandate, reporting requirements or the 
ratification process, are equally available to all MS. Hence, an alternative focus is warranted. 
Because MS and Commission interact continuously both within the Trade Policy Committee as 
well as outside, a ‘signalling approach’ was used to study control. Such an approach emphasises 
the various instruments used by the principals to signal their interests to an agent and has been 
applied more commonly when dealing with a multiplicity of principals. The overlap between the 
variety of signals to be identified and the tactics employed by negotiators makes it possible to 
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integrate insights from negotiation theory in the PA-model from the side of the dependent 
variable. 
(3) PA and CPA: Whereas the PA-literature has often recognised that monitoring is costly, little 
attention has been devoted to the divergent capacities of the member states as principal. 
Adhering to the idea of information asymmetry as the driver of agency slack, a distinction 
between exogenous and endogenous information asymmetry is suggested. Whereas the former 
looks at the external negotiating context as a source for information asymmetry, the latter focuses 
on the asymmetry in information that lies within the administration’s control. Member states can 
decide to attend meetings –or not; they can decide to gather additional information regarding the 
preferred policy – or not. When treating the Council as a collective principal, existing approaches 
have most often resorted to exogenous information asymmetry to understand the relation 
between the MS as part of the Council as the Commission. To obtain leverage over our research 
question, it is more useful to focus on sources of endogenous information asymmetry.  
Negotiation theory 
(A) Contribution to Negotiation Theory: A minor contribution of this dissertation to the literature 
on negotiations is the focus on the incidence of signalling rather than the content of such signals. 
This simplification can ensure more accurate measurements despite the loss in detail. However, 
the main added value to Negotiation theory is located in the integration of insights from 
principal-agent models as well as comparative public administration. 
(B) Negotiation Theory and PA: While many PA-scholars are cognisant of negotiating theory and 
have conducted research on both subjects, the two fields have mostly co-existed next to one 
another without much cross-fertilization.80 Incorporating the highly institutionalised context 
within which member states and Commission interact into negotiation theory also generates new 
insights that can be of interest to the negotiation literature. More specifically, the 
conceptualisation of the Council as a hybrid principal guided the differentiation between 
collective and bilateral signalling strategies. Consequently, we have looked into the factors that 
may facilitate the preference for one strategy over the other. In addition to differentiating between 
the types of signals emitted, the PA-model also informed the identification of different stages of 
                                                     
80 Compare for example Dür and Mateo (2010) with Dür and Elsig (2011); Niemann and Huigens (2011) with Niemann 
(2004) or da Conceição-Heldt (2011) with da Conceição-Heldt (2006).  
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the negotiation process. The six stages identified, allow for a distinction between proactive and 
reactive stages as well as between the formal and informal phases of the negotiation process. 
(C) Negotiation Theory & CPA: But synergies could also be identified between negotiation theory 
and comparative public administration. Among the factors explaining negotiating tactics and 
strategies, the functioning of the administration behind the negotiator has only received scant 
attention. This research’s focus on the administrative capabilities and more specifically the 
ability to monitor the Commission and derive domestic interests enables us to explain a MS 
propensity to apply signalling tactics. Prudent steps are also set to understand the capabilities or 
characteristics that enable a MS to be involved in the early or later stages of the negotiations as 
well as their preference for bilateral or collective strategies. 
Comparative Public Administration 
(A) Contribution to CPA: As briefly touched upon in the two previous sections, this dissertation 
also contributes to the growing Comparative Public Administration literature. Drawing on the 
notion of the policy network and network performance, the developed conceptualisation of 
administrative capacity represents an improvement to prior concepts and measures. But this 
research also presents –a modest- contribution to the more advanced literature on network 
performance. Most public administration scholars in this domain have focused their attention to 
implementation networks, whereas the performance of policy networks has attracted limited 
attention. 
(B) CPA and Negotiation theory: Within the CPA studies that focus on EU member states, much 
attention has been devoted to map the divergences with regards to domestic coordination 
processes. Unfortunately none of these were applied to the EU’s CCP. Moreover, the large 
majority of such studies are ideographic in nature. In the event that nomothetic approaches are 
applied, it primarily concerns the ability of member states to implement or ‘download’ European 
legislation. This dissertation contributes to the CPA-literature by studying a MS’ ability to 
upload their preferences to the European level.  
(C) CPA and political economy of trade: While the synergies with principal-agent model have 
already been discussed above, there is also a final theoretical contribution to be identified when 
looking at the extant political economy of trade policy. The institutional approaches in the 
comparative IPE of trade have almost exclusively focussed their attention on variation in the 
legislative system. In the EU’s CCP, the national parliament’s role has been usurped by the 
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executive and thus variation needs to be found at the level of the bureaucracy. In the end we are 
studying executives that seek control over a supranational executive. 
In summary, this research has shown that there are significant synergies to be reaped from 
further integrating insights from comparative public administration, principal-agent models and 
negotiation theory. I consider the bridging of these three traditions in scholarship the most 
significant contribution to the broader literature.  
Theoretical contributions:  
1. Conceptualisation of the Council as a hybrid principal 
2. Application of a signalling approach to study control 
3. Conceptualisation of administrative capacity in a multilevel setting 
4. Development of a framework to explain MS ability to ‘upload’ their preferences 
5. Steps towards a comparative executive political economy of trade 
 
2. The lessons learnt 
Translating the theoretical framework to an empirical research design implied several hurdles to 
be overcome. The first hurdle pertained to the limited information available on the functioning of 
domestic trade administration. The second hurdle to be overcome was the derivation of concrete 
indicators for the quantitative analyses. To address these challenges, the general research design 
incorporated an exploratory qualitative stage before quantitative data could be gathered. 
Descriptive data analysis as well as the testing of various propositions took place before the main 
thesis could be asserted. 
Qualitative findings  
For the dependent variable – control- in-depth interviews with officials in the different European 
institutions were conducted. These interviews resulted in three main insights. First of all, the 
interviews showed that –contrary to prior expectations- Lisbon has not brought the CCP closer to 
the CFSP. The creation of a separate FAC trade as well as the role of the rotating presidency 
therein strengthened the relative independence of the trade policy community. Secondly, the 
interviews also confirmed the growing importance of informal processes in EU decision-making. 
This observation did not only refer to the discussions that take place in the margins of the TPC 
meetings, but also emanates through the organisation of Informal Technical Meetings by the 
European Commission. And finally, the interviews helped to clarify the role and importance of 
the various council working parties that discuss the EU’s external trade negotiations. 
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On the side of the independent variable - administrative capacity- qualitative pilot studies in 
Belgium, Estonia, Poland and Spain unearthed variation along four identified topics of inquiry. 
First and foremost, administrations varied in terms of centralisation and the scope for 
overlapping competencies. Secondly, variation in the coordination process could be found on 
three dimensions: the openness to participation, method of conflict resolution and the potential 
for discussion. Thirdly, the member states differed with respect to the available resources at their 
disposal. These differences manifested themselves through the available staff, the scope for 
specialisation, and the pertinence of diplomatic rotation. Finally, variation was found regarding 
the way in which state and society interact. Thus it was found that not all administrations could 
rely on an extensive network of business associations and that interaction often occurred on the 
initiative of the administration itself.  
Quantitative findings 
Each of the quantitative chapters devoted to the dependent and independent variables consisted 
out of two parts: first an operationalization was elaborated followed by a descriptive analysis of 
the results obtained. This structure will be maintained in our discussion here. 
The qualitative research confirmed that it was important to capture both formal ánd informal 
processes of control. By consequence a survey of representatives was preferred over a document-
based codification of formal meetings. The focus on the incidence of a signal rather than its 
content also facilitated data reliability. Seven different signals were thus identified. In addition to 
distinguishing between various bilateral and collective signals, assessing the strength of these 
signals was also an important contribution to the literature.81 In the end, three propositions were 
formulated with regards to the dependent variable and put to the test.  From the analyses it was 
revealed that (1) MS signalling strategies could not be explained by their voting power. Whereas 
the larger MS predominantly signalled their preferences directly to the Commission, smaller MS 
applied a wide variety of strategies. The data also showed that (2) involvement in an early phase 
of the negotiations leads to more signalling overall and that (3) MS that are mostly active during 
the formal stages of the negotiations also have a higher propensity to signal collectively. 
                                                     
81 Whereas many studies have distinguished –and combined- a wide variety of tactics, few have made a clear 
differentiation with respect to the ‘strength’ of these tactics. In this regard, my research is but a humble step that requires 
further refinement. A respondent suggested that instead of focusing on the ‘modus’ through which a signal was emitted, 
it might be better to grasp the weight of a signal by focusing on the authority of the recipient of said signal. Requesting a 
meeting with the Commissioner is a stronger signal than communicating with the chief negotiator or a commission official 
at a more technical level (Interview, TO#31). Deciding on the appropriate weights is a challenging endeavour but one – I 
believe – is important to undertake. 
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Administrative capacity was originally conceptualised as the ability to monitor the Commission 
and accurately derive domestic interests. In transforming this definition into measurable 
indicators, I started from the notion of network performance. Using a series of assumptions 
regarding the factors that foster and deter network performance, and drawing on the insights 
from the pilot studies, a survey was developed that grasps the ability of a trade administration to 
monitor the Commission and derive their domestic interests. The focus on the performance of the 
policy network seemed adequate from a theoretical perspective but appeared less feasible 
empirically. While data on monitoring capacity was easily gathered, the mapping of the –often 
decentralised- policy networks inside the capitals was far more difficult. Despite this set-back, I 
feel the derived indicators are stronger than existing indicators commonly used in (quantitative) 
comparative analyses.  
Four findings emerged from the ensuing analyses. Firstly, member states vary strongly in their 
monitoring as well as deriving capacity; variation that can only for a small part be explained by 
the size of the MS. Secondly, the results raise doubt on one of the major assumptions in the IPE of 
trade policy i.e. the presence of competition among mobilised interest groups. A large majority of 
respondents rejected the statement that they receive sufficient input from societal stakeholders. 
The research also revealed that most interaction between state and society occurs on the initiative 
by the trade officials thereby questioning the assumption of the state as a passive aggregator of 
interest group pressures. That is not to say interest groups do not matter, rather the contrary. 
Instead, it suggests that we need to know more about trade policy-making in the absence of 
mobilised interests. As indicated in the first chapter, existing studies on the EU’s trade policy 
have often focussed on the most politicised issues. This research reveals that such focus might 
create a biased view on the trade policy making process.  
The third finding pertains to the challenge identified by Matthew Baldwin where he stated that 
national administrations are under increasing pressure. The research indicated that his concern 
has some credence as a large majority of respondents confirmed the challenge of having to do the 
same or more work but with fewer resources.82 And fourthly, we found that the amount of input 
from societal actors decreases significantly when we shift our focus from the Western to the 
                                                     
82 Further research is required to substantiate this finding as it is unclear whether the source of an increase in workload is 
due to the deepening and widening of the trade agenda, declining budgets or the supranational character of the policy 
domain. That is, if the results are not affected by social desirability bias in the first place. 
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Eastern member states. The capability of interest groups to provide useful information, however, 
was only related to the size of a country. 
Administrative capacity and control 
The dependent and independent variable were, ultimately, linked in the previous chapter. In 
testing the main hypothesis, the results indicate that monitoring capacity, indeed, increases 
control. The analyses were less straightforward with regards to the various components of 
deriving capacity. An increasing amount of -high quality- input from interest groups resulted in 
more signalling. A similar effect could be observed with respect to the available human resources. 
By contrast, the effects of coordination as well as the number of ministries are not significant. The 
absence of said effect can be related to the complexity of the causal relation under study. More 
ministries might lead to more input, but could also imply more administrative hurdles depending 
on the effectiveness of domestic coordination. Here, it could be worth considering configurational 
methods of data analysis (see e.g. Raab, Mannak, and Cambre, forthcoming)  
Subsequent analyses also indicated that administrative capacity can explain the signalling 
strategy a MS applies. More specifically, MS that have high monitoring capacity signal the 
Commission relatively more often through bilateral than collective tactics. A final empirical 
contribution is related to the stage at which the MS predominantly voice their concerns. Those MS 
where the administration initiates consultation with societal stakeholders are found to be more 
active in the early stages of the negotiation than administrations that awaited input from interest 
groups. Also the availability of plenty human resources facilitates proactive signalling. 
In summary, the most important contributions from an empirical perspective are the following: 
1. Mapping the diversity in EU MS’ trade administrations  
2. Update on our knowledge of MS –Commission interaction in external trade policy 
3. Asserting the importance of state-centric explanation in light of limited societal input 
4. Finding of a relation between administrative capacity and MS signalling  
5. Affirmation of the importance of societal interests  
3. The paths revealed 
In addition to the potential improvements to the theoretical and empirical research as identified 
above, we can also identify a number of directions to expand on this research. On the one hand 
we can adapt the developed framework and apply it to the study of similar cases; on the other 
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hand we can delve deeper into some of findings that fell out of the scope of the envisioned 
research. I will discuss each below. 
3.1 I have a theory looking for cases! 
The theoretical framework developed to study the relation between the functioning of a domestic 
(trade) administration and the control it can obtain over the Commission can be extended in three 
ways. It can be applied to other international organisations, to other legislative institutions (i.e. 
European Parliament) or to other policy domains. 
International organisations 
When looking for alternative cases to elaborate and test the developed hypotheses, a good 
starting point are other regional organisations. While the EU is one of the oldest and most 
integrated regions in the world, many other regional organisations have emerged over the last 
decades. The majority of these organisations also originated as a free trade area or customs union. 
The nascent literature of comparative regionalism has sought to map the (dis-)similarities 
between different regions and increase our understanding of their emergence and integration 
process. These studies have amongst others led to the mapping and comparison of various 
regional organizations (see e.g. Koitzsch 2012), the initiation of a dialogue between EU Studies 
and the new regionalism (Warleigh‐Lack and Van Langenhove 2010)83, and inquired into the 
potential causal drivers for the origin and evolution of such regions (Haastrup 2013; Jetschke and 
Lenz 2013). Neither the varying participation of member states in the internal decision-making 
process nor the factors explaining their influence have received much attention. A comparative 
analysis on how the member states in these regions coordinate a position is both timely and 
appropriate. Not in the least to enrich our knowledge on the political economy of trade in non-
OECD countries. Countries that do not always conform to the standards of a liberal democracy 
(Hankla and Kuthy 2013; Milner and Kubota 2005).  
A comparative analysis of national trade administrations in other regions can also be desirable to 
uproot the Europeanization literature from its sui generis perspective (Warleigh‐Lack and Van 
Langenhove 2010). We can expect that member states of other regions will also adapt to a system 
of multi-level governance following their membership (Börzel 2011a).84 The focus on trade policy 
                                                     
83 But for a critique on the sustainability of such a dialogue see Jorgensen and Valbjorn (2012) 
84 Clearly one has to take into account that to effectively observe a ‘Regionisation’-effect one needs to compare with similar 
countries that are not part of the regional organisation (Haverland 2006). Nevertheless, the comparison of trade 
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might be the best starting point for such an exercise. Not only because it is the policy domain 
where most competencies have been delegated to the regional organisation, but also because 
many regions have already participated in external trade negotiations. Studying how domestic 
trade administrations have organised in these countries –along with the regional decision-making 
process- is therefore of great interest both to the study of International Political Economy, 
comparative public administration as well as comparative regionalism. 
In addition to other regional organisations, the theoretical framework can easily be expanded to 
study participation and influence within the World Trade Organization. Here, notions of 
administrative capacity have mostly featured to assess the developing countries’ ability to fully 
participate in the negotiations as well as the organization’s dispute settlement mechanism (Busch, 
Reinhardt, and Shaffer 2009; Guzman and Simmons 2005; Shaffer 2005). Most scholars have been 
concerned with members’ legal capacity, or presence in Geneva.85 While the delegation from the 
members to the WTO is of a different nature than the one within a regional organisation, it would 
be worth the effort to study empirically whether domestic decision-making processes can explain 
the –lack of- involvement of the different members within the WTO. Besides the effects of 
administrative capacity in terms of participation at negotiations, it might also be interesting to 
understand the (administrative) factors determining the choice to participate in the multitude of 
meetings organised within the WTO. 
An additional reason to focus on international organisations like the WTO is that the divergence 
among the members in terms of technical expertise is likely to be of greater importance. The 
original proposal of this research project focused explicitly on epistemic sources of information 
asymmetry between principals and agent as the main independent variable. By consequence, it 
was quite understandably that the first reaction I obtained on my research design was the 
suggestion to select developing countries in my sample to increase variance on the independent 
variable. Forwarding this suggestion as a path for further research feels like succumbing to Lord 
Goring’s device as he remarked: “I always pass on good advice. It is the only thing to do with it. It is 
never of any use to oneself.” (Oscar Wilde, An Ideal Husband, Act I) 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
administrations across these regions can be of interest to understand whether the adjustment processes are similar and if 
not what explains such differences. 
85 The absence of LDC’s in trade disputes should not be overstated, however. The possibility to free ride in dispute 
settlement procedures as well as the ‘indirect use of the litigation system in the negotiations’ mitigates the gravity of their 
absence in trade disputes  (Elsig and Stucki 2012, 311).  
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Other Legislative Institutions 
The first applications of the principal-agent model in political science focused on the relation 
between a legislative and its executive. Expanding the formulated hypothesis would thus suggest 
that control of the EP over the Commission is contingent on the performance of the policy 
network(s) on which the MEP’s can draw. With respect to the European Parliament, most studies 
have focused on the composition of committees (McElroy 2006); their functioning (Egeberg, 
Gornitzka, and Trondal 2014) or their powers (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003). Scholarship on the 
policy networks of MEPs is scarce although, recently, interest has been increasing (Egeberg et al. 
2013).  
Whereas scholars have argued that the European legislative system can be characterized as 
bicameral (Crombez, Steunenberg, and Corbett 2000; Crombez and Vangerven 2014), one has to 
take into account that representation within the Council (working party system) is not 
comparable to that of the European Parliament. The trade experts in the TPC are embedded in a 
trade administration that functions as the central hub of a large policy network. The implication 
this holds for bicameral decision-making in the EU has not attracted much research, however. 
Whereas recent studies have focused on explaining the EP’s bargaining success (Costello and 
Thomson 2011; Rasmussen and Reh 2013), no study to my knowledge has looked into the impact 
of the divergent administrative capacity of both chambers on the resulting legislation. Both in 
terms of bargaining success, the number of amendments to a proposal or the chances of the 
overall proposal being rejected, we could hypothesise that divergent administrative capacity may 
be an important explanatory variable. 
Understanding the performance of the policy networks the EP can rely on, is also an important 
pre-requisite to study any decision-making process subject to the OLP. Whereas the formulated 
thesis was applied to the case of external trade negotiations, one could think of alternative policy 
domains to study the relation between administrative capacity and the resulting control at the 
supranational level.  
Other policy domains 
A third application that is worth exploring concerns a cross-sectional study within a single 
member state. The performance of the policy network on which a national administration can 
draw is likely to vary across different policy domains. Inquiring into the effect of such variation 
on MS’ influence is desirable for three reasons. Firstly, it enables a mapping of within-country 
variation. Many existing studies have either neglected the existence of such variation or refrained 
182 
 
from a systematic analysis thereof. By making an elaborate mapping, we can address the question 
whether future studies better differentiate across policy domains or whether the assumption can 
be maintained that country-level characteristics of the administration apply across policy 
domains. In the opening chapters, I have made the assumption that variation might be 
substantial, but adequate research is still lacking on this subject. 
Secondly, attention to the differences within a country (rather than across MS) enables a most 
similar case-study design. This is important as it helps to address one of the largest challenges in 
asserting the impact of varying administrative forms i.e. over-determination. There are many 
explanations to the same phenomenon and the complexity of the structure of the policy-network 
makes the formulation of unambiguous hypotheses even more challenging. Studying variation 
within a country simplifies the comparative design as many explanatory factors remain stable 
across the cases.  
Thirdly, the focus on different policy networks within a member state facilitates data-gathering; 
due to the limited marginal costs -both in time and in resources- to include additional cases in the 
research design. The researcher does not have to familiarise her- or himself with the linguistic 
barriers, institutional history or administrative culture before gaining access to the desired 
information (Eglene and Dawes 2006). As (horizontal) policy networks can overlap considerable, 
the amount of respondents to be consulted is also reduced. The additional time gained can 
facilitate the rigorous mapping of the broader policy network.  
3.2 I have a case looking for theories! 
Throughout the fieldwork and the data-analysis, I also encountered many findings that 
warranted deeper investigation, but fell outside the scope of the developed research framework. 
Two expansions from a theoretical perspective are deemed interesting. The first questions the 
capabilities of the Commission’s DG Trade whereas the second looks into the personal traits of 
national representatives as an explanatory factor of negotiation strategies. 
European Commission 
With so many “deep and comprehensive” trade negotiations taking place simultaneously, a 
respondent raised the question as to why I did not pose the reverse question i.e. Does DG Trade 
still has the capacity to keep up with the trade agenda (Interview, TO#43)? Since the “Global 
Europe, Competing in the World” communication was issued by former Commissioner 
Mandelson (European Commission, 2006), the EU has initiated trade agreements with almost all 
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major trading partners in the world. In addition to Canada, India, Japan and the US it has 
reopened a number of its older agreements to upgrade them into deep and comprehensive 
agreements. The earlier concern by former DG Trade’s director of Market Access, Matthew 
Baldwin, with regards to the member states’ capacity to “promote their interests […], question the 
Commission, and defend the line against third-country ‘incursion’” (M. Baldwin 2006, 930) was voiced 
before the ‘Global Europe’ strategy was launched.86 A path for further research might thus inquire 
into how the European Commission deals with this increasing workload. 
From the interviews in Chapter 4 the prominence of the informal technical meetings featured as 
an alternative forum for decision-making. While originally not inquiring much into this subject, 
the repeated mentioning of these meetings by different respondents indicates that it is of 
considerable importance to the trade policy-making process. Part of the drivers for the increasing 
use of ITM’s was related to the increasing workload of the Commission. As such this might also 
suggest an alternative explanation to the observed increase of informal governance in 
International Organisations. Most explanations for informal governance in the European Union, 
focus on demand by the member states to allow for a deviation from the formal procedures 
(Kleine 2013). Here, the origin might be the Commission itself.  
Alternatively, the Commission has the power to shape the overall policy-network on which it 
relies to ensure a steady input of quality information. As such the Commission can act as a meta-
governor that shapes and manages the policy-network rather than act as a passive aggregator of 
the interests of the multitude of stakeholders affected by trade policy decisions (Bell and 
Hindmoor 2009; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). Here the Market Access Partnership, the Informal 
Technical Meetings and the various consultations organised by the Commission might be an 
interesting subject for further research. 
National Representatives in the Council Working parties 
In my research, I have deliberately focused exclusively on the member states in relative isolation 
from each other. This approach was preferred to develop a parsimonious theoretical framework. 
However, it also implies that I repeatedly bumped into the limitations of such parsimony. The 
most pertinent of these limitations is the black-boxing of the national representatives. In my 
analysis, the representatives largely featured as a two-way transmission belt transmitting 
                                                     
86 The ‘Global Europe, Competing in the World’ - communication was issued by Commissioner Mandelson and set in 
motion the EU’s active pursuit of deep and comprehensive trade agreements with emerging economies (Commission 
2006b). 
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information from the Commission to the administration and voicing the domestic position to the 
European level. Their importance was largely derived from their position at the nexus of the 
information flows. Nonetheless, as the pivotal players in a country’s trade administration, the 
qualities and role conceptions of such representatives can be a potent explanatory factor not only 
of the amount of control exerted but also the strategies pursued.  
The observation that participants of the TPC have a rather large discretion in the decision on how 
to defend national interests (even with detailed instructions), suggests that there is substantial 
scope for personal traits to complement the forwarded administrative capacity as a pre-cursor of 
control. That monitoring capacity was not associated with the size of a MS or its level of 
development, suggests that the qualities of the representative may matter to understand 
divergences in MS control over the Commission. The recollection of one TPC member that some 
representatives could punch above their weight through means of humour stresses the need to 
complement our focus on administrative capabilities with a more personal dimension.  
This need also surfaced when studying the signalling strategies of different member states. Here, 
I already alluded to the potential for role conceptions. While meaningful variation has been found 
with regards to respondents intergovernmental versus supranational role conceptions (Beyers 
2010; Hooghe 2005), most of this research has sought to explain the extent of socialization 
processes and their drivers, but have omitted to study the effects such role conceptions might 
have on policy outcomes or policy dynamics. The role conceptions forwarded in my research are 
different than the traditional focus on intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. They pertain 
to the MS’ relation to the Commission as part of a collective or a singular principal. Further 
research is desirable to grasp such role conceptions and assess, for example, how they can affect 
MS’ signalling strategies. 
In summary 
Coming back to Montesquieu’s quote at the start of this chapter, it is now possible to address the 
question whether we can –or should- build on this research’s findings. In this concluding chapter, 
I have tried to present a balanced picture of the potential uses and limitations of the conducted 
research. Despite the remaining challenges in measuring administrative capacity, I feel the 
research initiated through this dissertation provides a useful starting point for further inquiry. 
Clearly, through the fieldwork (and the ensuing data analysis) I have encountered the challenges 
to conduct comparative public administration research for nomothetic purposes. However, with 
the necessary caution, I believe it is worth the effort to gradually improve our understanding of 
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how administrations function and what its effects on member states’ influence in the EU’s 
multilevel decision-making system are. 
There are clearly many paths undiscovered and thus many opportunities remain to refine our 
insight into the intricate relation between the performance of the policy network and control over 
the Commission. Through the executed research, I hope to have shed light on the challenges as 
well as the rewards to be encountered when venturing further on this path. 
  
186 
 
List of interviewees 
I guaranteed the respondents all information would be treated with the greatest confidentiality; 
by consequence, I cannot provide detailed information regarding the respondents. Members of 
the Jury can obtain additional information regarding the interviewees upon request.   
 
TO # Function Date Interviewer Method 
1 National Official 02/05/2012 Johan Person 
2 National Official 31/05/2012 Johan Person 
3 National Official 04/06/2012 Johan Person 
4 National Official 04/06/2012 Johan Person 
5 National Official 05/06/2012 Johan Person 
6 National Official 05/06/2012 Johan Person 
7 National Official 05/06/2012 Johan Person 
8 National Official 07/06/2012 Johan Person 
9 National Official 01/08/2012 Johan Person 
10 National Official 17/08/2012 Johan Person 
11 National Official 20/08/2012 Johan Person 
12 National Official 21/11/2012 Johan Person 
13 National Official 21/11/2012 Johan Person 
14 National Official 22/11/2012 Johan Person 
15 National Official 23/11/2012 Johan Person 
16 National Official 27/11/2012 Johan Person 
17 National Official 27/11/2012 Johan Person 
18 National Official 28/11/2012 Johan Person 
19 National Official 21/11/2012 Kate Person 
20 National Official 22/11/2012 Kate Person 
21 National Official 20/11/2012 Kate Person 
22 EU Official 11/02/2013 Johan Person 
23 National Official 29/03/2013 Johan Person 
24 National Official 29/03/2013 Johan Person 
25 EU Official 16/04/2013 Johan Person 
26 EU Official 18/04/2013 Johan Person 
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27 EU Official 24/04/2013 Johan Person 
28 National Official 14/08/2013 Johan Person 
29 National Official 22/08/2013 Johan Person 
30 EU Official 21/10/2013 Johan Person 
31 EU Official 21/10/2013 Johan Person 
32 National Official 20/11/2013 Johan Person 
33 National Official 13/03/2014 Johan Phone 
34 National Official 04/03/2014 Johan Phone 
35 National Official 04/03/2014 Johan Phone 
36 National Official 04/03/2014 Johan Phone 
37 National Official 05/03/2014 Johan Phone 
38 National Official 05/03/2014 Johan Phone 
39 National Official 05/03/2014 Johan Phone 
40 National Official 05/03/2014 Johan Phone 
41 National Official 07/03/2014 Johan Phone 
42 National Official 11/03/2014 Johan Phone 
43 National Official 11/03/2014 Johan Phone 
44 National Official 11/03/2014 Johan Phone 
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Appendix I:  Survey 1– TPC officials 
1. In preparation of and during a typical meeting of the TPC, how often do you engage in the following 
activities?  
Activity Never Very 
Rarely 
Rarely Regularly Frequently Very 
Frequently 
a. Contacting other member state 
representatives 
      
b. Adding an issue to the agenda       
c. Voicing concerns during the 
meeting 
      
d. Communicating concerns to the 
Commission through e-mail  
      
e. Communicating concerns to the 
Commission over phone 
      
f. Meeting in person with 
Commission officials 
      
g. Coordinating a position with like-
minded states 
      
 
2. At which stages of the negotiation process do you generally engage in the activities listed in the previous 
question? 
Stage Never Very 
Rarely 
Rarely Regularly Frequently Very 
Frequently 
a. Prior to discussions on the 
mandate 
      
b. During the approval of the 
mandate 
      
c. In the first negotiation rounds, 
before texts are circulated 
      
d. As soon as concrete texts are 
being made available 
      
e. When the ratification of the 
agreement is being discussed 
      
f. Once the agreement needs to be 
implemented 
      
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3. To monitor the Commission during negotiations, a myriad of sources can be used. How 
frequently do you consult the following sources in an average month? 
Source Never Very 
Rarely 
Rarely Regularly Frequently Very 
Frequently 
a. Briefings within the Trade Policy 
Committee 
      
b. Informal Technical Meetings       
c. Bilateral contacts with 
Commission officials 
      
d. Other DG’s within the 
Commission 
      
e. Council Secretariat       
f. European Parliament       
g. Other Member State 
representatives 
      
h. Colleagues from within the (line) 
ministry 
      
i. Colleagues from other ministries       
j. Permanent Representation       
k. Your embassies abroad       
l. The external negotiating partners 
(i.e. non  EU member states) 
      
m. Private stakeholders (i.e. Business 
associations, NGO’s, labour unions)  
      
 
5. How often do you feel that the Commission’s initial proposals deviate from your country’s preferences? 
 Never  Very Rarely    Rarely Regularly  Frequently   Very Frequently  
 
6. In your view, how often has your country been successful in shaping the Commission’s negotiating 
position?  
 Never  Very Rarely    Rarely Regularly  Frequently   Very Frequently  
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Appendix II: Summary statistics  
[A] Summary statistics –respondent level 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Strategy 46.88 30.77 57.14 6.59 
Strategy(weighted) 43.92 24.14 62.22 8.27 
Proactive (ratio) 55.90 33.33 72.73 9.52 
Proactive (added) 56.56 40 76.67 9.82 
Formal 50.50 41.67 66.67 5.77 
Shapley Shubik 
Index 
0.035 0.009 0.146 0.036 
Vote power 0.035 0.009 0.082 0.025 
GDP per Capita 36891.83 9036 103828 19130.64 
Log(population) -4.16 -7.10 -1.83 1.35 
CMB 57.88 26.67 100 15.84 
CoordResult 63.51 37.5 100 20.13 
CoordMethod 69.35 50 100 16.72 
Societal input 43.43 0 87.5 28.35 
#staff (imputed) 31.62 7 67.9 16.80 
 
[B] Summary statistics (country-level) 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Strategy 47.41 37.39 57.14 4.68 
Strategy(weighted) 44.80 30.74 62.22 6.70 
Proactive (ratio) 55.86 33.33 72.73 8.70 
Proactive (added) 56.80 40 70 8.26 
Formal 50.52 43.48 66.67 4.97 
Shapley Shubik 
Index 
0.04 0.01 0.15 0.04 
Vote power 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.03 
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GDP per Capita 34179 9036 103828 21974.78 
Log(population) -4.17 -7.10 -1.83 1.44 
CoordResult 64.44 37.5 100 20.16 
CoordMethod 71.67 50 100 16.00 
Societal input 41.67 0 87.5 26.56 
# Staff (imputed) 30.80 7 67.9 18.21 
 
3. Assessment of outliers. 
 
A common method to assess the presence of outliers is through the calculation of DFBETA’s. This 
is a measure that can be calculated for each observation and is basically the difference between 
each of the regression coefficient calculated for the full sample and the regression coefficient 
calculated with the observation deleted. The cut-off value for DFBETAs is 2/sqrt(n), with n the 
number of observations. In the graph below, the cut-off values are indicated by the horizontal 
lines. Values outside this band warrant additional scrutiny.  The two observations within the 
ovals were also identified through qualitative follow-up interviews and were removed from the 
sample. 
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Appendix III: Topic list Interviews Trade Administration 
1. Human Capital – staff  
1. How many people are active within your sub-directorate general ?  
2. What is the average experience of staff within the sub-directorate general? 
3. What is the general profile of the staff employed? Tecnicos Comerciales y Economistas, 
diplomados comerciales del estado, other?  
 
2. Internal organization 
4. Could you describe the internal process that follows once the Commission expresses his 
intention to initiate a new trade proposal (E.g. launch a new trade agreement)?  
a. How are responsibilities assigned for such an initiative? Is responsibility 
assigned to one specific sub-directory or shared through a task-force?  
b. Who or which body assigns such a responsibility? 
c. Does some form of prioritization takes place at this stage?  
5. How do you ensure coherence across different policy initiatives? Internal coordination 
meetings, a policy plan/strategy?  
6. How do you determine the Spanish position in a given trade negotiation?  
a. Build on prior experience within the group? 
b. Do you perform an impact analysis of different alternative scenarios? 
c. Input from other ministries or departments? (which?) 
d. Reliance on private actors for input (sectoral organizations or individual firms) 
7. Does the intensity of these activities (information gathering and coordination) differ 
according to the stage of the negotiation? 
3. Interaction with Public actors 
In the previous section we briefly touched upon the role of expertise in other ministries for the 
formation of the Spanish position. Trade policy touches upon many areas that belong to the 
competency of other ministries.  
8. In which fora do you generally deal with potential conflicts?  
9. What is the frequency of such meetings?  
10. How are potential conflicts resolved?  
 
4. Interaction with Private actors  
11. Through which channels does consultation with societal actors take place? Does it take 
place on an ad-hoc basis or through rather structured meetings? 
12. How are these societal actors selected? If they come on their own account, how are they 
informed? 
13. What is the frequency of such contacts?  
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Appendix IV: Survey 2 – National trade officials 
1. For which country do you work: 
  
2. In which Ministry do you work:   
 
3. In which administrative unit are you currently employed ? (Unit refers to the directorate, sub-
directorate or unit that most accurately defines your work environment) ____________________________ 
 
4. Are you the head of this unit? YES  NO 
 
PART I: FORMULATING A POSITION ON TRADE ISSUES 
 
5. In preparing the position of your country on a trade issue, how frequently do you actively 
consult the following sources of information?  
 
Data- Source Never Very 
Rarely 
Rarely Regularly Frequently Very 
Frequently 
a. Own experience       
b. Economic data       
c. Colleagues from other units 
     ° within your ministry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ° outside your ministry       
d. Export promotion agency        
e. Your country’s embassies 
abroad 
      
f. Individual firms       
g. Sectoral business 
associations (e.g. car 
manufacturers, farmer’s union) 
      
h. Umbrella organizations (e.g. 
chambers of commerce) 
      
i. Civil Society Organizations 
(Labour unions or NGOs) 
      
j. Parliament (committees & 
parties) 
      
h. Minister ( including his 
private office or cabinet) 
      
i. Other       
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6. Which units – both within and outside your ministry- are actively involved in preparing your 
country’s trade position? List the ones with whom you interact most frequently in order of 
importance. 
 
 Unit Ministry 
1.   
2.   
3.   
 
 
7. Over the last six months, how often did you coordinate with other Ministries through: 
(Coordination involves sharing of information, circulating positions, voicing concerns and solving disputes) 
 Less than 
once every 
three months 
Every 
three 
months 
Each 
month 
Every two 
weeks 
Once a 
week 
Multiple 
times a 
week 
Roundtable meetings with all 
concerned ministries 
      
Personal meetings with the 
responsible line ministry 
      
Correspondence over an 
extensive e-mail list  
      
Correspondence with the 
responsible line ministry  
      
Meetings within an inter-
ministerial taskforce 
      
Trilateral discussions       
 
 
8. How often does it occur that the position as prepared by your unit is amended or adjusted by: 
 Never Very 
Rarely 
Rarely Regularly Frequently Very 
Frequently 
Other units within your 
ministry 
      
Other ministries       
Permanent representation       
The responsible minister or 
his/her personal advisors 
      
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PART II: INFORMATION ON YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT 
 
9. How many people in your unit work on European trade policy? 
  one (yourself)    
 between 2 and 5   
 between 5 and 10    
 between 10 and 20 
 more than 20   
 
10. Can you give an estimate of the total number of staff working on trade within your ministry? 
________ Staff members ( Full Time Equivalents)  
 
11. How much time do you generally devote to the following activities  
0= 0% of your time  –--  10 = 100% of your time 
 
(a) Processing information provided by the Commission & the Council 
(b) Consulting with domestic stakeholders  
(c) Defending your country’s position in Brussels 
(d) Coordination within and across ministries 
(e) (legal) Implementation & provision of public service  
(f) Other, non-trade related activities 
 
12. How would you rate the overall effectiveness of the training and development you have 
received in the last 12 months in terms of addressing the challenges you face on-the-job? 
 Very high   
 High    
 Moderate   
 Low    
 Very Low   
 No training received   
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13. Please evaluate the following statements: 
Statement Yes Yes, but Indifferent No, but No 
We receive little input from business 
organizations 
     
Interaction with private stakeholders occurs 
mostly on our initiative 
     
Private stakeholders lack the required expertise 
to provide useful input 
     
We face difficulties balancing our offensive and 
defensive interests  
     
 
14. I feel the quality of my work suffers because of … 
 Never Rarely Regularly Frequently Always Not 
Applicable 
Constantly changing political 
priorities 
      
Overly bureaucratic procedures       
Having to do the same or more 
work, but with fewer resources  
      
High staff turnover       
Increasingly complexity of trade 
issues 
      
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Appendix V: Questionnaire phone interviews 
Trade policy often touches upon the competencies of various ministries. My first questions are 
related to the involvement of such ministries when determining a position on trade and the 
internal coordination processes. 
 Q1.Which ministries in your country’s administration are regularly consulted on 
trade issues? Regularly means at least one a month. 
 Q2. How does coordination usually take place?  
o Bilateral or roundtable meetings? Importance of e-mail versus personal 
meetings? 
o Does the ministry select who to consult or can each ministry attend? 
o If personal meetings occur. How often do they occur and are these meetings 
formalised (e.g. a personal meeting a day before the TPC)?  
 Q3. Can you give a rough estimate of the total number of staff working on trade 
issues within your government? That implies trade officials in your own ministry 
and the experts from the ministries listed in Q1.  
In formulating a position, different challenges can be encountered. The following statements try 
to assess whether these challenges apply to your trade administration. 
 Q4. Please evaluate the following statements: 
Statement Yes Yes, but Indifferent No, but No 
a. We receive little input from business 
organizations 
     
b. Interaction with private stakeholders occurs 
mostly on our initiative 
     
c. Private stakeholders lack the required 
expertise to provide useful input 
     
d. We face difficulties balancing our offensive 
and defensive interests 
     
e. I feel the quality of my work suffers due to 
administrative hurdles 
     
f. I feel the quality of my work suffers because 
we have to do the same or more work, but with 
fewer resources 
     
I feel the quality of my work suffers because of 
high staff turnover 
     
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Executive Summary 
For the negotiation of international trade agreements, the Member States (MS) delegate 
negotiating authority to the European Commission but retain control through the Council of 
Ministers. While the treaty provisions provide the same control mechanisms to all MS, recent 
studies that inquired into the different tactics and strategies employed by national 
representatives in the different Council meetings have uncovered substantial variation among 
the MS. This evidently raises questions about the causes of this variation.  Why do some MS exert 
more control on the Commission-as-negotiator than others?  
The research presented in this dissertation seeks to contribute to this debate by presenting the 
thesis that such variation is determined by the performance of the national administration. The 
relation between administrative capacity and member states’ influence over the EU’s decision-
making process has only attracted cursory attention. While the literature of comparative public 
administration, negotiation theory and the principal-agent model has each touched upon the subject, 
gaps still persist. To provide a compelling answer, cross-fertilization between these different 
strands of literatures is necessary. In order to reap the identified synergies, the dissertation starts 
from the Principal-Agent model and argues that the Council can also be conceptualised as a 
multiplicity – rather than a collective- of principals. This implies that each MS has the ability to 
monitor, reward or sanction the Commission-as-agent independently during the negotiations.  
To study control (the dependent variable) in a context of multiple principals, a signalling 
approach was preferred over a focus on formal mechanisms of control. The conceptualisation of 
administrative capacity (the independent variable) is made in reference to the specific functions 
an administration performs. Applied to the EU’s external trade negotiations, two such tasks were 
identified i.e. monitoring what the Commission is negotiating on behalf of the MS (monitoring 
capacity) and deriving a nation’s interests within the negotiation (deriving capacity). The main 
thesis presented in this dissertation then posits that higher administrative capacity results in 
more frequent signalling of the Commission. 
Empirically, a mixed method design was applied to test this assertion. Both for the 
operationalization of the dependent and independent variable an exploratory qualitative stage 
was organised to foster greater understanding of the national and EU policy-making contexts. 
Interviews were conducted in four member states –Spain, Belgium, Estonia & Poland- and with 
senior officials in the EU institutions. Based on these insights, survey-instruments were 
developed and distributed among trade officials in the relevant working parties as well as in 
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national trade administrations. Participants of the different formations of the Trade Policy 
Committee filled in a survey on various signalling tactics they apply in an effort to control the 
Commission. In addition to the frequency by which the respondents signalled the Commission, 
data was also gathered on the stage in the negotiations at which such signalling takes place and 
the applied signalling strategies (bilateral or collective). To explain the uncovered variation, data 
on both monitoring and deriving capacity was gathered from national trade officials. Monitoring 
capacity covers the various sources of information a representative consults to be informed on 
the Commission’s actions. As trade officials consult a wider array of sources and with greater 
frequency, their monitoring capacity increases. With respect to deriving capacity, the gathered 
data covers three different traits of the policy network: the different actors involved, the available 
human resources and the coordination process by which the diverse interests are aggregated. 
Ultimately, data on twenty-two MS was gathered, forming a representative sample. 
Through bootstrapped regression analysis we could not reject the thesis that higher monitoring 
capacity leads to more control being exerted even when controlling for a MS’ size. The evidence 
was more opaque when it concerns deriving capacity. Here, input from societal actors and the 
available human resources showed a positive correlation with the signals emitted. Based on the 
data gathered, a relation between the coordination process and control could not be found. Next 
to finding a relation between administrative capacity and MS signalling, the dissertation also 
points to the importance of state-centric explanations of trade policy in light of limited societal 
input. Both the qualitative fieldwork in the member states as the survey data indicated that not 
all administrations have equal access to input from business organisations.  
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Sommaire 
Pour la négociation des accords commerciaux, les États membres (EM) donnent délégation à la 
Commission européenne. En même temps, ils gardent une forme de contrôle grâce à leur siège au 
sein du Conseil de l’Union européenne. Bien que les dispositions du traité fournissent les mêmes 
mécanismes de contrôle à tous les États membres, des études récentes mettent en évidence des 
différences significatives entre les États membres en ce qui concerne leurs activités au Conseil de 
l’UE. Ceci suscite évidemment des questions sur les causes de ces différences. Pourquoi certains 
EM exercent-t-ils plus de contrôle sur la Commission-comme-négociateur que d'autres?  
La recherche présentée dans cette thèse vise à alimenter ce débat en soutenant la thèse que cette 
variation est déterminée par la performance de l'administration nationale. La relation entre la 
capacité administrative des Etats membres et l’influence sur le processus de prise de décision de 
l'UE n'a attiré qu’une attention superficielle. La littérature relative à l'administration publique 
comparée, la théorie de la négociation et le modèle principal-agent a abordé le sujet. Des lacunes 
persistent cependant. Afin d’apporter une réponse convaincante, l’intégration de ces différents 
volets de la littérature est nécessaire. Pour valoriser les synergies identifiées, la thèse s'appuie sur 
le modèle principal-agent et fait valoir que le Conseil peut également être conceptualisé comme 
une multiplicité - plutôt qu’une collectivité- des principales. Cela implique que chaque État 
membre -comme principal- a la capacité de surveiller, récompenser ou sanctionner la 
Commission –comme agent- durant les négociations. Pour étudier ce contrôle (la variable 
dépendante) dans un contexte de multiples principales, une approche de signalisation a été 
préférée à une mise au point sur les mécanismes de contrôle officiels. La conceptualisation de la 
capacité administrative (la variable indépendante) est faite en référence aux fonctions spécifiques 
qu'une administration exécute. Une fois ce principe appliqué aux négociations commerciales 
extérieures de l'UE, deux de ces tâches ont été identifiées à savoir la surveillance de ce que la 
Commission est en train de négocier au nom de les EM (capacité de surveillance) et 
l’identification des intérêts de la nation dans cette négociation (capacité d’ identification). 
L’hypothèse principale présentée dans cette thèse postule alors que des capacités administratives 
plus élevées augmentent la fréquence d’émission des signaux à l’ égard de la Commission.  
Empiriquement, une conception de la méthode mixte a été utilisée pour tester cette hypothèse. 
Une phase qualitative exploratoire a été organisée tant pour l'opérationnalisation des variables 
dépendante et indépendante pour favoriser une meilleure compréhension des contextes 
politiques nationaux et européen. Les entrevues ont été menées dans quatre Etats membres-
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Espagne, Belgique, Estonie et Pologne-et avec des hauts fonctionnaires dans les institutions de 
l'UE. Sur la base de ces idées, les questionnaires ont été élaborés et distribués aux responsables 
du commerce dans les groupes de travail du Conseil concernés ainsi que dans les administrations 
nationales du commerce. Les participants aux différentes formations du Comité de la politique 
commerciale ont répondu à une enquête sur les tactiques de signalisation qu'ils appliquent pour 
contrôler la Commission. La fréquence avec laquelle les répondants ont donné des signaux, mais 
aussi les phases dans lesquelles se trouvaient les négociations ainsi que les stratégies de 
signalisation appliquées (bilatérales ou collectives) ont été relevés. Pour expliquer la variation 
découverte, des données à la fois sur la capacité de surveillance et celle d’identification ont été 
recueillies à partir de responsables nationaux du commerce. La capacité de surveillance couvre 
les différentes sources d'information qu'un représentant consulte en étant informé sur les actions 
de la Commission. Quand les responsables du commerce consultent un large éventail de sources, 
avec une plus grande fréquence, leur capacité de surveillance augmente. En ce qui concerne la 
capacité d’identification, les données recueillies couvrent trois caractères différents du réseau 
politique: les différents acteurs impliqués, les ressources humaines disponibles et le processus de 
coordination par lequel les divers intérêts sont synthétisés. En fin de compte, ce sont des données 
sur vingt-deux États membres qui ont été recueillies formant un échantillon représentatif.  
Grâce à l'analyse de régression à la méthode bootstrap nous ne pouvions pas rejeter la thèse selon 
laquelle une capacité de surveillance plus élevée conduit à un plus grand contrôle exercée même 
après contrôle de la taille d'un EM. La preuve est moins claire quand il s'agit de la capacité 
d’identification. Ici, les contributions des groupes d’intérêt et les ressources humaines 
disponibles ont montré une corrélation positive avec les signaux émis. Sur base des informations 
obtenues, une relation entre la manière de coordonner et le contrôle n'a pu être trouvée. La thèse 
souligne également l'importance d'explications centrées sur l'état de la politique commerciale. Le 
travail qualitatif sur le terrain dans les Etats membres et les données de l'enquête indiquent que 
toutes les administrations ne peuvent pas compter sur une contribution égale de leurs groupes 
d’intérêt. 
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Samenvatting 
Voor de onderhandeling van internationale handelsakkoorden delegeren de lidstaten  
onderhandelingsbevoegdheid aan de Europese Commissie. Terzelfdertijd behouden ze enige 
controle door hun zetel in de Raad van Ministers. Hoewel de verdragsbepalingen voor iedere 
lidstaat dezelfde controlemechanismen voorzien, hebben recente studies aangetoond dat de 
lidstaten onderling sterk verschillen in de mate waarin ze zich laten gelden binnen de raad van 
ministers. Dit roept uiteraard vragen op over de oorzaken van deze variatie. Waarom oefenen 
sommige lidstaten meer controle uit over de Commissie-als-onderhandelaar dan anderen? 
Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift beoogt een bijdrage aan dit debat te leveren door de stelling te 
poneren dat deze variatie een gevolg is van het functioneren van de nationale administratie. De 
relatie tussen de bestuurlijke capaciteit en de invloed die lidstaten over het 
besluitvormingsproces van de Europese Unie (EU) uitoefenen heeft slechts beperkte aandacht 
gekregen. Terwijl de literatuur van de vergelijkende bestuurskunde, onderhandelingstheorie en 
het principaal-agent model hun licht lieten schijnen over deelaspecten van deze vraag, bleven er 
grote lacunes bestaan. Om een deftig antwoord te geven, is een kruisbestuiving tussen deze 
verschillende onderdelen van de literatuur noodzakelijk.  
Teneinde de geïdentificeerde synergieën te benutten, vertrekt het proefschrift van het principaal-
agent model en wordt er geargumenteerd dat de Raad ook kan worden opgevat als een veelvoud 
- in plaats van een collectiviteit- van principalen. Dit houdt in dat iedere lidstaat vanuit zijn 
hoedanigheid als principaal over de mogelijkheid beschikt om de Commissie te observeren, te 
belonen of te bestraffen tijdens de onderhandelingen. Om controle (de afhankelijke variabele) in 
een context van meerdere principalen te bestuderen, verkoos ik de de conceptualisering van 
controle als het sturen van signalen boven een focus op formele controlemechanismen. De 
conceptualisering van bestuurlijke capaciteit (de onafhankelijke variabele) is bepaald in functie 
van de specifieke taken die een administratie uitvoert. Toegepast op het externe handelsbeleid, 
werden twee dergelijke functies geïdentificeerd, met name het observeren van wat de Commissie 
onderhandelt namens de lidstaten (observatiecapaciteit) en het identificeren van de belangen van 
een land binnen de onderhandelingen (identificatiecapaciteit). De voornaamste hypothese in dit 
proefschrift stelt dat hogere administratieve capaciteit resulteert in het frequenter signaleren van 
de Commissie.  
Empirisch werd een ‘mixed method’ ontwerp uitgewerkt om deze stelling te onderzoeken. Een 
verkennende kwalitatieve fase vond plaats om meer inzicht te verwerven in het nationale en  
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Europese beleidsvormingsproces. Interviews werden uitgevoerd in vier lidstaten -Spanje, België, 
Estland en Polen-en met ambtenaren in de EU-instellingen. Op basis van deze inzichten, werden 
survey-instrumenten ontwikkeld en verspreid onder de vertegenwoordigers in de betrokken 
raadswerkgroepen, alsmede in de nationale handelsadministraties. De deelnemers van de 
verschillende formaties van het Comité Handelspolitiek vulden een enquête in over de frequentie 
waarin ze verschillende signaleringstactieken gebruiken. Daarenboven werd ook informatie 
verzameld over de stadia van het onderhandelingsproces waarin dergelijke tactieken gebruikt 
worrden evenals de geprefereerde signaleringsstrategie (bilateraal of collectief). Om de gevonden 
variatie te verklaren, werden respondenten in de nationale handelsadministraties bevraagd over 
hun observatie- en identificatiecapaciteit. Observatiecapaciteit werd geoperationaliseerd door de 
mate waarin vertegenwoordigers diverse informatiebronnen consulteren. Hoe breder het scala 
aan bronnen en hoe frequenter deze bronnen geconsulteerd worden, hoe groter de 
observatiecapaciteit. Met betrekking tot de identificatiecapaciteit, dekken de verzamelde 
gegevens drie verschillende kenmerken van het beleidsnetwerk: de veelheid aan actoren die 
betrokken zijn in het formuleren van een positie, de beschikbare personeelsmiddelen en de 
performantie van het coördinatieproces. Uiteindelijk werden gegevens over tweeëntwintig 
lidstaten verzameld wat resulteert in een representatieve steekproef.  
De stelling dat hogere observatiecapaciteit leidt tot meer controle konden we niet verwerpen op 
basis van een gebootstrapt regressie-model. Zelfs na controle voor de grootte van een lidstaat zijn 
de resultaten significant. De resultaten waren minder duidelijk als het gaat over het effect van 
identificatiecapaciteit. Hier toonden de inbreng van maatschappelijke actoren en het beschikbare 
personeel een positieve correlatie met de signalen die worden uitgezonden. Op basis van de 
verzamelde gegevens kon er echter geen effect gevonden worden van het coördinatie proces  op 
de uitgeoefende controle. Naast het vinden van een relatie tussen de bestuurlijke capaciteit en de 
controle uitgeoefend door de lidstaten benadrukt het proefschrift ook het belang van statelijke 
verklaringen van het handelsbeleid. Zowel het kwalitatieve veldwerk in de lidstaten als de 
enquêtegegevens tonen aan dat niet alle administraties evenzeer kunnen rekenen op de inbreng 
van maatschappelijke actoren. 
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